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Abstract 
The liberalization of the EC telecommunications market has, from the 
beginning, been based on a dual-regime of sector-specific regulation and 
competition law. One of the areas where the interrelation between these two 
sets of rules is most obvious is that of access to telecommunications 
networks. 
The material in this thesis is up to date as of the 31 51 July, 2004. This thesis 
examines the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) as the competition law 
principle which deals with access of new market entrants to established 
facilities and, in the case of telecommunications, networks. This examination 
leads to the conclusion that if there is an EFD in EC law, it should be applied 
with extreme caution. 
The thesis then examines the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications, with a particular emphasis on the framework for access 
and interconnection, and concludes that EC competition law has acquired a 
prevailing role in the context of regulation of telecommunications .. The reform 
of regulation of electronic communications that is so profoundly inspired by 
competition law principles, marks a previously unattained level of mutual 
interaction between regulation and EC antitrust law. 
Concerning the viability of this dual regime of competition law and regulation, 
the thesis comes to the conclusion that before sustainable competition has 
been established, a certain degree of sector-specific regulation has to be 
upheld. Phasing-out sector-specific regulation too early by relying solely on 
competition law would create considerable risks for both new entrants and 
incumbent operators. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chap~er 1: ~ntroduction 
The deadline for the implementation of the new regulatory framework for 
electronic communications expired on 251h July 2003. This has been the 
latest step in the evolution of the telecommunications sector into a highly 
competitive and dynamic market. 
The liberalization of EC telecommunications (telecoms) has been successful 
and has contributed to an accelerated growth rate, reduced tariffs and market 
entry by a considerable number of new entrants. Telecoms services have 
become the fastest growing sector of the European economy. The estimated 
growth of the telecoms sector in 2003 was between 3.7% and 4.7%, 
compared to a forecast rate of EU GOP growth of 0.8% (3% in nominal 
terms). 1 The combined national markets of the then 15 Member States were 
worth an estimated 251 billion euros in 2003.2 
In an information-based service economy such as the EU, the quick and 
efficient transfer of information is essential. Fixed or mobile telephones and 
the Internet all reduce distance, enabling everybody to access information. 
Similarly, telecoms make it possible for companies to be more efficiently 
managed and to access consumers more effectively. After an exceptional 
'boom' in 1998-2000, the telecoms sector underwent a major crisis at the 
beginning of the new century. Because of heavy investments at the end of 
the preceding decade, many new market entrants simply disappeared, and 
established market operators were left with huge debts.3 However, according 
to the Commission's latest Report on the Implementation of the EU electronic 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 91h Report on 
the Implementation of the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package, COM (2003) 
715 final (91h Implementation Report). The new report has not been published yet. 
2 ibid. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Electronic 
Communications: The Road to the Knowledge Economy, COM (2003) 65 final 
~ 
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Communications Regulatory Package,4 the sector is now on its way to 
recovery. 5 Improved financial conditions, combined with continued growth in 
the revenue from services, have created the conditions for the sector to 
recover. 6 In 2003, the sector experienced a modest rate of expansion with 
revenues having increased by 2.6%, most of which can be attributed to the 
services sector: in particular, mobile services as well as broadband7 and 
Internet services.8 
The information and communication sectors had previously begun 
converging rapidly. The new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications tries to adapt telecoms regulation to the changed economic 
environment. In its communication, "Connecting Europe at High Speed", the 
Commission pointed out that the late or incorrect transposition by Member 
States of the new regulatory framework is holding back competition and 
creating uncertainty, so full implementation remains a top priority for 2004.9 
This is particularly true for the new Member States, which must bring their 
telecoms sectors, and their wider economies, more closely into line with 
those of the existing Member States. 10 In early October 2003, the 
Commission launched infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC 
against several Member States for late transposition of the new regulatory 
framework. 11 
In January 2004, the Commission proposed a Directive on services in the 
Internal Market. 12 While not specifically dealing with issues covered by the 
new regulatory framework, the removal of barriers to service provision will 
benefit all users of services, including those in the telecoms sector. 
4 in the interest of clarity, the following nomenclature will be used consistently throughout this 
thesis: The Commission (the EC Commission); the ECJ (the European Court of Justice); the 
CFI (the Court of First Instance) 
5supra n.1, p. 4 
6Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions- Connecting 
Europe at High Speed: Recent developments in the Sector for Electronic Communications, 
COM (2004)61 final, p.4 
7By October 2003 there were nearly 20 million broadband connections in Europe, however 
broadband growth in the best performing Member States shows signs of levelling off. (supra 
n.5, p. 4-5) 
8 ibid., p.4 
9ibid. 
10ibid. 
11 see Press Release, I P/03/1750, 17 December 2003 
12COM (2004)2, see also Commission Press Release IP/04/37 
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The implementation of the new regulatory framework has rekindled the 
debate concerning how best to achieve sustainable competition in the 
telecoms market: either through the application of sector-specific regulation 
or the usage of general EC competition rules, in particular Articles 81 and 82 
EC. This debate has occupied telecoms policies from the beginning. 
The EU has been regulating the telecoms sector since the late 1980s, with 
full liberalization of services and infrastructures achieved in January 1998. 
From the start, the liberalization process has been based on a close 
interaction between sector-specific regulation and competition law. General 
competition rules and principles, developed by the Commission or the 
Community Courts under competition law, have had significant influence on 
sector-specific regulation in the telecoms sector. These general competition 
rules, complementing sector-specific regulation, are fully applicable, 
especially to dominant operators. This approach has been highly successful 
and has ensured the establishment of effective competition in EC telecoms 
markets. However, the liberalization process has not yet reached the stage 
where it is possible to forego sector-specific regulation altogether and rely 
solely on competition rules. Some markets are still not fully competitive and 
some may never reach the stage of full competition. Nevertheless, the 
application of sector-specific regulation has to be adjusted, preparing the 
sector for a time when markets are fully competitive, sector-specific 
regulation can be phased out, and the competition rules alone will be 
applicable. Thus, the new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications was established, marking a new step in the relationship 
between sector-specific regulation and competition law, with the latter taking 
a predominant role for the first time. The new framework applies ex ante 
regulatory intervention, using concepts and principles taken directly from 
standard competition law theory and practice. 
One area of the telecoms sector in which this interaction between competition 
law and regulation is particularly apparent is that of access to and 
interconnection of networks. Despite the full liberalization of the telecoms 
sector from January 1998, incumbent operators still occupy dominant 
positions in most areas of the sector. This is particularly true for the area of 
local access, also called the "local loop". As duplication of these 
infrastructures is not, in most cases, viable, new entrants into the market are 
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dependent on access to the incumbents' networks to provide (new) services 
to end-users. As the incumbents· have no inherent interest in sharing their 
networks with potential competitors, a certain degree of regulation is 
indispensable to allow the telecom market to become competitive. The 
question is, whether such issues should be resolved under Article 82 EC, and 
in particular the Essential Facilities Doctrine, or whether they should better be 
dealt with under a sector-specific regime. 
This thesis will analyse the relationship between Article 82 EC (as one of the 
major rules of general competition law) on the one hand, and sector-specific 
regulation in the EC telecoms sector on the other. It will focus on the area of 
network access. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 will give a general introduction 
to the telecoms industry and telecoms policies in the EC. It will start with a 
summary of the main stages of the liberalization process, pointing out the 
influence of general competition law on this process. It will then explain the 
importance of access policies and give a brief summary of some of the 
economic features of the telecoms sector which may make a certain degree 
of sector-.specific regulation indispensable. Chapter 3 analyses the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine (EFD) as the major concept in EC competition law dealing 
with access issues under Article 82 EC. In Chapter 4, the thesis will deal with 
the Commission's 1998 Access Notice, in which the competition law concept 
of essential facilities has found its most explicit formulation and is applied to 
access issues particular to the telecoms sector. Chapter 5 will examine the 
new regulatory framework for access and interconnection and will determine 
how far this has been influenced by competition law principles developed 
under Article 82 EC. The final chapter will conclude on the interrelation 
between competition law and sector-specific regulation, and on whether one 
should prevail over the other in the EC telecoms sector. 
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Chap~err 2: Genera! ~ntroduc~ion ~o EC 
Te~ecommun~cations 
1. The term "teiecommunications" 
The telecommunications market is characterized by the provision of 
telecommunications services on the one hand and the provision of 
telecommunications networks on the other. 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services 1 defined "telecommunications services" as 
"services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and 
routing of signals on the public telecommunications network by means of 
telecommunications processes, with the exception of radio-broadcasting and 
television. "2 
"Public telecommunications network" was defined as "the public 
telecommunications infrastructure which permits the conveyance of signals 
between defined network termination points by wire, by microwave, by optical 
means or by other electromagnetic means." 3 
The new Framework Directive4 uses the broader terms "electronic 
communications network" and "electronic communications services". 
The "electronic communications network" is defined as "transmission systems 
and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources 
which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by 
electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed and mobile 
terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used 
for the purpose of transmitting, networks used for radio and television 
1Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of June 28, 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services (Services Directive) (1990)0.J. L 192/10 
2ibid., Art.1 
3ibid. 
4European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/21/EC of March 7, 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive) (2002) O.J. L 108/33 
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broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of 
information conveyed."5 
"Electronic communications service" is defined as "a service normally 
provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance 
of signals on electronic communications networks, including 
telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control 
over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and 
services; it does not include information society services, as defined in Article 
1 of Directive 98/34/EC, which do not exist wholly or mainly in the 
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks."6 
2.Telecommunications 1n the EU: From legai 
monopoly to full competition 
The liberalization of the EU telecommunications market, compared to that of 
other countries such as Japan7 and the US,8 has been relatively slow, and 
has been conducted in a piecemeal fashion. It was only in 1987 that the 
Commission, in its Green Paper on Telecommunications, 9 set out a 
comprehensive policy framework for EU action in the telecommunications 
sector. Until then, telephone companies were government-owned 
monopolies. 
The EU telecommunications liberalization process can be divided into a 
number of stages, starting with the above-mentioned 1987 Green Paper 
( 1988-1996), that foresaw at the time full liberalization of equipment, 
5 ibid., Art. 2(a) 
6 ibid., Art.2(c) 
7 In Japan, the Telecommunications Business Law of 1985 liberalized most 
telecommunications markets ( see T. Kiessling I Y. Blondeel, The EU regulatory framework 
in telecommunications, (1998) 22(7) Telecommunications Policy ,571, p.571) 
8 In the US the first license to compete for public switched long-distance services was 
granted to MCI in 1969, and in 1980 the market for long distance service was effectively 
liberalized (see Kiessling/ Blondeel, p. 571) 
9 
"Towards a Dynamic Economy- Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market 
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment"(1987 Green Paper) COM (1987) 290 
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terminals and "value-added services". 10 This was followed by a transitional 
review period of the 1992 Review11 and the 1994 Green Paper12 (1996-1997) 
which led to the full liberalization of the telecommunications market on 1 
January 1998. By the end of the 1990s, building on the Information Society 
concept13 developed in the EU during the mid-1990s, the EU had started a 
convergence debate that resulted in the new package of Directives on 
Electronic Communications adopted in February 2002. This current 
framework is characterised by a previously-unattained level of mutual 
interaction between regulation and competition law as the basis for future 
regulation of the sector, particularly with regard to the use of market 
definitions and the concept of dominant positions as developed under 
competition law. 
There follows a brief summary of the development of EU telecommunications 
(telecoms) markets and regulation, from before the 1987 Green Paper to the 
present. As indicated, this development has resulted in a dual regime based 
on sector-specific regulation and the application of EC competition rules. 
2.1 Pre-1987: The time of state monopolies 
Until the early 1980s, the importance of the telecoms sector was not reflected 
in Community law. The telecoms markets in almost all Member States were 
monopolies, usually consisting of one service and infrastructure provider 
(Public Telecoms Operator or 'PTO'): the PTO was either wholly or partly 
owned by the Member State, or fully integrated within the government, as an 
administrative department or agency. 14 The only exception at the time was 
10
"Value added services" or "enhanced services" are, for example, email, voice mail, online 
information and database services. 
11 1992 Review of the situation in the telecommunications sector, (1992 Review), SEC (92) 
1048 final. 
12Published in two parts: Part 1- Principles and Timetable, , COM (94) 440 final and Part II- A 
common approach to the provision of infrastructures for telecommunications in the European 
Union, , COM (94) 682 final (the Infrastructure Green Paper) 
13The general idea underlying the concept of the Information Society required new legal 
measures for the information sector. An Action Plan (COM (94) 347 final) established a 
framework for necessary action, by developing the concept of the Information Society, at the 
centre of which stood the accelerated liberalisation of telecommunications. 
14P.Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, (Oxford 
2000), p.2 
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the UK, which had partially liberalized its telecommunications market 1n 
1983. 15 
The only alternative to using services provided by PTOs was the 'in-house' 
provision of telecoms services: this was only possible for the largest telecoms 
customers (multinational corporations, banking and insurance sector 
companies, government departments etc.). As PTOs usually held a monopoly 
over the infrastructure, 'in-house' provision involved first leasing the required 
capacity from PTOs, and then installing a customer's own equipment in order 
to provide the desired telecoms services. In practice, the cost of leasing lines, 
in particular cross-border lines, was so high within the EC that 'in-house' 
provision was a very costly alternative. 16 
It was generally assumed that the telecoms sector was an instance of a 
natural monopoly, i.e. it was assumed that a single entity could offer all 
modern communications at a lower cost than a number of competing 
suppliers. 17 A monopoly was assumed to result in a larger supply of 
innovation, due to economies of scale and scope in research and 
development. A more competitive market structure was thought to result in a 
slower rate of technological innovation. Several networks were thought to 
cause confusion and duplication of resources. Telecoms regulation was 
advocated as a method of achieving certain broad social benefits, such as 
universal services, which would not otherwise be available or easily 
achievable. The market was characterized by vertical integration between 
PTOs and equipment suppliers, which made it difficult for new competitors to 
enter the market. 18 
2.2 The inception of the EU telecommunications liberalization 
process: The 1987 Green Paper 
However, it soon became apparent that legal monopolies in the area of 
telecoms prevented the development of a sector which was of growing 
15ibid. 
16V.Jer6nimo, Telecommunications and competition in the European Union, Third ECSA 
World Conference, A Selection of Conference Papers, p.2 
17ibid. 
18ibid. 
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economic importance. The European telecoms industry was suffering from 
market fragmentation, which in turn prevented it from reaping the benefits of 
economies of scale. Lagging behind the US and Japan, which had liberalized 
their telecoms markets, it became obvious that deregulation and introduction 
of competition were indispensable factors to encourage innovation and 
investment in the sector and to make sure that consumers could benefit fully 
from the technological revolution taking place worldwide. 19 In particular, the 
transformation of the US market as a result of the AT&T divesture agreement 
could be felt in Europe.20 The liberalization of the telecoms sector in the UK, 
with the privatization of British Telecom, also made Europe more open to the 
idea of liberalization and deregulation.21 In addition, the recognition of 
significant direct and indirect costs to society from government regulation 
pushed the sector towards a competitive approach, as well as increasing the 
demand for telecommunication services from large customers. 22 
Irreversible forces, such as technological advancements, contributed the 
most to the dismantling of the regulated monopoly paradigm. By the end of 
the 1980s, the growing digitalisation began to transform European 
telecommunications networks into "multipurpose information 
infrastructures".23 The traditional technical distinction between voice and data 
networks could no longer be upheld as, in most cases, they actually occupied 
the same physical facilities. This growing interdependence of computers and 
telecommunications brought companies such as IBM, Siemens and Apple to 
the telecoms industry.24 As a result, non-voice services could be provided at 
lower cost through a variety of access mediums, such as cable television, the 
Internet, private networks, satellite etc. and by a corresponding variety of 
service providers. 
The opening up of the telecoms market to competition was unavoidable. This 
was confirmed and facilitated by the landmark ECJ judgement in Bntish 
19 J.-D.Braun/R.Capito, The Emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a New Self-
Standing Field within Community Law, Chapter 2 in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, EC Competition 
and Telecommunications Law,(The Hague, 2002), p.51 
20H. Ungerer, Ensuring efficient access to bottleneck facilities. The case of 
telecommunication in the European Union (Florence 1998), p.3 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23H. Ungerer, EU competition law in the telecommunications, media and information 
technology sectors, (1995) Fordham Corp. L. I., 465 ff., p.471 
24 ibid. 
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Telecommunications, 25 i n which the Court confirmed that EC competition 
rules applied to the telecoms sector. The combination of these factors led the 
Commission to issue, in 1987, its Telecommunications Green Paper,26 which 
envisaged a number of changes in EU telecoms, including: 
- The progressive opening of the market for telecommunications 
services, especially value-added services, with the exception of public 
voice telephony. As will be seen later, EU competition law played an 
essential role in this area. 
- The promotion of European-wide services through standardization. 
- The development of a Community-wide market for terminal 
equipment. 
- The development of conditions permitting competition on an "equal 
footing", including, for example, the separation of regulatory and 
operational functions where these were under a single 
administration.27 As a result, the telecoms sectors of the Member 
States underwent a profound organizational reform, leading to the 
transformation of state PTO companies into normal companies, and 
finally privatization. 
Most importantly, in the context of the present discussion, the 
Green Paper envisaged harmonized access conditions. 
The Commission's policy proposals were largely approved by the Council of 
Telecommunications Ministers, which adopted a resolution voicing its general 
support for the Commission's strategy.28 Two separate strands of legislative 
initiatives followed: Commission-initiated measures aimed at the liberalization 
of telecoms equipment and services and (later) infrastructure; and Council-
initiated measures aimed at the harmonization of laws and regulation in 
Member States, to ensure open access to telecommunications services and 
networks. This dual approach, involving liberalization and harmonization, has 
been described as the "basic dualism" of EC telecoms law.29 
25C- 41/83, Italy v. Commission, [1985] ECR 873 
26supra n. 19 
27Council Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment up to 1992, OJ C 257, , p.1 
28ibid. 
29 Braun/ Capito, Chapter 2 in Koenig/ Bartosch,/Braun ,p.64 
Chapter 2: General Introduction to EC Telecommunications 11 
2.3 On the way to full competition 
2.3.1 Regulation 
There are basically two different types of regulation. One type aims to protect 
public interests, such as universal service, safety, protection of privacy, 
protection of the environment etc. These rules are of a non-economic nature 
and therefore have little in common with competition rules. They are, more or 
less, applied independently of competition law.30 
On the other hand, there is economic regulation, which deals with matters 
such as price control and network access regulation. It function is twofold: 
firstly, it seeks to abolish monopolies and introduce competition; secondly, it 
has to make sure that competition continues to exist. The latter function 
interacts with competition law?1 In this thesis, the term "regulation" will refer 
to economic regulation. 
a. Liberalization 
The objective of liberalization is to abolish monopoly and other special rights 
of incumbent operators and to introduce competition in those monopolized 
markets.32 The liberalization of the EC telecommunications market was a 
gradual process, starting in 1988 with the Telecommunications Terminal 
Equipment Directive 88/301/EEC,33 which opened the market for telecoms 
equipment to competition. According to the Directive, special or exclusive 
rights for the importation, marketing, connection, bringing into service and 
maintenance of telecoms terminal equipment must be withdrawn by the 
3
°K.W. Grewlich, "Cyberspace: Sector-specific regulation and competition rules in European 
telecommunications,(1999) 36 CMLRev,937, p.983 
31 L. Garzaniti, Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law 
&Regulation, (London, 2003), p.538 
32 Jeronimo, p.5 
33Commission Directive 881301 /EEC of may 16, 1988 on competition in the markets in 
telecommunications terminal equipment, (Terminal Equipment Directive) (1988) OJ L 131/73, 
amended by Commission Directive 94/46/EC amending Directive 88/3017EEC and Directive 
90/308/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications [1994] OJ L268/15 
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Member States.34 This brought an end to the monopolies enjoyed by 
incumbent operators over the attachment of equipment to their networks. The 
reasons for imposing conditions on the provision of terminal equipment were 
limited to a small number of essential requirements. These essential 
requirements were : user safety; the safety of employees and of public 
telecommunications network operators; protection of public 
telecommunications networks form harm; and the interworking of terminal 
equipment. 
This was followed in 1990 by the Services Directive 90/388/EEC35 which 
provided for the withdrawal of all exclusive rights from telecommunications 
operators, except for voice telephonl6 , telex, mobile, paging and satellite 
services - the so-called "reserved services". It was argued that a sudden 
opening of the market would have threatened the financial stability of the 
incumbent national telephone organisations and their ability to provide 
universal service, as they relied on voice telephony as their major source of 
income.37 
Member States were required to ensure that operational and regulatory 
functions would be carried out by separate, independent entities. The 
Directive provided that the power to grant operating licences, to control type 
approval and mandatory interface specifications, to allocate frequencies and 
to monitor the conditions of use should be vested in bodies independent of 
the incumbent national operators, so-called National Regulatory Authorities 
("NRAs"). 38 There was a fear that the continued exercise of regulatory 
functions by the incumbent operators would lead to discrimination against 
new market entrants, in favour of the incumbent's operations, constituting a 
major obstacle to the introduction of competition in the telecoms market. 
Again, restrictions on the provision of services could only be imposed if they 
constituted so-called "essential requirements". 39 
34 ibid., Art. 6 
35supra n.1 
36
"Voice telephony" was defined as "the commercial provision for the public of the direct 
transport and switching of speech in real time between public switched network termination 
points, enabling any user to use equipment connected to such a network termination point in 
order to communicate with another termination point" (Services Directive, supra n.1, Art. 1) 
37Garzaniti, (2003), p.4 
38 supa n.1, Art. 7 
39Security of network operations, maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of 
services, data protection 
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The scope of the Services Directive has been gradually enlarged by: new 
directives dealing with satellite communications (Directive 94/46/EC or "the 
Satellite Directive"40); the use of cable television networks for the provision of 
telecommunications services (Directive 95/51/EEC or "the Cable 
Directive"41 ); and mobile and personal communications (Directive 96/2/EC or 
"the Mobile Directive"42). The Services Directive did not initially address the 
ownership of infrastructure, which remained in most countries the preserve of 
the incumbent national operator.43 However, a Review44 carried out in 1992, 
led to an agreement on full liberalization of the EU telecoms market, including 
public voice telephony and telecoms network infrastructure. The Review 
provided for, inter alia, the full liberalization of public telephone services by 1 
January 1998 and the publication of a Green Paper on Network Infrastructure 
Liberalization. The Infrastructure Green Paper45 led to the inclusion of the 
liberalization of telecoms network infrastructure within the 1 January 1998 
schedule. 
Finally, Directive 96/19/EC ( the "Full Competition Directive"46) extended the 
scope of the Services Directive to public voice telephony services, and 
required Member States to fully liberalize the provision of network 
infrastructure by 1 January 1998 (with transition periods for some Member 
States47). 
4
°Commission Directive 94/46/EC amending Directive 88/301 and Directive 90/388 in 
particular with regard to satellite communications, (1994) OJ L268/15 
1Commission Directive 95/51/EC amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to abolition of 
restrictions in the use of cable TV networks for the provision of already liberalised 
telecommunications services, (1995) OJ L256/49 
42Commission Directive 96/19/EC amending Directive 90/388/EEC with a view to opening up 
the mobile and personal communications market to competition, (1996) OJ L20/59 
4~he Cable Directive (Directive 95751/EC) began the process of infrastructure liberalisation 
by abolishing restrictions on the use of cable networks for the provision of already liberalised 
telecommunications services 
44supra n. 11 
45supra n.12 
46Commission Directive 96/19/EC of March 13, 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, [1996] OJ L 
74/13 
47 
until 2000 for Luxembourg and 2003 for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Luxembourg 
agreed to introduce full competition by 1 July 1998, Spain by 30 November 1998, Portugal by 
1 January 2000 and Greece by 31 December 2000 
Chapter 2: General Introduction to EC Telecommunications 14 
b. Harmonisation 
The liberalization measures were accompanied by complementary 
harmonization measures, adopted by the Council. These harmonization 
measures provided for the gradual harmonization, on a Community-wide 
basis, of the conditions for access and use of public telecommunications 
networks and services. The first harmonization directive, the Open Network 
Provision ('ONP') Framework Directive,48 was adopted on the same day as 
the Services Directive,49 which underlines the "basic dualism" on which the 
EU telecoms regulatory system is based (see above). It aimed to preventing 
the national incumbent telecoms operators from using their monopoly control 
of infrastructure to inhibit the liberalization of the services market. The ONP 
Framework Directive stipulated that access to public telecommunications 
services had to be provided on the basis of non-discriminatory, objective and 
transparent conditions published in an appropriate manner.5° Furthermore, it 
was explicitly stated that ONP conditions must not restrict access to public 
telecommunications networks or services, except for reasons based on 
"essential requirements", similar to those set out in the Services Directive. 51 
The ONP Framework Directive was supplemented by a series of subsequent 
harmonization directives, applying ONP principles to specific areas, such as 
leased lines52 and voice telephony.53 In order to take account of the newly 
competitive environment, the ONP Framework Directive and the Leased 
Lines Directive were amended in 1997 by a European Parliament and 
Council Directive (Directive 97/51/EC or "the ONP Amending Directive"54). 
48Council Directive 90/387/EEC of June 28, 1990 on the establishment of the internal market 
for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (ONP 
Framework Directive) (1990) OJ L 192/1 
49 supra n.1 
50 supra n.48, Art.3 (1) 
51 ibid., Art. 3(2) 
52Council Directive 92/44/EEC on the application of open network provisions to leased lines, 
~1992] OJ L295/23 (ONP Leased Lines Directive) 
3Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the application of open 
network provision to voice telephony, [1995] OJ L321/16 (ONP Voice Telephony Directive) 
54 Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and Council amending Council Directives 
907387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in 
telecommunications, [1997] OJ L 295/23 (ONP Amending Directive) 
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Similarly, Directive 95/62/EC on voice telephony has been replaced by 
Directive 98/1 O/EC.55 
In response to the changing competitive environment in the sector, the 
Review carried out in 1992 led, inter alia, to an agreement by the Council to 
adjust the ONP framework to fully-liberalized market conditions and to 
establish a regulatory framework for interconnection and access to services 
and networks.56 Since the telecoms infrastructure in Europe had developed 
as a set of interconnected networks, owned and operated by many different 
organisations, the importance of interconnection was increasing rapidly. 57 
The aim of the ONP Interconnection Directive was to secure the 
interconnection of networks and the interoperability of services.58 Member 
States were required to remove all restrictions on the ability of service 
providers to negotiate interconnection. 59 Organizations authorised to provide 
networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services had a right 
and an obligation to negotiate interconnection with other operators or service 
providers.60 Operators with Significant Market Power61 (SMP) were required 
to meet all reasonable requests for access to their networks, including access 
at points other than network termination points offered to the majority of users 
(so-called "special network access"). 52 The Directive was amended in1998,63 
requiring the introduction by 1 January 2000 of fixed-link number portability64 
55Directive 98/1 0/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the application of open 
network provision to voice telephony and on universal service in a competitive environment, 
~1998] OJ L 101/24 
6Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through 
application of the principles of open network provision, [1997] OJ L 199/32 (ONP 
Interconnection Directive) 
57 G. Knieps, Regulatory reform of European telecommunications: Past experience and 
forward-looking perspectives, (2001), 2 E.B.O.R.,641, p.648 
58 supra n.56, Art.1 
59 ibid.,Art.3(1) 
60 ibid.,Art.4(1) 
61 According to Article 4 (3) of the ONP Interconnection Directive (supra n.56), SMP was 
presumed for any operator with a market share greater than 25% of a particular telecoms 
market in a given geographic area of a Member State within which it is authorised to operate. 
62supra n. 56, Art.4(2) 
63Directive 98/61/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 
97/33/EC with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection, (1998) OJ L 
268/37 
64Art.1 (2) of Directive 98/61/EC provides:" National Regulatory Authorities shall encourage 
the earliest possible introduction of number portability whereby subscribers who so request 
can retain their number(s) on the fixed public telephone network and the integrated services 
digital network (ISDN) independent of the organisation providing service ... " 
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and, in the case of SMP operators, carrier pre-selection.65 In 1997, a common 
framework was also established for the granting of telecommunications 
service authorisations and individual licences. 56 
Although an initial attempt was made to establish a clear distinction between 
harmonization and liberalization measures, this distinction has become 
increasingly blurred. An example of this is Article 4a(3) subsection 2 of the 
Services Directive 90/388/EEC,67 which sets up comparatively detailed 
requirements for the decisions that National Regulatory Authorities can adopt 
in an interconnection dispute. The more natural place for such a provision 
would have been the ONP Interconnection Directive. 68 
c. Legal Basis 
One of the main reasons for the liberalization process is the EU aim of the 
establishment of an internal market: "a market based on competition and free 
circulation of goods, services, people and capital is at odds with systems 
based on national monopolies."69 However, the principle of undistorted 
competition (Article 3(g) EC) has also contributed considerably to the 
liberalization process.70 The justification provided in the recitals of both the 
Terminal Equipment Directive71 and the Services Directive72 built on the 
provisions of the Treaty concerning the freedom to provide services as well 
as the competition rules. In the Terminal Equipment Directive, for example, 
the Commission argued that special or exclusive rights for the provision of 
65 Art.1 (3) of Directive 98/61/EC provides: "National Regulatory Authorities shall require at 
least organisations operating public telecommunications networks ... and notified by national 
regulatory authorities as organisations having significant market power, to enable their 
subscribers ... to access the switched services of any interconnected provider of publicly 
available telecommunications services. For this purpose facilities shall be in place by 1 
January 2000 at the latest ... which allow the subscribe to choose these services by means of 
pre-selection with a facility to override any pre-selected choice on a call-by-call basis by 
dialling a short prefix." 
66Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the common framework for 
general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services, 
~1997) OJ L 177/15 
7supra n.1 
68supra n. 56; Braun/Capita, Chapter 2, Koenig/ Bartosch/ Braun, p.59 
69 A. Bavasso, , Communications in EU Antitrust Law: Market Power and Public Interest, , 
(The Hague, 2003), p.43 
70 ibid. 
71 supra n. 33 
72supra n.1 
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terminal equipment prevented users from choosing the equipment that best 
suited their needs, thus constituting an infringement of Articles 30 and 37 EC 
(now Articles 28 and 31 EC). 73 Equally important, special or exclusive rights 
for the maintenance of terminal equipment are necessarily restrictive of the 
freedom to provide cross-border services, contrary to Article 59 EC (now 
Article 49 EC).74 In addition, the Commission stated that special or exclusive 
rights for the provision of terminal equipment would be incompatible with 
Article 86 EC (now 82 EC), particularly, because such rights would "limit 
outlets and impede technical progress since the range of equipment offered 
by the telecommunications bodies is necessarily limited, and will not be the 
best available to meet the requirements of a significant proportion of the 
users."75 Similarly, in the Services Directive, the Commission stated that 
special or exclusive rights regarding the provision of telecommunications 
services constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services and 
therefore Article 59 EC (now Article 49 EC).76 Regarding Article 86 EC ( now 
Article 82 EC), the Commission held that special or exclusive rights granted 
to telecoms organizations led to the abuse of a dominant position. In 
particular, such rights prevent or restrict access to the market for telecoms 
services provided by their competitors, thus limiting consumer choice.77 
In British Telecommunications78 the ECJ held that EU competition rules were 
applicable to the European telecommunications sector. This landmark 
judgment did not only open the door for the liberalization of the sector: it also 
clarified a number of issues concerning the application of Article 86 EC ( then 
Article 90 EC), which were of significance for the subsequent development of 
the sector. The Court held that it was for the Commission, not the Member 
States, to determine the legality of any derogation granted from the 
application of the competition rules on the basis of Article 86(2) EC ( then 
Article 90(2)).79 The Court also made clear that the derogation should be 
interpreted narrowly.80 Since then, competition rules, and in particular Article 
86 EC (ex Article 90 EC) have played an important role in the liberalization of 
73supra n. 33, recital 5 
74 ibid., recital 7 
75i bid., recita I 13 
76supra n.1, recital 5 
77 ibid., recital 13 
78supra n. 25 
79ibid.,para.30 
80 ibid. 
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the sector. Article 86 EC deals with the application of the Community 
competition rules to public undertakings and those granted special or 
exclusive rights. 
Article 86(1) EC 81 submits public undertakings to the Treaty rules. Article 
86(2) EC82 provides Member States with some authority to derogate from the 
application of the Treaty rules, in so far as this is necessary for the fulfilling of 
the particular tasks assigned to public undertakings operating services of a 
general economic interest or having the character of revenue-producing 
monopolies. Article 86(3)83 provides that the Commission may address 
decisions or directives to Member States to ensure the observance of Article 
86 EC.84 
The overall liberalization of the telecoms market was based to a large extent 
on the systematic use of Article 86(3)EC. The important aspect of Article 
86(3) EC is that it confers legislative power upon the Commission without 
granting the Member States the right to interfere. When the Commission 
passed the Terminal Equipment Directive85 and the Services Directive86 on 
the basis of Article 86(3) EC (then Article 90(3)), both Directives were 
challenged by a number of Member States before the Court of Justice.87 
However, the Court largely confirmed the legality of the Directives.88 The 
81 Article 86(1) EC reads: "In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor 
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to 
those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89." 
82Article 86 (2) EC reads: "Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing monopoly shall be subject 
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular 
tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as 
would be contrary to the interests of the Community." 
83Article 86 (3) reads: "The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this 
Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member 
States." 
84For a more detailed discussion of Article 86 EC in the telecommunications sector , which 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis, see Bartosch, The Liberalization of European 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Markets- The Road from Monopolies to Competition 
and Universal Service, Ch. 3 in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun 
85supra n. 33 
86supra n. 1 
87Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1259 ( the Terminal Equipment 
Ruling) 
Joined Cases C- 271/90 , C-281 /90 and C-289/90, Spain v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-5833 
~the Services Directive Ruling) 
8The ECJ declared the Directives void as far as the provisions on special rights were 
concerned, holding that the Directives did not specify the rights concerned and did not 
specify in what respect the existence of such rights is contrary to the Treaty. Also the 
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principal contentious issue was that of whether the Commission could use 
Article 86(3) EC to abolish special and exclusive rights. In France v. 
Commission, 89 France submitted that the Terminal Equipment Directive could 
not provide for the abolition of monopoly rights since special or exclusive 
rights per se were not prohibited by the Treaty. It argued further that the 
Commission had encroached upon the Council's legislative powers, and that 
the Directive should have been adopted as an harmonization directive on the 
basis of Article 83 (then Article 87) EC and Article 95 (then Article 1 OOa) 
EC.90 The ECJ opined that state monopolies, although recognized under 
Article 86 EC (then Article 90), must be regarded as a derogation from the 
rules of the Treaty in general, and from the competition rules in particular.91 
As far as the second argument is concerned, the Court found that the 
Commission in principle did not lack the power to enact the Directive as the 
subject-matter of the power conferred on the Commission by Article 86(3)EC 
is different from, and more specific than, that of the powers conferred on the 
Council by either Article 95 EC (then Article 1 OOa) or Article 83 EC (then 
Article 87).92 
Subsequently, as dealt with above, the Commission adopted a series of 
Directives based on Article 86(3) EC. When adopting measures with 
predominantly harmonizing functions, such as the ONP Directives and the 
New Regulatory Framework, Article 95 EC was used as the legal basis. The 
Council and Commission had already agreed on a compromise approach of 
the usage of Articles 86 EC and 95 EC respectively in 1989,93 and in 1993 
the Council finally officially approved the Commission's liberalization 
approach, but stated that future directives should be passed with the full 
participation of Council and Parliament.94 
provisions contained in both Directives concerning the termination of long-term contracts 
were declared void. 
89supra n. 87 
90ibid. , para. 20 
91 ibid, in para. 20, the Court stated that "even though that article (Article 86 EC) presupposes 
the existence of undertakings which have certain special or exclusive rights, it does not 
follow that all special or exclusive rights are necessarily compatible with the Treaty." 
92 ibid, paras.25-27 
93so-called compromise of 1989, summed up by the Council in Council Press Release 
235/89 of 7 December 1989 
94Council Resolution 93/1 of 22 July 1993 on the Review of the Situation in the 
Telecommunications Sector and the Need for Further Development in that Market, (1993] OJ 
C213/1; and Council Resolution 94/3 of 22 December 1994 in the principle and timetable for 
the liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructures, [1994] OJ C379/4 
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2.3.2 Competition rules 
Apart from constituting a legal basis for regulatory measures, European 
competition law also applies independently to the telecoms sector, as it does 
to other sectors of the economy. In particular, the competition rules ensure 
that the liberalization process is not undermined by unilateral or co-ordinated 
market conduct and concentrations, protecting market players from 
competition. Its role is to make sure that legal monopolies are not replaced by 
de facto ones. Thus far, it has constituted an "indispensable complement" to 
sector-specific regulation. 95 The Commission has frequently emphasised the 
important role competition law plays in the telecoms sector. For example, in 
its Infrastructure Green Paper96 , the Commission stated that: 
"In a market which will for many years be characterised by the presence of 
dominant operators controlling bottleneck facilities, a level playing field will 
only be possible by reinforced scrutiny of compliance with the competition 
rules. Otherwise the emergence of competition will be stifled.'m 
A comment by Sir Leon Brittan on the subject of air transport and 
competition policy is also relevant to the role of general competition rules in 
the telecoms sector: 
"One should ... keep in mind that an industry emerging from a long period of 
regulation is usually dominated by a few oligopolists. Most Member States 
have for many decades organised their air transport policies as a function of 
the needs of their flag carrier, with the result that these normally have a 
dominant position on their home market. Hence there is a need for strict 
vigilance in order to avoid abuses of those dominant positions, in particular 
where dominance would be used in order to prevent the development of 
competition .. .The move from regulation to competition will be successful only 
if there are competitors able to take advantage of new opportunities."98 
95Garzaniti, (The Hague, 2003),p. 243 
96supra n.12 
97 ibid., section Vll.8 
98Address by Sir Leon Brittan to the Centre of European Policy Studies, Competition Policy 
and International Relation, (Brussels, 1992) 
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Since a liberalized telecoms market is a relatively new phenomenon, the 
Commission has published guidelines within the "1998 package" on the 
application of EC competition law to the telecoms sector.99 These guidelines 
seek to clarify, specifically in relation to telecoms, the types of behaviour that 
may fall foul of the competition rules, i.e. Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. The 
Commission has also issued a Notice on the application of competition rules 
to access agreements, 100 as the Commission considered that the control 
exercised by incumbent telecoms operators over access to end-users could 
generate competition problems. In the Access Notice, the Commission 
specifies that one purpose of the Notice is "to set out access principles 
stemming from EU competition law as shown in a large number of 
Commission decisions in order to create greater market certainty and more 
stable conditions for investment and commercial initiative in the telecoms and 
multimedia sectors". 101 From the beginning, the liberalization process has 
been based on the interrelation of sector-specific regulation and EC 
competition rules. The New Regulatory Framework constitutes a new step in 
this relationship. 
2.4 The New Regulatory Framework 
In December 2001, the European Parliament adopted a compromise text for 
a New Regulatory Framework in Electronic Communications. This completed 
legislative proceedings which had begun with the adoption of four 
communications on 10 November 1999,102 including the so-called 1999 
Communications Review, and the adoption of seven proposals by the 
Commission in July 2000. 103 Together, those proposals led to the New 
99Guidelines on the Application of EC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector ( 
the 1991 Competition Guidelines) O.J.1991 C233/2 
100Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (1998 Access Notice) O.J.1998 C265/2 
101supra n.1 00, preface 
102The four communications are the following: the Fifth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(1999)537; the Communication on the 
Consultation on the Radio Spectrum Green Paper ,COM(1999)538; the Communication 
"Towards a New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and 
Associated Services" (The 1999 Communications Review),COM(1999)539; a Report on the 
Development of the Market for Digital Television in the European Union, COM(1999)540 
103COM(2000)393 
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Framework for the Regulation of Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services. 
The Commission observed that, despite the introduction of competition into 
the telecoms market through the then current framework, entailing falling 
tariffs and a growing number of operators, there was still insufficient 
competition. Incumbent operators continued to occupy dominant positions in 
a still fragmented telecoms market. In addition, the trend towards 
convergence between carriage and content functions called into question 
existing arrangements under which telecommunication and broadcasting 
were regulated under different regimes. 104 
The 1999 Communications Review 105 introduced the key elements of the 
Commission's policy for the new regulatory framework designed to cover all 
communications infrastructure and associated services. The main objectives 
of the new framework are: 
-Adjustment to convergence 
There is widespread agreement that convergence is occurring at the 
technological level. Digital technology allows both traditional and new 
communications services- whether voice, sound or pictures- to be provided 
over many different networks, such as traditional wired telephone networks, 
satellite, cable television etc. The Commission's Green Paper on 
Convergence defines the term "convergence" as follows: "the ability of 
different network platforms to carry essentially similar kinds of services, or the 
coming together of consumer devices such as the telephone, television and 
the personal computer."106 As a result, the formerly independent sectors of 
telecommunications, media and IT technology converge. 107 
COM(2000)386 
COM(2000)384 
COM(2000)392 
COM(2000)407 
COM(2000)385 
COM(2000)394 
104Statement of Erkki Liikanen, Commissioner for the Information Society, press release, 10 
November, 1999,1P/99/825 
105supra n.11 0 
106Commission's Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and 
information technology sectors, and the implications for regulation: Towards an Information 
Society Approach, COM(97)623 
107for further details on the phenomenon of convergence, see in particular the Commission's 
Green Paper, ibid. 
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In order to adapt the existing regulatory conditions to an increasingly 
converged communications environment, the new framework is based on the 
principle of "technological neutrality". 108 This means that sector-specific 
regulation applies to any network or service permitting the transmission of 
signals, including satellite networks, fixed and mobile terrestrial networks, 
and broadcasting networks regardless of the type of information conveyed. 
- Gradual phasing out of sector-specific regulation 
Under the new regulatory framework, competition law is meant to be the 
prime instrument for regulating the electronic communications market. The 
framework provides for a gradual phasing-out of sector-specific regulation. 
Ex-ante regulation should be limited to the minimum necessary109 to achieve 
clearly defined policy objectives, such as the promotion of competition and 
consumer protection as well as the completion of the internal market in 
electronic communications. However, until markets become genuinely 
competitive, some sector specific ex-ante rules continue to be appropriate. 
-Increased harmonization 
Harmonisation of legislative procedures must ensure the development of the 
market in a consistent manner at EU level. 
The 1999 Communications Review introduces eight key proposals, which can 
be summarized as follows: 
(1) The new framework should cover all communications infrastructure and 
associated services. However, the framework does not cover content 
regulation. It is therefore based on the distinction between the regulation of 
transmission and the regulation of content. 110 
(2) Internet transmission services should be treated in the same way as other 
transmission services. 
(3) The new framework should introduce a system of general authorisations 
instead of individual licences, with the exception of the use of radio spectrum 
and numbering resources. 
108for further details on the influence of convergence on regulation, see C. R. Blackman, 
Convergence between telecommunications and other media, Telecommunications Policy 
1998, 22(3), 163; B. Clements, The impact of convergence on regulatory policy in Europe, 
Telecommunications Policy, 1998, 22(3), 197 
109supra n.14, recita127, sentence 1 
11
°COM(2000)239 final, p.20 
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(4) It should establish a coherent Community approach to the allocation of 
radio spectrum. 
(5) It should extend the scope of universal service by means of market-based 
analysis of demand for and availability of services. 
(6) It should encourage the unbundling of the local loop throughout the EU, 
applying the EC competition rules. 
(7) The Commission does not introduce a European Regulatory Authority for 
communications services. It wants to improve cooperation between the 
Commission and the national regulators. 
(8) Regardless of the communications infrastructure, the same principles for 
regulation would apply to access and interconnection. 
A wide-ranging debate ensued, 111 having regard to which the Commission 
published, in July 2000, its proposal for a package of measures 112 which were 
to form the basis for the new EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications. The main areas of contention, that had arisen before the 
full adoption of the new regulatory framework, centred on: the NRAs and 
appeal mechanisms; cost orientation principles for operators with SMP; slow 
implementation of the Regulation on local loop unbundling; 113 the request for 
more stringent reporting obligations; and transparency from new entrants in 
relation to leased line interconnection. The European Parliament supported 
discretion for the Member States to determine whether e-mails sent for 
commercial purposes should be authorised with the preliminary consent of 
the subscriber ("opt-in") or whether the subscriber should have the right to 
require removal of the lists of e-mails ("opt-out"). 
Other issues that were debated included: 
-the definition of SMP, 
-rights of way, facilities sharing and co-location, 
-interconnection rights anywhere in the Community, and 
-the net cost financing of universal service obligations. 114 
111The results of the public consultation are summarised in the Commission Communication 
dated 26 April 2000,COM(2000)239 
112supra n.103 
113 Commission Regulation 2658/2000/EC of December 18, 2000 on unbundled access to 
the local loop (ULL Regulation), (2000) OJ L336/4 
114
supra n.111 
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The new regulatory framework reduces the number of legal texts from 26 to 
eight, significantly increasing simplicity and clarity. The new framework 
consists of five harmonization directives, including a framework directive and 
four specific directives concerning: 
-authorization, 
-access and interconnection, 
-universal service and users· rights and 
-data protection. 
There is also a Regulation on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop (adopted 
in December 2000). 115 In addition, a Commission liberalization directive116 
(also called the 'Competition Directive') consolidates the original 
Liberalization Directive 90/388/EC, but does not add any new obligations. A 
decision on Community Radio Spectrum Polici 17 has also been adopted. 
The directives were published in the Official Journal of the European 
Community. All Member States were required to adopt national legislation 
implementing them by 24 July 2003, with the exception of the Data Protection 
Directive for which the deadline was 31 October 2003. 
A detailed discussion of the various measures of the new regulatory 
framework would go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in order to 
understand the new regulatory regime on access, it is important to mention 
some general issues which are contained in the Framework Directive 
(Directive 2002/21/EC). 118 
The Framework Directive provides the overall structure for the new regulatory 
regime, and sets out fundamental rules and objectives which apply across all 
the new directives. As its name suggests, it is the directive that establishes 
the new framework 
115Framework Directive, Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ L 108, ,p.33 
Authorisation Directive, Directive 2002/20/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ L 108, , p.21 
Access and Interconnection Directive, Directive 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ L 108, 2, 
p. 7 
Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ L 108, 2, p. 51 
Data Protection Directive, Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002, OJ L 201,, p. 37 
Regulation on Local Loop Unbundling, Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of 18 December 
2000, OJL336, p.4 
116Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002, OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p .. 21 
117Decision No 676/2002/EC of 7 March 2002, OJ L 108, 24.04.2002, p.1 
118supra n.4 
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2.4.1 Scope and aim 
According to Article 1 (1 ), the Framework Directive establishes a harmonized 
framework for the regulation of electronic communications services, 
electronic communications networks, associated facilities and associated 
services. Article 2 sets out the relevant definitions for the new regulatory 
framework, in particular the definition of "electronic communications network", 
"electronic communications service" and "associated facilities". 119 
The Framework Directive, and therefore the new framework, is based on the 
principle of "technological neutrality", taking into account the increasing 
convergence of telecoms, broadcasting and information technology. This 
means that the new framework covers any communications network or 
service permitting the transmission of signals, regardless of the type of 
information conveyed. This is in contrast to the old regulatory regime, which 
did not take account of network or service convergence and consequently 
established definitional boundaries between telecommunications and 
broadcasting. Different networks were associated with the delivery of a 
specific type of message or signal. This meant that similar services were 
subject to different regimes depending on the network on which they were 
carried. 120 
However, as far as communications services are concerned, the new 
framework distinguishes between the regulation of transmission and the 
regulation of content. The latter continues to fall under Directive 89/36/EC 121 
as amended by Directive 97/36/EC122 (the "Television without Frontiers 
Directive"). The new framework, therefore, does not cover the content of 
services delivered over electronic communications networks or services, 
including audiovisual content, financial services and certain information 
society services. 123 
119For the definition of "electronic communications network" and "electronic communications 
service", see Chapter 2, 1; "associated facilities" are defined as "facilities associated with an 
electronic communications network and/or an electronic communications service which 
enable and/or support the provision of services via that network and/or service. It includes 
conditional access systems and electronic programme guides. 
120Garzaniti (2003), p.1 0 
121 Council Directive 89/552 of October 3, 1999 on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities, (1999) O.J. L298/23 
122Directive 97/36, (1997) O.J. L202/60 
123supra n 4, Article 2(c) 
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2.4.2. Re-definition of Significant Market Power (SMP) 
One of the objectives of the new regulatory framework is to reduce sector-
specific regulation in favour of the application of general competition 
principles. 124 An example of the movement towards greater reliance on 
competition law principles is the change in the way in which operators with 
significant market power are to be identified and regulated. Significant market 
power (SMP) is the key concept used to identify those undertakings upon 
which regulators can impose sector-specific regulation. Under the old 
regulatory regime, operators having more than a 25% market share of a 
specific market were presumed to have SMP, but the relevant NRA enjoyed 
some discretion to take other factors into account. 125 This arbitrary 
presumption of market power was criticised as going against competition law 
principles and resulting in obligations being imposed that were greater than 
those which could be imposed under Article 82 EC. 126 A share of 25% would 
generally not be considered sufficient to indicate market dominance under 
Article 82. The original concept of SMP was developed with the incumbent 
ex-monopoly operator in mind, and has been a major tool in facilitating 
market entry for new operators. Now that these market-entry objectives have 
largely been achieved, the concept of SMP is being re-defined in line with the 
general competition law concept of market dominance. According to Article 
14 of the Framework Directive, an undertaking shall be deemed to have 
significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a 
position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to appreciable extent independently 
of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. Where an undertaking 
has significant market power on a specific market, it may also be deemed to 
have significant market power in a closely related market, where the links 
between the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in one 
124 ibid., Recital 27 
125supra n.56, Article 4(3) 
126A. Tarrant, Significant market power and dominance in the regulation of 
telecommunications markets, (2000) 21 ECLR 320. p.320 
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market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the 
market power of the undertaking. 
Thus, the new form of significant market power is designed to embrace single 
company dominance, joint dominance and the leverage of a dominant 
position on to an associated market. To summarize, one can say that in terms 
of opening up the market there are three instruments which have been used 
to liberalize the telecoms market in the European Community: 
-the progressive liberalization of a former monopoly sector, 
-the accompanying harmonization measures, and 
- competition rules. 
One of the areas in which the interrelation between regulation and 
competition law is particularly apparent is the issue of access to telecoms 
networks, which has always played an important role in the opening-up of the 
telecoms sector. 
3. Access to te!ecommunications networks: Why 
access matters 
Our "western" economies are developing into so-called "information 
economies", in which the emphasis of economic activity has shifted from 
manufacturing industries to services industries, many of which process and 
trade information. 127 Information and communication systems, and 
particularly the Internet, are at the centre of this change. Whether an 
individual can profit from these developments or not depends on his or her 
ability to access the relevant information, and therefore his or her ability to 
access the relevant communication systems. A failure to access the 
necessary information can lead to social failure and exclusion. Nowadays, 
Communication systems are often a gateway "to finding jobs, or taking part in 
civic organisations, to learning about new life opportunities."128 The landmark 
127C. Murroni/N. Irvine, Access Matters, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 
1998.,p.1 
128Murroni/lrvine, quoting from G. Mulgan and J. Coulthard, Virtually Social Information 
Exclusion, p.6 
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document concerning the Information Society, the Bangemann Report, 129 
emphasised the importance of economic and social measures to ensure 
equal participation to the information revolution: "Fair access to the 
infrastructure will have to be guaranteed to all, as will the provision of 
universal service, the definition of which must evolve in line with the new 
technology." 
Access to information is inseparable from access to communications. 130 This 
comprises access at the technical as well as at the market level, i.e.: access 
to networks and essential facilities as well as interconnection; access for 
consumers to the network and content; and access of market actors to 
consumers. Access for consumers is dealt with under the concept of 
Universal Service. This thesis, however, will deal with access of telecoms 
operators and service providers to the networks of their competitors, in order 
to enable them to reach their customers. Access in this sense is therefore a 
generic concept covering any situation in which one party is granted the right 
to use the network or facilities of another party. 
It should be noted that access and its relationship to competition law featured 
in the telecoms sector as early as British Te/ecommunications, 131 in which the 
Court confirmed the requirement to give access to a "value-added" service 
provider, and specifically addressed the issue that development of new 
technologies in this context was in the public interest. 132 The importance of 
access to telecoms networks and their components has increased 
substantially in recent years. Liberalization has brought about a vast number 
of new entrants who sell retail telecoms services using both the incumbent's 
network and their own network. In addition, an increasing number and range 
of non-telecom services are distributed through telecommunications 
networks. Due to the convergence of media, telecoms and computing, a 
growing number of services are being delivered over telecommunications 
networks, and are thus dependent on a few competing delivery systems. 133 
For example, the growing success of the Internet as a marketplace testifies to 
129Commission of the European Communities, Europe and the Global Information Society, 
Report of the high level group on the information society, Brussels, May 1994 
130Murronillrvine, p.1 
131 supra n.25 
132Ungerer, (Florence, 1998), p. 5-6 
133
"b"d 23 I I ., p. 
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the increasing reliance on telecoms networks for the sale of services and 
goods. 
Access of telecoms operators to their competitors· networks or facilities can 
be described as third-party access. Basically, there are two types of third-
party access: "one-way access"134 or "indirect access"135 on the one hand, 
and "two-way access" 136 or "interconnection" on the other. 
The term "interconnection" covers the physical and logical linking of 
networks. It refers to a situation where two or more operators require mutual 
access to each others' networks in order for their customers to be able to 
communicate with each other, or to access services provided on other 
networks. 137 In this scenario, competition is developed only among rival 
networks. Mobile telephony presently works that way. There are numerous 
mobile subscribers, but there is no competition for reaching the subscribers 
to a network, and a network provider can charge other parties to reach its 
own subscribers. 138 Interconnection is of increasing importance with the 
number of alternative networks rising steadily. These alternative networks 
often do not have the same coverage as the incumbents' networks and are 
therefore dependent on access to these networks to offer maximum network 
benefits to their customers. 139 
"One-way access", in contrast, covers the situation where an entrant does not 
own his own network, and therefore needs access to an infrastructure owned 
by an incumbent operator, usually the former state-owned monopolist. One-
way access allows service providers without physical connections to the end-
user to reach customers. It is a one-sided dependence of the new entrant on 
the incumbent operator. 140 Duplicating the network is either impossible or at 
least not feasible for financial or other reasons. In some cases, for example, 
other networks find it difficult to gain a position within the market if another 
network already exists ("first mover advantage"). These facilities or networks 
are called "bottlenecks" or "gateways", because entire industries rely on only 
134M.Canoy/P. Bijl/ R.Kemp, , Access to telecommunications networks, TILC Discussion 
Paper (2003) , p.5 
135Murroni/ Irvine, p. 55 
136Canoy/ Bijl/ Kemp, p. 5 
137 Canoy/ Bijl/ kemp, p. 14 
138Murronillrvine, p. 55 
139J.M Bauer/S.S. Wildman, Third annual Quello Communication Policy and Law 
S~mposium; Rethinking access, (2002) L.Rev.M.S.U.-D.C.L.605 p. 607 
14 Canoy/ Bijl/ Kemp, p.5 
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one facility provider, or very few providers. The incumbent operator is 
vertically integrated most of the time, which means not only that it owns the 
network but also that it is active in the services market and therefore reluctant 
to give new service providers access to its network. Network sharing 
therefore helps to create and maintain competition in the retail market. 
Examples of one-way access are "access to the unbundled local loop" and 
"Carrier Select". 141 Access to the unbundled local loop means that the new 
entrant gains access to the copper-cable pairs of the incumbent's local 
network which enables him to offer broadband services directly to the 
consumer. 142 At the moment, the roll-out of broadband services in the EU is 
relatively limited. 143 This is why the Commission has put the unbundling of 
the local loop on top of its agenda: 
"Unbundling of the local loop aims to foster competition in local access 
networks, currently dominated by incumbent operators. New entrants do not 
have the investment capacity to duplicate the local network. Therefore, they 
must be allowed to use the incumbents' localloop."144 
Carrier Select means that an entrant has originating and terminating access 
to the incumbent's local network. 145 This example of one-way access seems 
to be working well. 146 
The policy of promoting competition in telecoms proved to be very successful 
in many areas, as it brought increased choice for customers 147 and drastically 
reduced tariffs 148 for telecoms services. However, liberalization did not 
141 Canoy/ Bijl/ Kemp, p. 5 
142Access to the local loop will be discussed in more depth later in the thesis 
143The number of new unbundled lines has increased by 828 000 between July 2002 and 
July 2003. This is double the number compared to the previous year but still low as a 
proportion of total subscriber lines and the development of local loop unbundling is still rather 
unbalanced across the EU and has not yet taken off. ( see 9th Commission Report on the 
Implementation of the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Package, p. 5) 
144Erkki Liikanen, "Is there a third way for the Internet in Europe", speech delivered at Global 
Internet Summit Barcelona, 22 May 2000 
145By dialling a prefix, consumers can indicate that they want the entrant instead of the 
incumbent to carry a telephone call. 
146See, inter alia: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Working Party 
on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies: Developments in Carrier Selection 
and Pre-Selection, DSTI/ICCPITISP(2001 )4/Final, p.4ff. 
1471n August 2003 there were in the EU a total of 1202 operators authorised to offer public 
voice telephony and 1484 public network operators. However, after the massive entry into 
the market that characterised the first stage of liberalisation (+113% between 1998 and 
2001 ), the number of operators authorised to offer public telecommunications services in 
Europe has started to decrease. ( g'h Commission Implementation Report, supra n.1, p. 14) 
1481n the five-year period since the opening of the voice telephony markets (1 January 1998), 
the EU weighted monthly expenditure for national calls by residential users decreased by 
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automatically coincide with the end of dominant positions. More than fifteen 
years after the 1987 Green Paper, 149 incumbent operators still have strong 
positions in many aspects of their business, and infrastructure competition 
has not matured in all parts of the industry.150 As mentioned above, 
competition is only developing hesitantly and to a very limited extent in the 
central sector of fixed local access. 151 This, in principle, would justify the 
application of regulatory open access requirements to local loop 
infrastructures. Such regulation is seen as an essential requirement for 
stimulating effective service-based competition. However, a significant 
number of commentators have remarked that a too-stringent access 
regulation may benefit consumers in the short term, but in the long term may 
have a negative effect on infrastructure competition. New entrants have no 
incentive to establish new networks as they have access to an incumbent 
operator's network, and the incumbent has no incentive to invest in a new 
infrastructure if it must share it with competitors. 152 
One of the main issues in telecoms policy is whether such access issues 
should be resolved by sector-specific regulation, or whether it is sufficient to 
apply the EC competition rules, particularly Articles 81and 82 EC, building on 
the evolving concept of essential facilities. So far, access policies have been 
characterised by an interplay between sector-specific regulation and 
competition law. Since the beginning of the liberalization process with the 
1987 Green Paper,153 a comprehensive sector-specific framework has been 
established, dealing in particular with access and interconnection. In parallel, 
the telecoms sector is to date the one sector in which the Commission has 
developed the most consistent position concerning the application of EC 
13.5 %.The overall reduction for the period 1998-2003 of the average cost of an international 
call has been 42% for residential users. (9th Report, supra n.1, p. 20-21) 
149supra n.9 
150The incumbents' share of the international voice telephony market stood at 62% in 
December 2000, of the long distance call market at around 70% and of the mobile market at 
69%. In the local call market there was a small reduction of the incumbents· share, during 
the period December 2001-2002, from 87% to 81%. One of the reasons for this is probably 
the introduction of carrier pre-selection in all the Member States. (9th Report, supra n.1, p. 15) 
In short, however, it can be said that the market share of incumbents remain fairly high. 
151 As at August 2003, 33% of EU subscribers used an alternative provider to route long-
distance and international calls, while only 25% were using alternative providers for local 
calls. ( 9th Report,supra n.1, p. 16) 
152This aspect will be discussed in more detail below 
153supra n.9 
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competition law to access issues, with the adoption of the Access Notice. 154 It 
is in the Access Notice that the competition law concept of essential facilities 
has been given its most explicit formulation. Although the essential facilities 
doctrine (EFD) has been established as part of ex-post application of 
competition rules, it has also had a significant influence upon ex-ante 
regulatory action, in particular upon the regulatory framework for access and 
interconnection. 
Convergence of the computing sector, which developed in the absence of 
specific regulation, with the broadcasting and telecoms sector, which are both 
highly regulated, has called into question the need for continued sector-
specific regulation in the communications sector altogether. The new 
regulatory framework, recognising that the new environment has made a 
number of traditional regulatory concepts out of date, advocates a gradual 
phasing-out of sector-specific regulation. 
4. Overview of economic features of the 
telecommunications sector 
In order to be able fully to understand and evaluate the necessity of the "dual 
regime" of sector-specific regulation on the one hand and general competition 
law on the other, it is essential to note briefly a number of economic features 
which distinguish the telecoms industry from other economic sectors. 155 
The telecoms sector is affected by certain economic features which, by their 
very nature, involve market failure, in that market forces such as competition 
cannot be expected to operate. The main role of general competition law is to 
prevent incumbents from excluding (potential) competitors form the market, 
through, for example, predatory pricing or a refusal of access to essential 
154 H. Ungerer, Access issues under EU regulation and anti-trust law - The case of 
telecommunications and internet markets, (2000) 5 Inn J.Comm.L.&Poly 1, p.S 
155This is only a brief overview; for more detail, see: M. Armstrong: Competition in 
Telecommunications, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 13, No.1, (1997), p. 64; M. 
Katz/ C. Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility , The American 
Economic Review, Vol.75, No. 3 (1985), p. 424 
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assets. 156 These features often result in first-mover advantages in the newly 
liberalized telecoms market which in turn constitute considerable barriers to 
entry157 for potential new market entrants. As these barriers to entry are 
structural, i.e. inherent in the market, and do not result form strategic 
exclusionary behaviour by incumbent dominant operators, competition law 
will find it difficult to deal with them timely and effectively. Sector-specific 
rules regulating prices and access seem to be better suited, in particular 
whenever access disputes are likely to be repeated. 158 
These economic features include elements of natural monopoly, sunk costs 
and network externalities. Although it is generally recognised that the 'natural 
monopoly' argument can no longer be used to justify state monopolies in the 
telecoms sector (see above), there are still areas in telecommunications 
which have features of a natural monopoly. 159 This is particularly true for 
local access networks (the so-called "local loop") due to the high 
infrastructure costs of the network. In contrast to other areas of the telecoms 
sector, such as long-distance or international networks, in which the 
introduction of competition may lead to higher quality of service and lower 
prices, the local loop is most cost-effectively run by a single undertaking. 160 
This is due to so-called "economies of density", whereby it is more cost-
effective to have a single local network in a certain local area than to have 
several. 161 Duplication of the local network would be economically inefficient 
and prohibitively expensive.162 This leads to other service providers being 
dependent on the incumbents' networks to reach their customers. As the 
incumbent has no inherent interest to provide access to its network, it must 
be required to do so by appropriate sector-specific regulation. 
156T. Van Dijk, General of specific competition rules for network utilities?, (2001) 2 Journal of 
Network Industries, 93, p.1 00 
157 
"A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing which must be borne by a firm 
which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry", Knieps, p. 
12 quoting from Stigler: Barriers to Entry, Economies of Scale and Firm Size, in Stigler (Ed.), 
The Organization of Industry, Irwin, Homewood, Ill (1968), p. 67, at 67 
158Van Dijk,p. 100 
159As mentioned above, a natural monopoly is an activity which is most cost-effectively 
carried out by a single firm rather than by several 
16
°K.W. Grewlich, Access to global networks - European Telecommunications Law and 
Policy, (1998) 41 GYIL, 9, p.95 
161Armstrong,p. 66 
162M. Holzhauser, Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation: Der Zugang zu Netzen und 
anderen wesentlichen Einrichtungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen sektorspezifischer 
Regulierung und allgemeinem Wettbewerbsrecht, ( Munich, 2001 ), p.1 08 
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In addition to problems caused by natural monopoly, some parts of the sector 
involve large fixed costs (investments) which are sunk. These can represent 
significant barriers to entry, as a market can only sustain a limited number of 
competitors which possess sufficient market power to be able to recover 
these costs. 163 In contrast to the incumbent operators, new entrants have to 
decide whether or not to build additional network infrastructure and spend 
irreversible costs. 164 However, due to increasing convergence and a 
decrease in costs in some infrastructures, duplication may become less 
expensive, which would make competition at the level of infrastructure a 
more feasible option.165 
Another economic phenomenon which has a considerable impact on the 
potential competitiveness of telecommunications is that of positive and 
negative "network externalities". "Network externalities" in the telecoms 
sector are predominantly positive, and arise if existing subscribers benefit 
when new subscribers join in.166 The more subscribers a network has, the 
more useful it becomes to the individual subscriber as his possibilities of 
communication increase. A network with small coverage is of little interest to 
the consumer. These externalities enhance the importance of interconnection 
(see above), as they lead to considerable first-mover advantages which may 
act as a barrier to entry. Without interconnection, small network operators 
would be severely disadvantaged relative to large network operators. 
Interconnection allows new entrants to compete without requiring them to 
duplicate the network.167 
163Van Dijk,p. 102 
164Knieps,p. 12 
165Van Dijk,p. 103 
166Armstrong,p. 76 
167Holzhauser,p. 26 
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Chap~er 3: Antitrust law and Access to 
Essentia ~ F aci I ities 
This chapter deals with the issue of ensuring access to facilities on the basis 
of the EC competition rules. The first part outlines a number of cases 
involving issues of access to infrastructures and other facilities. Because of 
the absence of cases in telecommunications, it focuses on the transport 
sector, in which rules regarding third-party access have principally been 
developed on the basis of competition rules. The general discussion of the 
essential facilities case law under Article 82 EC should serve as a basis for 
the following section, which concerns the application of EC competition rules, 
in particular the essential facilities doctrine (EFD), to the telecommunication 
sector. 
More than a decade ago the US Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) adopted the 'Open Network Architecture' (ONA) principle, to ensure 
that enhanced services providers and information service providers had non-
discriminatory access to the network. This ONA approach reflects the 
essential facilities doctrine, derived from case law interpreting the prohibition 
on monopolisation or attempts to monopolise under S. 2 Sherman Act. 1 
In EC telecommunications law, the EFD has also been used as an 
'inspiration' for ex-ante regulation, in cases where the ex-post application of 
competition rules may be insufficient: for example, in rapidly expanding 
markets, delay in granting access or interconnection may impair competition. 2 
1K.W. Grewlich, (GYIL, 1998) ,p.32 
2ibid., p.34 
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1. introduction to the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
(EFD) 
"The transposition of the 'essential facilities doctrine' like its predecessor, the 
fast-food hamburger, to Europe is viewed with some trepidation by many 
commentators anxious to protect the integrity of home-grown Community 
competition law principles."3 
The EFD originated in commentary on United States antitrust case law. It has 
featured prominently in a number of decisions made by competition 
authorities around the world. In essence, the doctrine states that where a 
monopoly or a dominant company owns or controls something, access to 
which is essential for its competitors to compete on a "derivative" or 
downstream/upstream market, it may be pro-competitive to oblige the 
company in question to give access to a competitor. That is said to be the 
case if the monopoly's or dominant company's refusal to grant access has 
sufficiently serious effects on competition, and if the refusal is not objectively 
justified. An essential facility can be a product, such as a raw material, or a 
service, including access to a place such as a harbour, or to a distribution 
network such as a telecommunications network. 
The doctrine may be applied to a number of sectors, even to facilities 
protected by intellectual property rights. As more utility and regulated markets 
open up throughout the world, the scope for applying the doctrine increases, 
thereby creating potential to free up essential resources that are fundamental 
to economic growth and development. 
The EFD can be seen as a limitation of the general rule that a firm is allowed 
to deal with whom it chooses, known as the "freedom to contract".4 The 
motivation behind the doctrine is the elimination of the unfair competitive 
advantage that ownership or control of an essential facility may give to a 
competitor. The dominance of the owner of an essential facility is often not 
due to its greater efficiency, but rather to externalities which make it 
impossible for the firm's competitors to duplicate the facility.5 
3L. Hancher, Case comment: Oscar Bronner, ( 1999) 36 CMLRev, 1289 
4A.Jones/B.Sufrin, EC Competition Law, (Oxford, 2001 ), p.377 
5J.T. Soma/D.A. Forkner /B. P.Jumps, The essential facilities doctrine in the deregulated 
telecommunications industry, (1998) 13 Berkeley Tech.L.J. 565,p.566 
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This is particularly true in the telecommunications sector where, despite full 
liberalization as of January 1998, the control of infrastructures and other 
facilities continues to confer a dominant position on incumbent 
telecommunications operators in the market for network provision. This is 
mainly due to the extensive investment that is required to build a network 
which can provide the same comprehensive geographical coverage as the 
incumbents' networks: 
"In the fixed network field the new entrants are faced with a situation where 
the incumbents hold fixed network assets built over one hundred years of 
monopoly. None of the new entrants can, in the short term, build parallel 
networks in the local loop which could rival these assets worth 200-300 
billions of euros of investment."6 
Therefore, in a number of Member States, incumbent operators continue to 
control the only nation-wide, fixed-line telecommunications infrastructure. The 
result can be felt, inter alia, in the market for access to the local loop, which is 
far from competitive despite ex-ante regulation. 
In parallel with sector-specific regulation, the EFD (applied within the 
framework of Article 82 EC) can be regarded as a useful tool to ensure third-
party access to telecommunications infrastructure and to tackle distortions of 
competition (re-)emerging during the liberalization process: 
"In the communications sector in particular, the doctrine now constitutes an 
important element as the backbone of sectoral regulation and represents one 
of the most interesting points of interaction between antitrust and regulatory 
provisions."7 
The European Commission itself has used the EFD to promote competition in 
services by obliging dominant incumbent operators to grant third-party 
access to their networks and other facilities. In its Guidelines on the 
Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector,8 
the Commission states that a refusal to provide reserved services (i.e. 
services for which, at the time, a telecommunications company would still 
have had a monopoly) would be unlawful when it would make it impossible or 
6H. Ungerer, The arrival of competition in European telecommunications, 3'd European 
Forum in the Law of Telecommunications, Information Technologies and Multimedia: 
Towards a common framework, (Luxembourg, 1998), at 7-8 
7 A. Bavasso, Essential facilities in EC law: The rise of an ·epithet' and the consolidation of a 
doctrine in the communications sector, (2002) 21 Y.E.L 63, p.63 
8see Ch.2, ftn.99 
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difficult to provide non-reserved services. In its more recent 1998 Notice on 
the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector ('the Access Notice'),9 the Commission dedicates 
ample space to the application of the EFD to scenarios in which a network 
operator refuses access to potential competitors. However, the restrictive 
approach towards the EFT adopted by the ECJ in its Bronnerjudgment10 may 
make it necessary to review the principles set out by the Commission in its 
Access Notice, and may draw attention to both the sector-specific access 
regime in the new regulatory framework and the complex relationship of the 
latter with EU competition rules. 
This chapter reviews the conditions under which access restrictions to 
essential facilities may constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation 
of Article 82 EC, in light of the Access Notice, the decisional practice of the 
Commission, and the case law of the ECJ and CFI. 
2. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in US antitrust 
~aw 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned above, the EFD originated in US antitrust law, in which it 
addresses a particular type of refusal to deal under the Sherman Act. 11 It is 
therefore useful to retrace the development of the doctrine in US law before 
attempting an analysis of its application in EU competition law. 
In United States v. Colgate & Co., 12 the Supreme Court held that in the 
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, a private trader is 
free to choose the parties with whom he will deal. As a consequence, US 
9See Ch.2, ftn.1 00 
10Case C-7/97, OscarBronnerGmbH&CoKG v. Mediaprint, [1998] ECR 1-7791 
11 US antitrust law consists of several acts, namely the Sherman Act (Act of July 2, 1890, 
Chap.647 ,26 Stat.209, as amended, 15 U.S.C.,Sec.1-t), the Clayton Act (Act of October 15, 
1914 Chap.323, 38 Stat.730, 15 U.S.C.,Sec.12-27) and the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(Act of September 26, 1914, Cap.311, 38, Stat.717-721, 15 U.S.C.,Sec.41-58). In the above 
context, the Sherman Act is of primary importance. 
12 250 US 300, 39 S Ct.465 [1919] 
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courts have been generally reluctant to condemn refusals to deal. However, 
two exceptions to the Colgate principle have been established in US case law 
which might be referred to as the "intent test"13 and the "monopoly leveraging 
test"14 . The former refers to cases in which the refusal was intended to 
eliminate competition in the monopolized market without any business 
justification. The latter deals with situations in which the monopolist uses his 
power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in a vertically related 
market. The main difference between the two tests is that in the "intent test", 
the focal point of inquiry is the market in which the defendant has monopoly 
power, whereas the "leveraging test" focuses on the related market. 15 
US courts have evidently been prepared to make an exception to the Colgate 
principle whenever an essential facility was at issue. 16 In contrast to the 
intent doctrine, the so-called EFD seems to focus on more objective factors, 
by shifting the focus of inquiry onto the mere existence of a bottleneck 
facility. 17 However, although several Supreme Court decisions have been 
quoted in support of the existence of an EFD, since none of those judgments 
expressly refers to an EFD, the existence of this doctrine is only supported by 
implication.18 An EFD has been explicitly adopted, but only by lower courts. 
Commentators cannot agree concerning which US cases actually illustrate 
the scope of application of any EFD. 19 
13Jones/Suffrin, p.387 
14ibid. 
15Hancher , p. 1302 
16There is a dispute in US antitrust law whether the essential facilities doctrine should be 
regarded as a mere variant of the classic Colgate exceptions, or whether it constitutes an 
independent principle. See: L. Hancher (1999) 36 CMLRev 1289; P. Areeda, Essential 
Facilities: An epiphet in need of limiting principles, (1990) Antitrust LJ 841 
17Larouche, (Oxford 2000), p. 175 
181n AT&T Corp.et a/ v. Iowa Utilities Board eta/. (Supreme Court 25 Jan. 1999) Justice 
Breyer calls it "an antitrust doctrine that this court has never adopted" 
19G.J. Werden, The law and economics of the essential facilities doctrine, (1987) St. Louis 
University Law Journal, val. 32, no.2, 433,p.441 
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2.2 Supreme Court cases 
2.2.1 Horizontal combination cases: Concerted action in violation of S.1 
Sherman Act 
The earliest two cases usually cited by US commentators in support of the 
EFD concerned multifirm combinations, in which several competitors jointly 
controlled an essential facility. According to Gerber, the courts are more 
willing to impose a duty to deal in these cases: as the Colgate rule applies 
only to unilateral action by monopolists, courts typically dispense with the 
intent requirement for cases of concerted action.20 
The origin of the EFD is often traced back to the 1912 Supreme Court 
decision in US v. Terminal Railroad Association.21 The defendant railroad 
association's members controlled most of the railways of the city of St. Louis, 
and controlled the only possible railway crossings over the Mississippi. The 
Supreme Court held that it was improper for Terminal Railroad Association to 
deny their competitors access to the only existing railway crossings, as it was 
geographically and economically impossible for its competitors to build an 
alternative railway bridge.22 As access to the railway crossings was, 
therefore, essential for the competitors to be able to compete, the Court 
required the defendant association to admit non-member competitors to the 
association. The Court therefore considered the only railway crossing in St. 
Louis to be an "essential facility", although that precise term was not used by 
the Court. 
Another case in this context was Associated Press v. United States. 23 The 
decision of the Supreme Court met with severe criticism, particularly as it 
extended the application of the EFD, from cases dealing with the efficient use 
of purely physical infrastructure to a case concerning an information-
20D.J. Gerber, Rethinking the monopolist's duty to deal: a legal and economic critique of the 
doctrine of "essential facilities", (1998) 74 Virginia Law Review 1 069,p.1 078 
21 224 U.S. 383 [1912] 
22 ibid. para. 397: "The result of the geographical and topographical situation is that it is, as a 
practical matter, impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St 
Louis, so as to be within reach of its industries or commerce, without using the facilities 
entirely controlled by the terminal company." 
23326 U.S.1 [1945] 
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providing facility. 24 In the telecommunications sector, competitors do not only 
require access to the incumbents' infrastructure, but also to information 
concerning, for example, customers and numbers. Associated Press 
concerned an association of newspapers which collected news for members 
of the association. However, it prohibited members from selling news to non-
members. New members could join easily as long as they were not 
competitors. The Supreme Court held that Associated Press had violated S.1 
of the Sherman Act by discriminating against competitors in its admission 
policy. Yet the court did not say that Associated Press had to admit everyone. 
The court put particular emphasis on the concerted nature of the 
discrimination: 
"Victory of a member of such a combination over its business rivals achieved 
by such collective means cannot consistently with the Sherman Act or with 
practical, everyday knowledge be attributed to individual 'enterprise and 
sagacity'; such hampering of business rivals can only be attributed to that 
which really makes it possible - the collective power of an unlawful 
combination." (emphasis added)25 
An interesting aspect of this case is that the Court required Associated Press 
to deal. Although the information service provided by it was not regarded as 
'essential'; the court only held that "the exclusive right to publish news in a 
given field, furnished by AP and all of its members gives many newspapers a 
competitive advantage over their rivals."26 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion offers the only clear support for the 
EFD. Frankfurter's use of the EFD compared Associated Press to a public 
utility, a business infused with the public interest in a free press in a 
democratic society ("the need for the maximum flow of information and 
opinion to preserve our democracy and our Constitution").27 The remaining 
Justices expressly disclaimed Frankfurter's public utility rationale for the 
opinion. Whilst the opinion has been regarded as adopting an "exceedingly 
24J.S. Venit/ J.J.Kallaugher, The essential facilities doctrine: A comparative approach, (1994) 
Fordham Corp. Law lnst., 315,p. 336 ff. 
25326 U.S.1,15 (1945) 
26 ibid, para. 26 
27ibid, para.29 
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limited" approach,28 some commentators regard it as an interesting approach 
to invoking the EFD.29 
2.2.2. Single firm conduct in violation of S.2 Sherman Act 
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United State~0 was the first case, quoted in support 
of an EFD in US law, which concerned a unilateral refusal to deal. Areeda 
provides a list of arguments why a unilateral refusal to deal should be treated 
differently from the above-mentioned concerted action in Terminal 
Railroad~1 and Associated Press. 32 First, he points out that concerted action 
is the exception, whereas single firm action is the rule. It should not be 
possible to force any firm to share one of its assets with a competitor simply 
because it might be called an "essential facility". Furthermore, in cases of 
concerted refusal to deal, access terms are defined more easily and the 
refusal is therefore easier to remedy. In addition, the remedy in concerted 
action cases is a 'once-and-for-all' remedy, which neither requires constant 
control nor the rationing of an existing resource. Finally, the mere fact that 
competitors have taken concerted action in the first place might be an 
indication of the essentiality of their venture, as it implies not only its 
importance but also that it is beyond the individual capacity of the 
collaborators. 33 
This is why most US courts limit the application of the EFD, in cases 
concerning unilateral action, to those which involve firms that compete on a 
lower level than the plaintiff. In such cases, there is a danger that the 
monopolist may use its power in one market to gain an advantage in 
another.34 Courts usually permit unilateral refusal by a defendant who does 
not compete with the plaintiff in an ancillary market.35 The application of the 
28Areeda, p.842 
29Bavasso (YEL 2000) p. 72; Soma/Forkner/Jumps, p.586 
30410 U.S.366 [1973] 
31 supra n.21 
32supra n.23 
33Areeda ,p. 842 
34The Supreme Court first proscribed such "leveraging" in United States v. Griffith (334 
U.S.100), declaring that "the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful." (at 
~ara. 107) 
5Gerber, p.1 076, see for example: Official Airline Guides (630 F .2d at920) 
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EFD to single firm conduct has to take notice of the conduct requirement 
necessary to constitute monopolization under s.2 Sherman Act. 36 
In United States v. Grinne/ CorporatiorP it was held that: 
"the offence of monopoly under Sec.2 Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the wilful 
acquisition or maintenance of (monopoly) power as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen or 
historic accident." 
Monopolization, under S.2 Sherman Act, requires some element of 
impropriety in the achievement or maintenance of monopoly power. This is 
usually found in conduct that excludes a rival (so-called "exclusionary 
conduct"). 38 
In Otter Taif9 the plaintiffs were municipalities which asked Otter to sell 
electricity wholesale or, alternatively, to carry electricity bought from other 
suppliers over its network, so that they could provide local distribution of 
electric power to their residents. Otter refused to do so. The Supreme Court 
considered Otter's refusal to supply to be a violation of S.2 Sherman Act and 
held that "the Sherman Act requires that where facilities cannot practically be 
duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow 
them to be shared on fair terms."40 It ordered Otter to distribute power over its 
grid, holding that its actions "had the purpose of delaying and preventing the 
establishment of municipal electricity systems."41 It had used its monopoly 
power to foreclose competition and to gain a competitive advantage ( the 
Griffith formula42). 
Therefore, since Otter Tail, one of the main criteria for the application of the 
EFD can be seen in the danger of the monopolization of an ancillary 
market.43 However, the language in the case suggests that it was purely 
36Section 2 Sherman Act reads: 
"Every person, who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." (15 U.S.C.a 2 
11997)) 
7384 us 563 (1966) 
38Areeda, p.842 
39supra n.30 
40 ibid, para. 130 
41 ibid, para. 379 
42supra n. 34 
43A.Kezcsbom/ A.V.Goldmann, No shortcut to antitrust analysis: the twisted journey of the 
essential facilities doctrine, (1996) 1 Columbia Business Law Review 1, p.6 
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decided as a case of monopolization and the order of distribution can be seen 
as a logical consequence thereof. Although it has been referred to as an 
essential facilities case,44 the Court treated the essential facility only as a tool 
by which the power company engaged in predatory behaviour.45 
However, some commentators suggest that Otter Tail cannot be. seen as 
establishing a general duty to deal. The unique circumstances surrounding 
the case provide a premise for this argument. Not only was Otter a natural 
monopolist, but also the conditions in the distribution market were already 
regulated by federal law. Otter may, therefore, have evaded that regulation, 
to the prejudice of consumers. As there was already a regulatory agency to 
supervise prices, "the Court could airily require Otter Tail to deal but never 
burden itself with the details."46 
Aspen Skiing47 can be seen as offering even stronger support for imposing a 
duty to deal on a monopolist who competes with the plaintiff on an ancillary 
market.48 It concerned a case in which the owner of three ski mountains, 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., refused to continue a cooperation with the 
plaintiff, owner of one ski mountain, over selling a joint lift ticket. 
The Supreme Court expressly stated that it was not going to address the 
issue of the essential facilities doctrine.49 It solely relied on its previous case 
law within the framework of the intent theory, by holding that the defendant 
had acted with anticompetitive purpose and therefore violated S.2 Sherman 
Act. It said that there was no absolute duty to deal, but refusals to deal may 
have "evidentiary significance".50 If it was found that as the defendant acted 
"with exclusionary or anticompetitive purpose or effect"51 it may be obliged to 
deal with the plaintiff. Areeda criticises this verdict as too far-reaching: he 
44see eg. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.13 (101h 
Cir.1984), 472 U.S. 585 [1985] 
45Gerber, p.1 080; D. E. Troy, Unclogging the bottleneck: A new essential facility doctrine, 
i1983) 83 Columbia Law Review, 441,450 ; other: Werden, p.441 
6Areeda,p. 847; also M. Furse, The essential facilities doctrine in Community law, (1995) 8 
ECLR 469,470 
47 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp.,472 U.S. 585 [1985] 
48Gerber, p. 1 081 
49supra n. 47, at 611 
The Court of Appeals for the 1 01h Circuit had found in favour of the plaintiff on two grounds: 
(1) the multimountain ticket was an essential facility which the defendant was obliged to 
share 
(2) there was sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to create or- maintaino a-
monopoly 
50supra n. 47, at 601 
51 ibid. at 603 
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claims the reason to refuse to deal is usually that the business wants to 
improve its position on the market place, which means to exclude the 
competitor in some sense, and asks "[w]ould that be enough to support a 
monopolization verdict?"52 
In a later case, based on Aspen, the Supreme Court held that " ... if Aspen 
stands for any principle that goes beyond its unusual facts, it is, that a 
monopolist may be guilty of monopolisation if it refuses to cooperate with a 
competitor where such cooperation is indispensable to effective 
competition ... "53 
However, the Court stressed that there was no duty to deal where the 
defendant could show a "legitimate business purpose" for the refusal to 
deal.54 "This shows that a monopolist may sometimes refuse to share its 
property, but the Court did not elaborate further". 55 
2.3 Lower court cases 
As mentioned above, so far it has only been the lower US courts which have 
expressly referred to the term "essential facilities doctrine".56 It has been 
maintained by commentators that the EFD has been an attempt by lower 
courts to "make sense of the Supreme Court precedent(s) .. .for analysing 
unilateral refusals to deal under section 2."57 
The term 'EFD' was first used58 in Hecht v. Pro Football lnc., 59 where the 
court held that access to the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium in Washington was 
essential to the operation of a professional football team. Recognizing the 
EFD and referring to its fundamental principles, the court found that there 
52Areeda,p. 841 
53 0/ympia v. Western Union Telegraph, 480 U.S.934 [1987] 
54 supra n.4 7 ,at 608-10 
558. Doherty, Just what are essential facilities? (2001) 38 C.M.L.Rev.397,p.401 
56 Alternatively also referred to as "bottleneck principle", (Troy,p. 441) 
57 K.L. Glazer I A.B. Lipsky, Unilateral refusals to deal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
~1995) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 749,p.753 
8Venit/ Kallaugher, 319 ftn.12 
59570 F.2d 982, 992-993 (DC Cir 1977) cert.den. 436 US 956 [1978]. The judgment contains 
a definition of EFD by Sullivan. "If a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a 
common facility and if due to natural advantage, custom or restriction of scale it is not 
feasible for excluded competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the 
facility must give access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory 
terms." (992) 
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were no reasonable alternatives, the stadium could not easily be duplicated 
by potential competitors, and there was sufficient capacity for an order of 
access to be reasonable. It was stated that: 
"To be 'essential' a facility need not be indispensable; it is sufficient if the 
duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its 
use inflicts a severe handicap in potential market entrants."60 
The most commonly-quoted definition of the EFD in US case law can be 
found in the 1983 case of MCI Communications Corp. v. AT& T,61 a decision 
in the field of telecommunications, concerning interconnection. The case 
concerned AT& T's refusal to interconnect MCI with their nation-wide 
telephone network, thus limiting MCI's ability to compete in the long-distance 
market. 
The Court of Appeals, th Circuit, expressly based its decision on the EFD, 
holding that the decisive factor was the transfer of market power from the 
monopolized market to an ancillary, competitive market: 
"A monopolist's refusal to deal under these circumstances is governed by 
the so-called essential facilities doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful 
because a monopolist's control of an essential facility (sometimes called a 
'bottleneck') can extend monopoly power from one stage of production to 
another, and from one market into another. Thus the antitrust laws have 
imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation of making the 
facility available on non-discriminatory terms."62 
Famously, the Court identified four criteria necessary to establish liability 
under the EFD: 
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
(2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential 
facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
(4) the feasibility of providing the facilitl3. 
The Court stated that the fundamental criterion for a facility to be essential is 
that the potential competitor is not able to duplicate it, both in physical and 
economic terms. With regard to the economic feasibility of duplication, it was 
60supra n. 59, at 992 
61 708 F.2d 1081,1132 (7th Cir.1982), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 891 [1983] 
62 ibid., at para.31 
63 ibid. 
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held, in another case, that: "(a)s the word 'essential' indicates, a plaintiff must 
show more than inconvenience or some economic loss; he must show that an 
alternative to the facility is not feasible."64 
The court emphasized that there may be legitimate reasons to deny access 
to an essential facility, but could not find any in the present case: 
"MCI produced sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to conclude that it was 
technically and economically feasible for AT&T to have provided the 
requested interconnections, and that AT& T's refusal to do so constituted an 
act of monopolization."65 
Since MCI, the doctrine has been applied in a variety of cases by the lower 
US courts, often widening the application of the EFD to an appreciable 
extent.66 Such extensive application of the EFD has been widely criticised,67 
but it seems that the Supreme Court is reluctant to intervene and "will let the 
lower courts muddle on".68 
2.4 Telecommunications cases 
The liberalization of the telecommunications sector in the US commenced 
with the break-up of AT&T in 1984, and was followed by the adoption of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. Any further analysis of this process, however, 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 69 
However, with regard to the application of the EFD in telecommunications 
cases, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Boaal0 is interesting. The Supreme 
Court was asked to interpret certain provisions of the 1996 
64 Twin Labs v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F .2d 566, 570 (2nd Circ, 1990) 
65supra n.233, para.33 
66See e.g. Twin Laboratories Inc v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2nd Circ,1990); 
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 c. Hyde,466 U.S.2,80 L.Ed.2d 2,104 S.Ct.1551 
~1984); Florida Fuels Inc. vBelcher Oil Co.717 F.Supp.1528 (SO Fla.1989) 
7See Areeda who suggests further limitations of the EFD, according to which the following 
principles should be taken into account: there is no general duty to share; no-one should be 
forced to deal unless doing so is likely to substantially improve competition in the market 
place; and no-one should be forced to deal if that could chill desirable activity. Even when all 
these conditions are satisfied, denial of access should never per se be unlawful, legitimate 
business purposes may justify not sharing a facility (p.841) 
68Giazer/ Lipsky, pp. 233 -235 . . . . 
69A useful summary can be found in J. Hausman I G. Sidak, A consumer-welfare approach to 
mandatory unbundling of telecommunications, (1999) Yale Law Journal , 417, 426-434 
70525 us 366 [1999] 
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Telecommunications Act. 71 The Court had to decide, inter alia,- under which 
conditions an incumbent telephone company could be compelled to share its 
network at cost-based rates with its competitors. Both Justice Scalia, in his 
majority opinion, and Justice Breyer, in his separate opinion, referred to the 
EFD . Both emphasised the importance of competition law principles in the 
interpretation of the Telecommunications Act. In particular, Justice Scalia 
stated that, even in a regulatory context, it was necessary to take into 
account economic considerations such as supply-substitutability. 72 
Justice Breyer observed that : 
"Although the provision describing which element must be unbundled does 
not explicitly refer to the analogous "essential facilities" doctrine (an antitrust 
doctrine that this court has never adopted), the Act in my view, does impose 
related limits upon the Federal Communications Commission's powers to 
compel unbundling. In particular I believe that, given the Act's basic purpose, 
it requires a convincing explanation of why facilities should be shared (or 
"unbundled") where a new entrant could compete without the facility, or 
where practical alternatives to that facility are available."73 
He also referred to the two main concerns usually raised in connection with a 
duty to supply access in the telecommunications industry, namely the huge 
administrative and social costs that an obligation to share facilities may entail, 
and the effect such an obligation may have on investment in the sector 
(concerns also raised in EU legal commentary): 
" [A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner's incentive to keep 
up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-
creating investment, research or labor." He concluded that: 
"Regulatory rules that go too far, expanding the definition of what must be 
shared beyond that which is essential to that which merely proves 
advantageous to a single competitor, risk costs that, in terms of the Act's 
objectives, may make the game not worth the candle."74 
71 Section 251 (d)(2) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act provides that: "In determining what 
network elements should be made available for purposes of subsection C (3) of this section, 
the Commission shall consider at a minimum, whether: (A) access to such network elements 
as are proprietary is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such network 
elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to 
~Jovide the services that it seeks to offer." 
supra n. 70, at 742 
73ibid. , at 753 
74 ibid, at 754 
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These considerations should be taken into account when applying the EFD to 
the European telecommunications markets. As Bavasso put it: 
"This statement expresses in clear, lucid and powerful terms a concern that, 
on the other side of the Atlantic, should guide the debate over essential 
facilities in communications and the importance of consumer welfare in 
regulation."75 
Another very recent case concerning the application of the EFD in the area of 
telecommunications is Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 76 in which the 
Supreme Court repeated and clarified its position concerning a duty to deal 
and the EFD. 
The facts in Verizon Communications can be summarized as follows: New 
entrants into the US telephone industry benefited from detailed federal 
regulations requiring "incumbent" carriers to share their networks. Rates 
charged for access had to be reasonable, and separate pieces of the 
incumbent's network had to be offered "unbundled". One of the incumbents 
(Verizon) had been subject to fines and to regulatory orders as a remedy for 
certain violations of those rules. Trinka, a law firm suing in the capacity of a 
customer for telephone services, alleged that: "Verizon had filled rivals' 
orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to 
discourage customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive 
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), thus impeding the competitive LECs' ability 
to enter and compete in the market for telephone services."77 Trinka alleged 
that Verizon's conduct constituted "monopolization", prohibited by S.2 
Sherman Act. The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal the claim was 
reinstated for trial on theories of, inter alia, violation of the EFD. 
The Supreme Court held that although "under certain circumstances, a 
refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and 
violate S.2" , it has been "very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, 
because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of 
identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm."78 The 
Court referred to its earlier decision in Aspen Skiing9 and characterised that 
75Bavasso (YEL 2000) 84 
76Verizon Communications, Inc. V. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, No. 02-682, 540 
U.S. (January 13, 2004) 
77 ibid, at 4 
78ibid., at 8 
79supra n.47 
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case as being "at or near the boundary of S.2 liability". 80 There, the Court 
"found significance in the defendant's decision to cease participation in a 
cooperative venture" because "[t]he unilateral termination of a voluntary (and 
thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to 
forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end".81 By contrast, 
the Trinka complaint: 
"does not allege that Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with 
its rivals, or would ever have done so absent statutory compulsion. Here, 
therefore, the defendant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of 
its refusal to deal -upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by 
competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice."82 
The Supreme Court seems to rely thereby on the doctrine of intent. 
The Court distinguishes Verizon Communications from the earlier cases of 
Aspen Skiin{/3 and Otter Tai!A by observing that, in the present case, "the 
services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the 
public".85 In Aspen Skiing, by contrast: 
"what the defendant refused to provide to its competitor was a product that it 
already sold at retaii. .. Similarly, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States. .. the 
defendant was already in the business of providing a service to certain 
customers. "86 
The Court concluded "that Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance in the 
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under this 
Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedent."87 The Court stated that "[t]his 
conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be established law 
the "essential facilities" doctrine crafted by some lower courts ... "88 . The Court 
refused either "to recognize or to repudiate" the "essential facilities doctrine" 
because, according to the Court, the Trinka complaint failed to allege all the 
elements of such a claim.89 An "essential facilities" claim requires 
"unavailability of access to the 'essential facilities"', whereas in the 
80supra n.76, at 9 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid. 
83supra n.47 
84
supra n.30 
85supra n.76., at 10 
86 ibid. 
87 ibid, at 11 
88 ibid. 
89 ibid. 
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circumstances of Verizon Communications "[t]he 1996 Act's extensive 
provision for access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of 
forced access."90 The Court concluded by saying that "essential facility claims 
should ... be denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to 
compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms."91 
Again, the Supreme Court refused to endorse the EFD. The Court previously 
declined to uphold a verdict on this basis in Aspen Skiin/2 and Justice 
Breyer pointedly noted the doctrine's lack of Supreme Court endorsement in 
the above-discussed decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board 93 In 
addition, in Verizon Communications, the Court did not merely seem to 
sidestep the doctrine as in the previous two decisions but expressed strong 
reservations, in particular concerning the difficulty of finding a balance 
between the fundamental antitrust concept of independence of competitors 
and the concept of enforced sharing of assets: 
"Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some 
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the 
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically 
beneficial facilities."94 
The Court also emphasized the relative institutional superiority of 
administrative agencies over antitrust courts, when it comes to regulating in a 
timely fashion and at the level of detail required for effective intervention in a 
fast-moving industry such as telecommunications. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The question is whether it can be concluded from the above that there is an 
independent concept of EFD in US antitrust law, particularly bearing in mind 
the fact that the US Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed the doctrine 
as such. The Supreme Court decisions commonly quoted as a support of an 
essential facilities concept in US antitrust law deal, above all, with the 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid. 
92supra n. 47 
93supra n. 70 
94 supra n. 76., at 8 
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interpretation of monopolization under Sec.2 Sherman Act. Indeed, more 
recent case-law seems to indicate a return to past principles such as the 
intent test. 95 However, examples can also be found in more recent case-law 
which point to a perception of the EFD as an independent legal concept: For 
example in Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines et.aP6 the Court held that 
"Stated most generally, the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when 
one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable 
access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to 
compete with the first." 
In some cases, the EFD seems to be regarded as a mere variant of the 
classic Colgate97 exceptions, rather than an independent concept. For 
example, in a case in the telecommunications sector, Southern Pacific 
Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 98 the court 
actually examined the elements of an EFD established in MC/,99 but based its 
decision on the anticompetitive intent - or lack thereof - of the defendant 
undertaking. 
It seems, therefore, that not even US case law points unequivocally to the 
EFD as an independent legal concept. Areeda refers to it as the "so-called" 
essential facilities doctrine: 
"so-called because most Supreme Court cases invoked in support do not 
speak of it and can be explained without reference to it. Indeed the cases 
support the doctrine only by implication and in highly qualified ways. You will 
not find any case that provides a consistent rationale for the doctrine or that 
explores the social costs and benefits or the administrative costs of requiring 
the creator of an asset to share it with a rival."100 
However, there is agreement that, if there is an independent concept of an 
EFD, this should be applied as narrowly as possible, as it might have a 
significant effect on innovation in a market economy. 101 
The Supreme Court's deep scepticism of the EFD is the opposite of the 
reception given to the doctrine in Europe: the perception of the EFD, in 
95For a number of case examples ,see M. Holzhaeuser, Essential Facilities in der 
Te/ekommunikation ,Beck 2001, p.178, ftn.798 
96948 F. 2d 536 (9th Circ 1991) 
97supra n.12 
98740 F.2d 980 (DC 1984) 
99 supra n.61 
100Areeda, p. 841 
101 ibid., p.852; Werden ,p.479 
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particular on the part of the European Commission, seems to be far more 
positive. However, the ECJ, in its recent ruling in Bronner, 102 has tried to curb 
the application of the EFD significantly. 
3. The deve~opment of an Essentia~ Facmties 
Doctrine in EC law 
The question is one of whether, and to what extent, the EFD principles can 
be applied in EC competition law. In EC competition law the development of 
the EFD is necessarily based on the interpretation of the existing legislative 
provisions and the case law concerning abuses of a dominant position under 
Article 82 EC. 103 Pursuant to Article 82 (b) EC, an abuse of a dominant 
position may consist of "limiting production, markets or technical development 
to the prejudice of consumers". This provision has generally been held to 
cover refusals by dominant undertakings to supply a customer or 
competitor. 104 In EC competition law, the EFD is often traced back to a 
number of decisions of the ECJ dealing with refusal to deal with or to supply a 
competitor. 
There is one main difference between Article 82 EC and S.2 Sherman Act. 
Whereas S.2 focuses on the manner in which a firm acquires, expands or 
maintains monopoly power, the focus of Article 82 EC is on the abuse of a 
dominant position. Therefore, S.2 sanctions the mere intention to gain a 
dominant position with inappropriate means, whereas the application of 
Article 82 EC presupposes the existence of a dominant position.105 However, 
once an undertaking has achieved a dominant position, it will be subject to 
fairly close scrutiny for any abuse. In US law the EFD is construed as an 
102supra n.1 0 
103Article 82 EC provides: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States ... 
104 R.Whish, Competition Law, (London, 2001),p. 614 
105C. Koenig/S. Loetz, Bedeutung der Essential facililities- Doktrin fUr den Zugang zu 
Netzinfrastrukturen im europaischen Telekommunikationsrecht, (2000) 9 EWS 377,p. 379 
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exception to the general principle of freedom to trade, and is therefore 
narrowly interpreted and applied by the courts. 106 In EC law the EFD has 
been construed as a special application of the duty to supply, which partially 
explains why the Community courts have only rarely and only recently 
referred to the EFD. 107 Article 82 EC and S.2 Sherman Act go in different, if 
not opposite directions: 
"Principally, US antitrust law proscribes only that which artificially lowers 
output and raises prices; even a dominant firm has the right to compete hard 
and may do so even if it excludes competitors. EC competition law, among 
other things, protects small and middle-sized business firms from unfair 
exclusions and has a broader sweep against abusive practices."108 
Although the ECJ has never imposed a general duty to supply upon dominant 
undertakings under Article 82 EC, in cooperation with the Commission it has 
established that, under certain circumstances, for the sake of competition, the 
freedom to contract should be limited. Under certain circumstances, the 
obligations of a dominant undertaking do not only consist of refraining from 
abusive practice but might extend to a duty to actively promote 
competition. 109 In 1984, the Commission stated that "as a general principle 
an objectively unjustifiable refusal to supply by an undertaking holding a 
dominant position on a market constitutes an infringement of Article 86 (now 
Art.82 EC)."110 The Commission has been very active in the transport 
industry, and has cited some of its rulings as "evidence of the determination 
to act against companies holding dominant positions", aimed at providing 
undertakings with a "fair chance to develop and sustain the challenge to 
established carriers."111 The impact of this policy is of paramount importance 
in the telecommunications sector, which has been and still is subject to 
106Venit/ Kallaugher, p. 315 
107See, eg. Jones I Suffrin, p.386; A. Capobianco, The essential facility doctrine: Similarities 
and differences between the American and the European approach, (2001) 26(6) E.L.Rev. 
548,p.550. For Temple Lang, who does not distinguish between EFD cases and refusal to 
supply cases, the EFD "may merely be a useful label for some types of cases rather than an 
analytical tool" (p.437) and therefore "[w]hat the Commission now calls essential facility 
cases were simply merged with what was regarded as the general class of cases in which 
dominant companies have a duty to supply ... " (J. Temple Lang, Defining legitimate 
competition: Companies ·duties to supply competitors and access to essential facilities, 
~1994) 18 Fordham Int. L.J. 437,p.446) 
08 E. Fox, Toward world antitrust and market access, (1997) 91 AJIL 1, 12 
109AG Opinion in Bronner, supra n.182 
11013th Report on Competition Policy (1984 ), p.157 
111 22nd Report on Competition Policy (1992), p. 218 
Chapter 3: Antitrust Law and Access to Essential Facilities 56 
liberalization, and in which new technology continuously creates new markets 
which are closely related to each other. 112 
An underlying theme in these cases on refusal to supply has been the notion 
that a dominant undertaking should not use its dominance in one market to 
strengthen its position and eliminate competition in a related market - so-
called "monopoly leveraging".113 This has caused difficulties for companies 
trying to integrate vertically, or simply trying to operate on a downstream 
market, and has laid the foundations for the EFD in EC law. 
The following outline of EC case law will start with the main EC cases on 
unilateral refusal to supply and will then lead to the definition of 
"essential facilities" in the decisions of the Commission as well as in the 
judgments of the ECJ. 
The leading case in this area is Commercial Solvents, 114 which is also widely 
regarded as the foundation of the EFD in EC law. 115 In this case, Commercial 
Solvents refused to continue to supply an Italian subsidiary, Zoja, with a raw 
material necessary for the production of an anti-TB drug. It tried to justify its 
refusal with its intention to become active in the downstream market for the 
derivative drug itself. The ECJ held that: 
" ... an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw 
materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for 
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is 
itself a manufacturer of these derivatives and therefore risks eliminating all 
competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 86."116 
112Bavasso, (YEL2000),p. 65 
113See, eg. Case 311/84, Centre Beige dEludes du Marche-Te/emarketing v. Compagnie 
Luxembourgeoise de Te/ediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux SA , [1985) ECR 
3261 ; see also: N.T. Nikolinaikos, Access agreements in the telecommunications sector-
Refusal to supply and the essential facilities doctrine under EC competition law, 
(1999) 20(8) E.C.L.R. 399,p.400 ;other Doherty, who distinguishes between refusal to supply 
cases and "extension of monopoly" cases, however he concedes that "this category of cases 
can overlap with the ·refusal to sell' cases" (p.413) 
114Cases 6, 7/73, /stituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Commission, [1974] ECR 223 
115Temple Lang (Fordham lnt"l L.J., 1994) p.438, Venit/ Kallaugher p. 315,0. Ridyard, 
Essential facilities and the obligation to supply competitors under the UK and EC competition 
law, (1996) 17(8) E.C.L.R. 438,p.438 ; R.F. Subiotto, The right to deal with whom one 
pleases under EEC competition law: A small contribution to a necessary debate, (1992) 
13(6) E.C.L.R. 234,p.23 
116 supra n.114.,para.25 
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However, the duty to supply in this case did not arise from the fact that the 
raw material could be regarded as an "essential facility". The defendants 
produced expert reports stating that it would have been possible for Zoja to 
receive the raw material from another manufacturer or to change its 
production methods so as to produce the raw material itself. However, the 
ECJ rejected these arguments and stated: 
"The question is not whether Zoja, by adapting its installations and its 
manufacturing processes, would have been able to continue its 
production ... based on other raw materials, but whether Commercial Solvents 
had a dominant position in the market in the raw material...lt is only the 
presence on the market of a raw material which could be substituted without 
difficulty ... which could invalidate the argument that Commercial Solvents has 
a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 (now Article 82 EC)."117 
The case of United Brands118 also dealt with a refusal to supply an existing 
customer. United Brands refused to continue to supply Oelsen, one of its 
distributors/ripeners, because Oelsen had taken part in an advertising and 
promotion campaign for a rival brand. The ECJ held that United Brands had 
abused its dominant position on the banana market, and stated that 
"an undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of marketing a product 
- which cashes in on the reputation of a brand name known to and valued by 
consumers - cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by 
regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no 
way out of the ordinary."119 
This seems to suggest that in United Brands the ECJ went further than in 
Commercial Solvents, 120 as it did not determine whether the refusal to supply 
would have led to the elimination of Oelsen on the market. 121 However, it 
acknowledged that United Brand's actions were "designed to have a serious 
adverse effect on competition on the relevant banana market by only allowing 
firms dependent upon the dominant undertaking to stay in business". 122 
117ibid. 
118Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207 
119ibid., para.292 
120supra n.114 
121 Subiotto, p. 235 
122supra n118, para.194 
Chapter 3: Antitrust Law and Access to Essential Facilities 58 
Importantly, the ECJ stated that a dominant firm may be justified in refusing 
to supply in order to protect its commercial interests, but not if "its actual 
purpose is to strengthen its dominant position and abuse it."123 
However, "even if the possibility of a counter attack is acceptable that attack 
must still be proportionate to the threat..."124 According to Temple Lang, this 
suggests that the duty to supply a customer or distributor may be less strict 
than the duty to supply a competitor, as the above formula "would not be 
appropriate to a refusal to supply a competitor". 125 
United Brands seems to be the first case in which "essential facilities" were 
mentioned. The ECJ held that: 
"the effect of this withdrawal of supplies was to ... discourage [the distributor] 
from selling bananas under a competing brand name ... ln this way UBC 
succeeds in keeping its principal distributor/ripeners within its own marketing 
network and in preventing its competitors from having access to them, thus 
denying to such competitors the essential facility which they may require in 
order to ripen their bananas before sale and therefore in fact from having 
access to the market..." (emphasis added) 126. Although this seems to indicate 
that a dominant company commits an abuse if it refuses competitors access 
to an essential facility, the issue was not discussed in detail. It only arose 
indirectly from the Commission's main action for discriminatory pricing. 127 
Both decisions can be interpreted as providing a broad duty to supply by 
firms in a dominant position. Whish writes: "Dominant firms must therefore be 
aware that they may not justify any refusal to supply. It is not enough that the 
refusal was in the firms' best commercial interests; it must be objectively 
justified if it is to escape condemnation under Article 86."128 
One of the rare cases in which a refusal to supply was considered to be 
justified is BP v. Commission. 129 The Commission had found BP had acted 
unlawfully by supplying its regular, long-term customers, instead of 
occasional customers, when a petrol shortage occurred during the oil crisis in 
123ibid., para.189 
124 ibid., para.190 
125Temple Lang (1994 Fordham Int. L.J.). p.447 
126
supra n.118, para.192 
127M. Cave I P. Crowther, Competition law approaches to regulating access to utilities: The 
essential facilities doctrine, (1995) Rivista lnternazionale Di Scienze Sociali e Discipline 
Ausiliarie 141, p.151 
128Whish, p.619 
129Case 77/77, Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschippij BV v. Commission, [1978] ECR 
1513 
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1974. However, the ECJ annulled the Commission's decision, holding that 
BP's supply strategy was reasonable in the circumstances. The refusal to 
supply AEG, which was only an occasional customer, was justified. The ECJ 
found that there were other sources of supply available: 
" .. it is clear, thanks to that support and the supply opportunities offered by 
the market apart form supplies coming from BP, that AEG was able during 
the crisis to find supplies which, although limited by reasons in particular of 
general scarcity of products, nevertheless did put it in a position to overcome 
the difficulties created by the crisis."130 
The principles established in Commercial Solvents131 and United Brands132 
were later applied by the ECJ in Telemarketing. 133 This case is of particular 
interest as it is the first to deal with a refusal to supply an essential service. 134 
It also played an important role in the Commission's liberalization of the 
telecommunications market. 135 
Telemarketing concerned a television broadcaster which would only accept 
advertisements for telemarketing 136 on its television station if the phone 
number used was that of its own subsidiary. The plaintiff could therefore not 
use its own number. The Court held that 
" ... an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is committed where, without any 
objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a 
particular market reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same 
group an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking 
as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with the 
possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking."137 
130ibid.,para.42; this is in contrast with the Commission's decision in Napier Brown v. British 
Sugar (OJ L 284/41, 1988) where British Sugar held a monopoly in the production of beet 
sugar and refused to supply Napier Brown, the larges sugar merchant in the UK. The 
Commission found in that case that shortages may not be used as a pretext for refusing to 
deal for unlawful reasons. 
131supra n. 114 
132supra n. 118 
133supra n.113 
134Holzhaeuser, p. 183; see also para.26 of the judgment: "that ruling (Commercial Solvents) 
also applies to the case of an undertaking holding a dominant position on the market in a 
service which is indispensable for the activities of another undertaking on another market" 
135M. Naftel Does the European Commission's Telecommunications Access Notice send the 
correct economic signals to the market?, (1999) 5 Phoenix Center Policy Paper 1,1 ,p.9 
136Telemarketing is the provision in television advertisements of the telemarketing 
company's telephone number enabling viewers to call in orders to obtain more information 
concerning the products advertised. 
137supra n113, para.27 
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For the first time, the Court established an "indispensability" test to a claim by 
a customer that a facility was essential. Referring to Commercial Solvents, 138 
the ECJ held: 
"[Commercial Solvents] also applies to the case of an undertaking holding a 
dominant position in the market in a service which is indispensable for the 
activities of another undertaking on another market..." (emphasis added). 139 
However, Telemarketing seems to go further than Commercial Solvents as 
for the first time it deals not with a refusal to supply, but with a refusal of 
access, therefore invoking the "indispensability" test, which was absent in 
Commercial Solvents and United Brands. 140 Also, the Court seemed to be 
relying less on the behaviour of RTL to establish an abuse, but rather more 
on structural factors: there had been no previous dealings between RTL and 
CBM.141 
The case of RTT v.IGB-Inno-BM 42 is interesting for this thesis as it concerns 
a decision in the telecommunications sector. This case, similar to 
Telemarketing, 143 does not deal with an actual refusal to supply but rather 
with an extension of monopoly power to an ancillary market. However, the 
decision is often referred to in legal literature as an example of the problem of 
access to facilities in EC law. 144 It also differs from the cases quoted above 
as it does not deal with the termination of supplies to an existing customer, 
but with the entrance of a new competitor into the market. 145 
The RTT case concerned the Belgium telecommunications administration 
(RTT) which had a legal monopoly on operating the public 
telecommunications network, as well as the power to adopt specifications 
and approve its competitors' products. Citing Telemarketing, 146 the ECJ held 
that: 
"an undertaking holding a monopoly in the market for the establishment and 
operation of the network, without any objective necessity, reserves to itself a 
138supra n.114 
139supra. n.113, para. 26-27 
140supra n.118 
141 Larouche, (Oxford 2000),p. 170 
142Case C-18/88, [1991] ECR 1-5973 
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144Temple Lang, Forh.lnt.p.469,K. Markert, Die Verweigerung des Zugangs zu "wesentlichen 
Einrichtungen" als Problem der kartellrechtlichen Mir..brauchsaufsicht, (1995) WuW, 560, 
p,.562 
45Nikolinaikos, (ECLR 1999) p.40 1 
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neighbouring but separate market, in this case the market for the importation, 
marketing, connection, commissioning and maintenance of equipment for 
connection to the said network, thereby eliminating all competition from other 
undertakings, constitutes an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty."147 
Despite the abolition of special and exclusive rights in the 
telecommunications market, this prohibition will still apply as long as 
incumbent telecommunications operators remain dominant in those markets 
that were formerly reserved to them, or in any new developing markets such 
as the internet service markets. 148 In the EC telecommunications market 
today, incumbent operators still hold dominant positions in the majority of 
relevant markets. 149 
In its 1998 Access Notice, 150 the Commission announced that it would apply 
the Tetra Pak151 precedent, which concerned closely related horizontal 
markets, to closely related vertical markets. 152 In Tetra Pak, the Court had 
held that under "special circumstances", Article 82 EC can be applied to 
conduct by a dominant undertaking on a distinct, non-dominated market. 
Accordingly, any unjustified extension of its upstream dominance onto a 
downstream service market by a dominant network services provider is likely 
to be prohibited by Article 82 EC. 
In France v. Commission, 153 the so-called 
case, the Court, in analysing the Terminal 
above) which abolished the exclusive 
Telecommunications Terminal 
Equipment Directive 154 (see 
rights of the national 
telecommunications monopolist to import, sell, put into service and maintain 
telecommunications terminals, said that the Treaty requires conditions in 
which competitors have equal chances. These conditions do not exist when 
one competitor has the power to lay down technical specifications for, and to 
approve products of, other competitors. 155 
The case law of the ECJ on refusal to supply has been severely criticised. 
One of the main points of criticism is that the Court does not take into account 
147 supra n.142, para.19 
148Garzaniti (2003), p.304 
149see Ch.2, ftn.149 
150see Ch.2, ftn.1 00 
151 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, [1996] ECR 1-5951 
152
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the effects the refusal to supply has on competition in general and thus on 
consumer welfare, but rather considers the interests of small and medium-
sized undertakings. This seems to indicate that every suppression of 
competitors per se is unlawful under Article 82 EC. As Kauper states: "these 
decisions come very close to condemning the use of particular means without 
regard to its ends .. .The Court of Justice comes close to holding it prima facie 
unlawful because it was a refusal to deal."156 And Korah points out that "the 
competition rules are not being used to enable efficient firms to expand at the 
expense of the less efficient, but to protect smaller and medium-sized firms at 
the expense of efficient or larger firms .. .The interest of the consumers, and 
the economy as a whole, in the encouragement of efficiency by firms of any 
size, is being subordinated to the interests of smaller traders."157 
4. Access to essentia~ facilities 
4.1 The introduction of the EFD into EC competition law by the 
Commission 
The EFD found its way into EC law mainly through the Commission's actions 
and decisions. However, it appears that the Commission had initially been 
more cautious than the ECJ in developing a broad duty to supply. 158 For 
example, it stated that in order for a refusal to sell to be abusive, it should be 
directed at existing customers and "gravely affect maintenance of conditions 
of effective competition in the Common Market"159 or "cause competition to 
be gravely restricted". 160 In 881/Boosey & Hawkes, 161 a case similar to 
United Brands, 162 the Commission even went so far to declare that "there is 
15~.E.Kauper, Whither Article 86? Observations on excessive prices and refusals to deal, in 
Annual Proceedings of the Fordh. Corp.L.I, (1992), 675, 676 
157V.Korah,An introductory guide to EC competition law and practice, (Oxford, 1997), p. 106 
158Subiotto, p. 236 
159supra n. 284, at 244 
16
°Case 22178,Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission, [1979] 
ECR 1869, para. 31 
161 1nterim measures [1987] OJ L 286136, at 19 
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no obligation placed on a dominant producer to subsidize competition to 
itself." 163 
In more recent decisions, the Commission found that there was a duty to 
assist competitors in certain circumstances. These decisions did not concern 
the supply of products but the granting of access to some kind of facility 
under the control of a dominant undertaking. A large number of these 
decisions concern the transport sector. However, some of these decisions 
might prove to be useful precedents in the telecommunications sector, in 
particular considering the absence of case law concerning access and 
interconnection in telecommunications under the competition rules. 
The Commission is the only European institution which has expressly 
referred to the term "essential facilities". It first used the term in its decision in 
Sea/ink/8&1 Holyhead 164 Nevertheless, proponents of the EFD claim that the 
doctrine manifested itself in earlier Commission decisions 165 such as 
Sabena166 and British Midland/Aer Lingus. 167 However, none of these 
decisions rely on the EFD, even implicitly. 
In Sabena, 168 the Commission found that Sabena's refusal to grant a 
competing airline access to its computer reservation system violated Article 
82 EC, in particular because the refusal was likely to prevent the competitor 
from operating on the London-Brussels route. The fact that the Commission 
considered that such access was of "capital importance .. .for all companies 
seeking to operate competitively on the Belgian market"169 might indicate that 
the Commission regarded the CRS as an "essential facility". Nevertheless, 
the market situation at the time seemed to indicate differently (for example, at 
least two airlines operating from Brussels were not listed on Sabena's CRS), 
and no reference was made to essential facilities when the Commission 
concluded that Sabena's conduct was considered abusive, since it "could 
have resulted in London European abandoning its plan to open a route 
between Brussels and Luton." 170 As Larouche said, " ... there is no indication 
that London European would of necessity have refrained from flying between 
163supra n.161, para.19 
1641nterim measures [1992] , not published in the Official Journal, but in [1992] 5 CMLR 255 
165Temple Lang, (1994 Fordham lnt'L.J.), p. 437 
166 London European Sabena, [1988] OJ L317/47 4 CMLR 662 
167[1992] OJ L96/34 
168supra n.166 
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Brussels and Luton without access to Sabena's CRS, only that it could have 
done so."171 
In British Midland /Aer Lingus172 the Commission stated that dominant 
undertakings should not "withhold facilities which the industry traditionally 
provides to all other airlines."173 The decision concerned a refusal by Aer 
Ling us to continue to interline 174 with British Midland, when the latter, a strong 
competitor, began to compete with Aer Lingus on the Dublin-London route. 
The Commission declared that whether a refusal to interline is unlawful 
depends on its effect on competition: 
" ... it would exist in particular when the refusal or withdrawal of interline 
facilities by a dominant airline is objectively likely to have a significant impact 
on the other airline's ability to start a new service or sustain an existing 
service on account of its effects on the other airline's costs and revenue in 
respect of the service in question, and when the dominant airline cannot give 
any objective commercial reason for its refusal...other than its wish to avoid 
helping this particular competitor."175 In the instant case the Commission 
could not find any such objective reason. It elaborated that: 
"Aer Lingus had not been able to point to efficiencies created by a refusal to 
interline nor to advance any other persuasive and legitimate business 
justification for its conduct. Its desire to avoid loss of market share, the 
circumstance that this is a route of vital importance to the company and that 
its operating margin is under pressure do not make this a legitimate response 
to new entry."176 Again, there was nothing to indicate that interlining was an 
essential facility. British Midland had begun to operate successfully on the 
Heathrow-Dublin route even without interlining with Aer Lingus. 177 
As mentioned above, in Sea/ink/ 8&/ Ho/yhead' 78 the Commission used the 
term "essential facilities" for the first time and defined an essential facility as 
"a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide 
171 Larouche,(Oxford, 2000),p. 181 fn. 274 
172supra n. 167 
173
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1741nterlining is an International Air Travel Association (lATA) practice by which almost all 
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issues a ticket for a journey, part of which will be made on another airline. Interlining also 
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at 35, 36) 
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services to their customers."179 The decision dealt with a complaint by B&l, 
which operated a ferry service out of Holyhead Harbour, against Sealink 
which was both a car ferry operator and the owner of Holyhead Harbour. 
Sealink instituted timetable changes to the detriment of B&l and in favour of 
its own activities. The Commission adopted a decision providing for interim 
measures, ordering Sealink to return to its previous timetable. The matter 
never went to a final decision as the dispute was settled. The Commission 
stated that: 
"A dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and itself uses an 
essential facility ... and which refuses its competitors access to that facility or 
grants access to competitors only on terms less favourable than those which 
it gives its own services, thereby placing the competitors at a competitive 
disadvantage, infringes Article 82, if the other conditions of that Article are 
met ... "180 
As a footnote to the decision shows, this statement was expressly based on 
the case law of the ECJ: Commercial Solvents, 181 Telemarketing, 182 
Renault, 183 Vo/vo, 184 Magi/1 185 and GB-Inno.186 
Furse suggests that the above test is more strict than that used in US case 
law and in British M!dland!Aer Lingus,187 as those cases concentrated mainly 
on the fact that the primary motivation of the defendant had been the 
detriment of the competitor, whereas such detriment was only a side-effect in 
Sealink/8&1 Holyhead.188 
One of the criticisms raised against the decision was that the Commission did 
not examine whether B&l could have operated its ferry service from an 
alternative port.189 Venit and Kallaugher indicate that the case was one of 
monopoly leveraging, which could have been decided without relying on the 
EFD. They considered that Sealink was dominant on the market for ferry 
179ibid. , para 41 
180ibid 
181 supra n.114 
182supra n. 113 
183Case 53/87, CICCRA v. Renau/!,[1988] ECR 6039 
184Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, [1988] ECR 6211 
185Cases C-241 to 241/91 P, RTT&!TP v. Commission (Magi/1),[1995] ECR 1-743 
186supran.142 · 
187 supra n.167 
188supra n164; Furse, p.472 
189Ridyard, p.442 
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services, and that it had extended that dominance from ferries to harbours. 190 
The Commission, however, did not examine whether Sealink was dominant 
on the ferry market.191 
The Commission developed the idea that an owner of an essential facility 
may have to provide access to it to a competitor in three further decisions 
concerning ports, Sea Containers Ltd!Stena Sea/ink, 192 Port of Rodby193 and 
Morlaix (Port of Roscoff). 194 
The Sea/ink II decision ( Sea Containers Ltd! Stena Sealink195) concerned a 
request by Sea Containers to operate a new service from Holyhead Harbour. 
Sealink refused to grant access to the port under reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions. The Commission followed its first decision, but 
added that the principle of essential facility applies "when the competitor 
seeking access to the essential facility is a new entrant into the relevant 
market."196 
Venit and Kallaugher point to a passage in the decision which seems to 
expand the doctrine further: "[i]t is the Commission's view that in the 
circumstances of the present case an independent harbour authority, which 
would of course have an interest in increasing revenue at the port, would at 
least have considered whether the interests of existing and proposed users of 
the port could best be reconciled by a solution involving modest changes in 
the allocated slot times or in any plans for the development of the harbour."197 
However, this aspect is not found in any of the other Commission's decisions 
concerning ports, and does therefore not seem to be a necessary part of the 
Commission's legal analysis. 198 
190Venit I Kallaugher, p.331 
191 Doherty, p. 415 
192[1994] OJ L15/8 
193[1994] OJ L55/52, 
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In Port of Rodby, 199 a decision adopted under Articles 82 EC and 86 
(formerly Art. 90) EC, the Commission stated that neither the Danish 
government's refusal to allow Stena to build a private commercial port near 
Rodby, nor to allow it to operate from Rodby itself, was a violation of Articles 
82 EC and 86 EC. The Commission found the port to be an essential facility 
as there was no alternative to that port for sea transport from Denmark to 
Germany. According to the Commission, such a refusal: 
"has the effect of eliminating a potential competitor on the Rodby-Puttgarden 
route and hence of strengthening the joint dominant position of DSB and DB 
(publicly owned companies) on that route ... Thus an undertaking that owns or 
manages and uses itself an essential facility ... and refuses to grant them (the 
competitors) access to such facility is abusing a dominant position. 
Consequently, an undertaking that owns or manages an essential port facility 
from which it provides a maritime transport service may not, without objective 
justification, refuse to grant a ship owner wishing to operate on the same 
maritime route access to that facility without infringing Article 86 (now Article 
82 EC)."200 
As far as an objective justification was concerned, there was no evidence that 
the port's capacities had been exhausted and Stena was willing to finance 
any necessary alterations. With regard to the first point, the Commission held 
that: 
"even on a saturated market, an improvement on the quality of products or 
services offered or a reduction in prices as a result of competition is a definite 
advantage for consumers; this could lead to an increase in demand which, in 
the present case, could be met by expanding the port."201 
This calls into question whether the Commission accepts the lack of capacity 
as an objective justification for a refusal to grant access to an essential 
facility.202 
The last of the above-mentioned port decisions of the Commission, 
Morlaix, 203 differs from the others in so far as the defendant, the owner of the 
199supra n.193 
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Port of Roscoff, CCI Morlaix (a French administrative body) did not operate 
ferries itself. Nevertheless, the Commission found that: 
"CCI Morlaix occupies a dominant position in the provision of an essential 
facility ... lts refusal, without objective justification, to grant access to these 
facilities to a company wishing to compete with a company active in a 
secondary market constitutes an abuse of its dominant position, even leaving 
aside any economic interest held by CCI Morlaix in Brittany Ferries."204 
Consequently, the Commission does not only seem to apply the EFD in 
cases where a dominant undertaking interfered with competition on a 
secondary market on which it competed itself, but rather sets out more 
broadly how an undertaking with a statutory monopoly must conduct itself.205 
Finally, in La Paste/SWIFT and GUF,206 the Commission dealt expressly with 
the EFD in a case concerning access to a telecommunications network. 
SWIFT, a union of banks, held a dominant position in Europe on the market 
for data transmission and data processing services. SWIFT denied other 
banks access to the concerned telecommunications network. The 
Commission considered the network to be an essential facility and SWIFT's 
refusal to grant access to be a violation of Article 82 EC. The Commission's 
view was that to refuse any entity access to such a network is tantamount to 
a de facto exclusion from the market for international transfer.207 
4.2 Intellectual Property Rights and essential facilities 
Although not directly relevant to this thesis, the case law on a duty to licence 
an IP right is closely linked to that developed on the EFD. As this thesis deals 
with access to tangible property in general, and access to 
telecommunications networks in particular, only those aspects of IPR cases 
that are significant in this respect will be analysed. The ECJ relied on cases 
involving access to IP rights (in particular Magi!f08 ) to reach its decision in 
204
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Bronner, 209 the leading ECJ judgement on essential facilities. Bronner is the 
only ECJ case which deals directly with access to infrastructure (in this case, 
a newspaper delivery scheme) and is therefore of particular interest in the 
telecommunications sector. Access to the incumbent operators' infrastructure 
is essential for new services providers to reach their customers and therefore 
for the competitiveness of the downstream market. In Bronner, the Court and 
the Advocate General refer in detail to their earlier decision in Magill, dealing 
with the licensing of IP rights. The Commission relied heavily upon Bronner 
in its recent decision in the /MS Healttt10 case, also dealing with a duty to 
licence an IP right. 
Although this thesis deals with access to tangible property, the refusal to 
licence an IP right can play a significant role in the telecommunications 
sector. The refusal to licence of the holder of an IP right becomes particularly 
acute when the IP right has become a standard for the industry: this is often 
the case in the telecommunications sector in which European standardisation 
institutions create such industrial standards. Therefore, such standardisation 
of technologies may create a need to obtain a license to this technology. 211 
As regards the delicate balance between the duty to give access and 
property rights, the ECJ held in Hauef1 2 that property rights might be limited 
by EC legislation provided that the limitation responds to a Community 
objective and the objective cannot be obtained by a less restrictive measure. 
As Bavasso points out, the situation is easier in the telecoms sector and in 
particular in the case of access to networks. Requiring the network owner to 
provide access to the network does not amount to an expropriation. Because 
of the de-materialized nature of the network, "the right to access is better 
analysed in terms of fair return for its use rather than in terms of 
confiscation."213 Due to the inherent differences between tangible property 
rights and IP rights, the relatively broad duty to supply developed by the 
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Commission and the Community courts was not automatically extended to a 
general duty to grant a license. 
To date, the only time the ECJ has considered a refusal to license to be an 
abuse under Article 82 EC was in Magi/1 214 As mentioned above, this case is 
of importance for this thesis, as it was relied on by the ECJ in Bronner.215 The 
case concerned the Irish and British broadcasters BBC, RTE and ITP, which 
each respectively held a copyright on their weekly programme listings. Each 
published a weekly TV guide containing only their own individual weekly 
programme listings. When Magill, an Irish publisher, started producing a 
comprehensive weekly TV guide, the three TV companies obtained 
injunctions against it in national legal proceedings and refused to licence to 
reproduce their programme information. 
In response to a complaint by Magill, the Commission found that the three 
television stations had abused a dominant position and ordered them to 
licence the information. The decision was upheld by the CFI, the judgment of 
which was, in turn, confirmed by the ECJ. 
The ECJ emphasised that the mere ownership of an IP right does not as such 
confer a dominant position.216 It stated, however, that the television 
companies held a de facto monopoly over the information about programmes 
required by Magill. They constituted the only source of such information for 
third parties, as they undertook the task of programming.217 
The ECJ stressed that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor 
may only in "exceptional circumstances"218 involve an abuse under Article 82 
EC. Nevertheless, it obliged the three TV companies to license the TV listings 
to Magill and identified three sets of "exceptional circumstances". 
Firstly, there was a potential demand for a comprehensive weekly 
programme guide, which the three companies did not meet. Viewers were 
obliged to buy three individual programme guides for each of the respective 
channels: 
" .. the appellants -who were, by force of circumstances, the only source of 
the basic information on programme scheduling which is the indispensable 
214supra n.185 
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raw material for compiling a weekly television guides - gave viewers wishing 
to obtain information on the choice of programmes for the week ahead no 
choice but to buy the weekly guides for each station and draw from each of 
them the information they needed to make comparisons. 
The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by relying on national 
copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new product, a 
comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants 
did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such 
refusal constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second paragraph of 
Article 86 of the Treaty."219 
This "new product" aspect is also of some interest for the question of whether 
competitors should gain access to infrastructure in the telecoms sector. 
Rapid technological development means that new products could potentially 
enter the market at any time and improve consumer choice. However, due to 
the still-dominant position of the incumbent operators, there is a danger that 
these will foreclose the market to such technological development. This can 
be seen in the development of broadband in the EU. Incumbents try to keep 
sole control of the local loop, but are also reluctant to establish broadband 
services themselves, fearing that these may compete with their established 
services. 
Secondly, the refusal was not justified.220 
Finally, the refusal was regarded as eliminating all competition in the 
downstream market, as the broadcasters "by their conduct reserved to 
themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all 
competition on that market".221 This last of the three exceptional 
circumstances prompted many commentators to state that the ECJ in fact 
endorsed the EFD, even if it did not mention it.222 
The judgment met with severe criticism. It was suggested that "Magill proves 
the truth of the old legal adage that bad facts make bad law". 223 The 
copyright in question, in weekly programme listing, was seen as a 
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particularly weak IPR.224 However, the ECJ could do nothing about this, 
because, as a matter of national law, a national court had already determined 
that the listings were protected by copyright. 225 
The CFI seemed to have broadened226 or at least refined227 the conditions set 
out in Magill in its decision in Ladbroke.228 The CFI also seemed to use 
'essential facilities' language in the case. 229 Ladbroke wanted to show 
French horse races live on television in its Belgium betting shops, but the 
owners of the copyright in the pictures, the French societe de courses 
refused to sell. Ladbroke explicitly referred to Magill and argued that the 
refusal prevented the appearance of a new product on the market. The 
Commission rejected Ladbroke's complaint, and the CFI confirmed its 
decision. 
The CFI defined the relevant geographic market as Belgium,230 which meant 
that the French societe de courses had not discriminated against Ladbroke 
by selling the pictures to bookmakers in Germany and Austria. 231 As 
Ladbroke was not active in the Belgium market it could neither discriminate 
between operators on the Belgium market, nor was there a danger of it 
monopolising the Belgium downstream market in horse betting.232 
Distinguishing Magi/1, 233 the Court observed that Ladbroke was active in the 
Belgium betting market for which it claimed to need the pictures and that the 
224see also AG Jacobs in Bronner, supra n.1 0, para. 63 
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owner of the rights itself was not present on that market.234 This seems to 
indicate that a refusal to supply does not constitute an abuse if the dominant 
company is not present on the downstream market for which access to the 
facility is said to be essentia1.235 The same can be said of an owner of 
telecommunications infrastructure who does not provide telecoms services 
himself, i.e. is not active in the downstream market. In this scenario, the 
owner has no interest in reserving the infrastructure to himself and would in 
fact benefit from sharing it. The CFI added that: 
"Even if it were assumed that the presence of the societe de courses on the 
Belgian market in sounds and pictures were not, in this case, a decisive 
factor for the purposes of applying Article 82 of the Treaty, that provision 
would not be applicable in this case. The refusal to supply the applicant could 
not fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 82 unless it concerned a 
product or service which was either essential for the exercise of the activity in 
question, in that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new 
product whose introduction might be prevented, despite specific, constant 
and regular potential demand on the part of consumers ... "236 
In defining the above test, the CFI went further than Magi/f37 and broadened 
the duty to licence an IP right: " ... this adds a statement of the essential 
facilities doctrine to a summary of the Magill judgment."238 The CFI held that 
the pictures were not indispensable for Ladbroke to operate on the betting 
market, as he had entered the betting market and was successfully operating 
on it without them.239 
4.3 The reaction of the ECJ and CFI to the EFD 
European Night Services (ENS/40 is another important, non-intellectual-
property decision which contains statements concerning an EFD in European 
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antitrust law. In this case the CFI expressly referred to essential facilities. It is 
of relevance for the application of the EFD in the telecommunications sector 
as it deals, inter alia, with access to infrastructure. The case is based on 
Article 81 EC. However, the CFI's judgement relies on Article 82 EC case 
law, in particular the above mentioned Magi/f41 and Ladbroke.242 
The case concerned a joint venture (ENS) between the main railway 
companies in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and France, which wanted 
to provide overnight rail services between the UK and continental Europe via 
the Channel Tunnel. The Commission243 found that the agreement infringed 
Article 81 (1) EC, but granted an exemption on condition that the companies 
undertaking the joint venture should provide locomotives, train crews and 
train paths to their competitors. 
The CFI quashed the Commission decision for insufficient reasoning. Inter 
alia, the Commission had failed to perform a thorough analysis of the market 
in question, and had not supplied adequate reasoning demonstrating that the 
locomotives and crew were necessary or essential. It was not shown that 
competitors could not buy them from manufacturers, or rent them. 244 The CFI 
stated that a facility can only be essential if there are no substitutes: 
"A product or service cannot be considered necessary or essential unless 
there is no real or potential substitute. 
Consequently, with regard to an agreement ... which falls within Article 85(1) 
(now Article 81(1)) of the Treaty, the Court considers that neither the parent 
undertaking nor the joint venture thus set up may be regarded as being in 
possession of infrastructure, products or services which are 'necessary' or 
·essential' for entry to the relevant market unless such infrastructure, 
products or services are not 'interchangeable· and unless, by reason of their 
special characteristics - in particular the prohibitive cost of and/or time 
reasonably required for reproducing them - there are no viable alternatives 
available to potential competitors of the joint venture, which are thereby 
excluded from the market." (emphasis added.)245 
241 supra n.185 
242supra n.228 
243 [1994] OJ L259/20, 
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The first part of the quotation restates previous case law, i.e. Magilf46 and 
Ladbroke,247 but it elaborates upon this on in the second part. For the first 
time, the question of how reasonable it would be for the competitor requiring 
access to recreate its own alternative facility is addressed.248 The test of 
"interchangeability" seems to refer to the test of the relevant product market. 
Although it might seem to be unnecessarily confusing to link the test for 
essentiality with a seemingly unconnected area of competition law (i.e. 
market definition), this may be regarded as a way for the CFI to state the 
importance of analysing the economic position of the alleged essential facility 
before ordering access to it.249 The second part of the test seems to refer to 
the impossibility of duplicating the facility. The CFI seems to regard this as an 
objective test, as reflected by the notion "potential competitor".250 It also sets 
the threshold for duplication fairly high, as there must be no "viable 
alternatives"251 . 
The CFI's approach in Ladbrokcl52 was confirmed by the ECJ in its 1998 
Bronnet253 judgment. So far, it has been the only case in which the ECJ has 
had to examine the essential facilities doctrine directly and intensively, as the 
plaintiff, Bronner, expressly relied on it in the initial proceedings. 254 
Importantly, for the analysis of access to telecoms infrastructure, the case 
deals with access to infrastructure in the shape of a newspaper delivery 
scheme. 
The matter arose by way of an Article 234 EC (then 177) reference from the 
Oberlandesgericht Wien, acting in its capacity as the Austrian Court of First 
Instance in competition matters (Kartellgericht). The defendant, Mediaprint, 
the largest national newspaper publisher in Austria, refused to give Bronner, 
a much smaller publisher, access to its highly developed newspaper delivery 
scheme. Bronner contended that this constituted an abuse of a dominant 
position, contrary to Article 82 EC, and claimed in particular that access to the 
246supra n. 185 
247supra n. 228 
248J. Scherer, Das Bronner-Urteil des EuGH und die Essential facilities - Doktrin im TK-
Sektor, (1999) 6 MMR 315, p. 317 
249Furse,p. 4 72 
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scheme was essential for it to compete with Mediaprint at a national level. He 
argued that available alternatives, such as postal delivery or starting his own 
delivery system, were either not entirely satisfactory or unduly expensive. 
The Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,255 in which he emphasises the 
need to confine the essential facilities concept within strict limits, is 
particularly noteworthy. Although the opinions of Advocates General only 
have persuasive weight in the judgments of the ECJ, the opinion is worth a 
close review. It contains a thorough analysis of the EFD as applied under US 
antitrust law and EU Commission decisions. 
The Advocate General (AG) did not deal with the issue of dominance in any 
detail, but considered that the key issue was whether Mediaprint's refusal to 
allow access to its delivery scheme was an abuse of a dominant position. 
Bronner had referred extensively to the essential facilities doctrine in 
submissions to the Court.256 Jacobs explained the doctrine as follows: 
" ... a company which has a dominant position in the provision of facilities which 
are essential for the supply of goods or services on another market abuses its 
dominant position where, without objective justification, it refuses access to 
those facilities. Thus in certain cases a dominant undertaking must not 
merely refrain from anti-competitive action but must actively promote 
competition by allowing potential competitors access to the facilities which it 
has developed."257 
The Advocate General observed that although the ECJ had not used the term 
'essential facility' in its case law, it had dealt with a number of cases 
concerning refusal to supply goods or services. He pointed out that the Court 
had found such a refusal to be an abuse only where "aggravating" 
circumstances were present. After discussing many of the relevant cases,258 
he concluded that 
"It is clear from the above rulings that a dominant undertaking commits an 
abuse where, without justification, it cuts off supplies of goods or services to 
an existing customer or eliminates competition on a related market by tying 
separate goods and services. However, it also seems that an abuse may 
2550pinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998, supra n.1 0 
256 supra n.1 0., para.33 
257
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consist in mere refusal to license where that prevents a new product from 
coming on a neighbouring market in competition with the dominant 
undertaking's own product on that market."259 
After examining the use of the essential facilities doctrine in US law,260 he 
turned to examine the Commission's decisions on essential facilities. He 
stated that the Commission had expressly used the term 'essential 
facilities'261 and observed that the term had played an important role in the 
Commission's decisions on refusal to supply.262 He concluded that: 
" ... the Commission constders that refusal of access to an essential facility to a 
competitor can of itself be an abuse even in absence of other factors, such as 
tying of sales, discrimination vis-a-vis another independent competitor, 
discontinuation of supplies to an existing customer or deliberate action to 
damage a competitor ( although it may be noted that in many of the cases 
with which it has dealt such additional factors are to a greater or lesser extent 
present)."263 (emphasis added.) 
After considering the position in the Member States,264 the Advocate General 
made a number of general observations. First, he stated that the laws of the 
Member States generally recognize the right to choose one's trading partners 
and the right to dispose of one's property freely. He added that this right was 
not to be interfered with lightly.265 Secondly, he pointed out that any 
competition policy argument for interfering with the freedom of contract calls 
for "a careful balancing of conflicting considerations"?66 He stated that 
allowing competitors access to essential facilities of dominant firms might 
259supra n. 10,para.43 
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seem to be pro-competitive by enabling competitors to enter the market. 
However, in the long-term, it might discourage the dominant firms from 
investing in the facility in the first place as well as discourage competitors 
from making the effort to duplicate the facility. 267 
One of the main issues in telecoms policy is whether to support the 
development of an alternative infrastructure, or whether to promote access by 
new market entrants to existing infrastructure. Both the 1998 Access 
Notice268 and the new Access Directive269 seem to favour service competition 
(i.e. access to existing infrastructure) over the promotion of infrastructure 
competition. This is in line with certain public policy considerations, such as 
the protection of the environment. Without question, it will enhance 
consumer choice, at least in the short term. 
Thirdly, AG Jacobs stressed that Article 82 EC existed to protect competition, 
and ultimately the consumer, not competitors. 270 Even the Commission in its 
1998 Access Notice agrees that the alleged necessity of an individual 
competitor for access to upstream facilities should not be sufficient to force 
access?71 
The AG added that in assessing conflicting interests, particular care is 
required where the services or facilities to which access is demanded 
represent the fruit of substantial investment. He said that this might be 
particularly true in relation to a refusal to license intellectual property rights. 
Where such exclusive rights were granted for a limited period, that in itself 
involved a balancing of the interest in free competition with that of providing 
an incentive for research and development. Therefore, it was with good 
reason that the Court has held that a refusal to license does not in itself, in 
the absence of other factors, constitute an abuse?72 
Having laid down those preconditions which severely curtail the scope of an 
essential facilities doctrine, AG Jacobs turned to explain the ECJ's judgment 
in Magi/1, 273 which seemed to have been a departure from previous 
jurisprudence inasmuch as the copyright owners in that case were obliged to 
267ibid. 
268See Ch.2,ftn 100 
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272 supra n.1 O.,para.62 
273supra n. 185 
Chapter 3: Antitrust Law and Access to Essential Facilities 79 
license their copyright. He stated that Magill was a case with very special 
circumstances which "wing the balance in favour of an obligation to 
license".274 
Although the Advocate General seems to accept that in certain 
circumstances it is justifiable for competition law principles to intervene in the 
conduct of a dominant undertaking or IP owner, he stressed that such 
intervention "whether understood as an application of the essential facilities 
doctrine or, more traditionally, as a response to a refusal to supply goods or 
services, can be justified in terms of competition policy only in cases in which 
the dominant undertaking has a genuine stranglehold on the related market 
(emphasis added)".275 Such interference would only be justifiable where the 
facility was "impossible or extremely difficult to duplicate due to physical, 
geographical or legal constraints" or such duplication "is highly undesirable 
for reasons of public policy."276 Cost alone might be a barrier to entry but 
only if the cost were such as to "deter any prudent undertaking from entering 
the market."277 In particular, this may be the case where such costs have 
been largely paid out of public funds.278 This, as Korah points out, would 
especially apply to recently deregulated industries, such as in the 
communications or energy sector. In these cases, the argument that 
intervention would stifle investment is less strong, as nationalized 
undertakings are less dependent on financial incentives for investment.279 
However, with increasing liberalization and the privatisation of the 
telecommunications market, the advantages gained by incumbents during the 
era of monopolisation are disappearing and the question of preserving 
incentives to invest gains more and more importance. 
Turning to the case in hand, the AG stated that Bronner had numerous ways 
of distributing the newspaper, and his business had even prospered without 
access to the distribution system. He concluded that there was no obligation 
on Mediaprint to allow Bronner access to its home delivery network.280 He 
observed that it had not been established that the level of investment 
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necessary to set up a nation-wide home delivery system would be such as to 
deter any entrepreneurial publisher, who was convinced that there was a 
market for another daily newspaper, from entering the market. 281 
Finally, he added that the requirement to supply would lead the Community 
and national authorities into detailed regulation of Community markets.282 He 
therefore concluded that the doctrine should be used with great care and 
should be restricted to special circumstances, none of which seemed to have 
been met in the present case. 
The judgment of the ECJ was much briefer than the AG's Opinion, but it 
followed the Opinion's main reasoning. As Naftel puts it: "[i]t can be viewed 
as an endorsement of the AG's opinion, but given the consensus nature of 
the ECJ's judgements, it is not surprising that the judgment is rather terse 
and cryptic at times."283 The judgment does not explicitly refer to the essential 
facilities doctrine, except in summarizing the parties' arguments, but rather 
reformulated the first question referring to it as an issue of refusal to supply. 
The Court puts the notion "essential facilities" in quotation marks, which 
leaves it open as to whether the ECJ accepts the doctrine as such.284 
Considering its previous decisions in Commercial Solventd-85 and Magllt86 
the ECJ concluded that for a refusal to grant access to be an abuse, three 
conditions would have to be met: 
(1) the refusal must be likely to eliminate all competition in the newspaper 
market on the part of the person requesting the service; and 
(2) the refusal must not be objectively justified; and 
(3) the product in question must be indispensable to carrying on the plaintiff's 
business, inasmuch as there is "no actual or potential substitute on 
existence". 287 
Applying those cumulative conditions, the ECJ rejected Bronner's claim 
simply on the ground that there were alternatives to the home-delivery of 
281
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newspapers, such as delivery by mail or sales in shops or at kiosks, even 
though other methods of distribution "may be less advantageous".288 
As far as the telecoms sector is concerned, the Commission stated in its 
Access Notice that there are not yet sufficient alternatives for certain kinds of 
telecoms infrastructure: "Aithough ... alternative infrastructure may as from 1 
July 1996 be used for liberalised services, it will be some time before this is in 
many cases a satisfactory alternative to the facilities of the incumbent 
operator. Such alternative infrastructure does not at present offer the same 
dense geographic coverage as that of the incumbent TO's network."289 
The ECJ continued in Bronner that if actual substitutes were insufficient, it 
was feasible for the plaintiff to create a delivery system himself. The ECJ held 
that there were no "technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of 
making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of 
a daily newspaper to establish, alone or in cooperation with other publishers, 
its own nationwide home-delivery scheme ... "290 It was therefore not enough to 
argue that it was not economically viable for Bronner to duplicate the system 
because of the small circulation of his newspaper: 
"For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would 
be necessary at the very least to establish, as the Advocate General has 
pointed out at point 68 of his Opinion, that it is not economically viable to 
create a second home-delivery scheme for the distribution of daily 
newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers 
distributed by the existing scheme."291 
Therefore, in determining indispensability, the question was whether an 
undertaking in the position of Mediaprint could be expected to establish a 
second system, not an undertaking in the position of Bronner. 
Commentators have welcomed the fact that the AG emphasized in his 
Opinion that the function of Article 82 EC was to protect competition in the 
downstream market, rather than competitors. 292 The AG also referred to the 
economic considerations which make a narrow application of the essential 
288
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facilities doctrine indispensable, namely the danger that an over-zealous 
application of the doctrine would stifle necessary investment. In its judgment, 
the ECJ did not consider any of those points. However, it interpreted its 
previous case law in a very restrictive way, and added the new criterion of 
"indispensability." Although the judgment did not explicitly accept or reject 
the essential facilities doctrine293 (the ECJ confined itself to a traditional 
"refusal to supply" approach), it can at least be read as correcting the ECJ's 
traditionally broader approach to the issue of refusal to deal under Article 82 
EC. 294 The more restricted conditions which must be established, before a 
refusal to grant access can be regarded as an abuse, call into question some 
of the earlier decisions of the Commission regarding either refusal to deal or 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine. In its decisions in United 
Brandd-95 and 8?,296 the Commission did not consider whether there were 
any substitutes for the goods in question?97 Neither did it consider, in British 
Midland, 298 SABENA299 nor Sealink00 , the competitive conditions on the 
relevant downstream market. The dose of economic reality afforded by the 
recognition that economies of scale do not automatically indicate an abuse of 
a dominant position has also been received positively.301 This is in contrast to 
the 1998 Access Notice,302 in which the consideration of economic principles 
has not been given any priority. According to Hancher, the Commission may 
need to refine its approach in cases concerning access to 
telecommunications networks.303 The test laid down in Bronne?04 is probably 
more exacting than that which the Commission had in mind when it included 
the EFD in the 1998 Access Notice. The conditions put up by the ECJ 
underline the importance of sector-specific access regulation, which provides 
more specific and far-reaching access rights than competition law.305 
Although the judgment can be seen as a significant contribution to the 
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clarification of the principles that apply to an essential facilities doctrine, or at 
least to a duty to supply or license, a large number of questions still remain 
unanswered. 
4.4 An unusual case: /MS Healttf06 
/MS Health is another case concerning a refusal to license an Intellectual 
Property Right. However, it is of particular interest for this thesis as it deals 
with the so-called "two-market paradigm", an issue of general importance in 
EFD cases. 
The cases dealt with so far have all been based on a two-tier market-
structure: a dominant undertaking uses its position on a primary or upstream 
market, which in turn has an effect on the competitive structure of a 
secondary or downstream market. /MS Healttr07 is an unusual case in this 
respect as it concerns the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the 
area of intellectual property rights. It is very complex, and only recently 
decided by the Court of Justice. In the following, only those aspects of the 
case relevant to this thesis will be discussed. 308 
IMS Health is the acknowledged world leader in providing pharmaceutical 
information services. In order to comply with German data protection law, 
IMS ·s services in Germany are based on a so-called "1860-brick structure" 
which divides the whole territory of Germany into artificially designated 
geographic areas (the so-called 'bricks'), that are used both to report on and 
measure sales of individual pharmaceutical products. This brick structure is 
protected by copyright under German law and has become the de facto 
306 NDC Health/IMS Health, Interim Measures, Case COMP Dl338.044 (July 3, 2001 },OJ 
L059 (February 28,2002) 18-49; Case T-184/01 R, Order of the President of the Court of 
First Instance of 10 August 2001 :IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, [2001] ECR 11-2349; Order 
of the President of the Court of First Instance of 26 October 2001 :IMS Health Inc. v. 
Commission,[2001] ECR 11-3193; Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Judgment of 
the Court of 29 April 2004 (not yet reported) 
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industry standard. IMS refused to license the 1860-brick structure to 
competitors. The case was launched when, on 3 July 2001, the Commission 
adopted interim measures requiring IMS to do so.309 At the same time, IMS 
brought copyright infringement proceedings against NDC in the German 
courts, because NDC had continued to use the 1860-brick structure. In the 
course of these proceedings the German court referred a number of 
questions to the ECJ concerning the extent to which a refusal to license the 
use of a data bank protected by copyright constituted an infringement of 
Article 82 EC. 
Two points of the Commission decision are of particular interest. First, the 
Commission considered that it was not necessary for it to show that the 
refusal to supply had prevented the emergence of a new product. It held that 
the "1860-brick structure" created by IMS was "essential" as it had become a 
de facto industry standard and there were no actual or potential substitutes 
for it. In this sense it seems to extend the ECJ's decision in Magi/1 310 There, 
one of the "exceptional circumstances" used to justify the order to license an 
intellectual property right was the fact that the refusal would have prevented a 
new product, for which there was potential consumer demand, from entering 
the market. The other interesting and heavily disputed point in the 
Commission's decision was that it did not consider it necessary to establish 
that IMS had tried to control a downstream or related market. As mentioned 
above, all previous relevant case law had dealt with cases involving an 
upstream as well as a downstream market. Here, NDC requested access to 
IMS's IP right, not in order to enter a downstream market, but in order to be 
able to compete with IMS in the primary market itself. NDC therefore tried to 
enter the very market which was protected by IMS's copyright. 
The fervently awaited judgement of the ECJ, which was finally delivered on 
April 29, 2004, does not, against all hopes and expectations, shed much light 
on the position of the ECJ regarding the recognition of the EFD within EC 
law. Again, the Court does not use the term at all. The judgment lacks any 
kind of detailed analysis and seems fully to endorse the opinion of AG 
309supra n. 21 0; The Commission has now withdrawn its decision, following a decision by a 
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Tizzano. 311 Referring to the summary of the Magilf1 2 judgment made by the 
Court in Bronner, 313 it states that three conditions have to be satisfied in order 
for a refusal to licence to constitute an abuse under Article 82 EC: 
"It is clear from that case-law that, in order for the refusal by an undertaking 
which owns a copyright to give access to a product or service indispensable 
for carrying on a particular business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient 
that three cumulative decisions be satisfied, namely, that that refusal is 
preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand, that it is unjustified and such as to exclude any 
competition on a secondary market."314 
The Court therefore clarifies that the conditions in Magllf1 5 should be applied 
cumulatively. It leaves it to the national courts to decide whether the facility is 
in fact 'indispensable' ,316 i.e. whether in this case the 1860-brick structure 
constituted an indispensable factor in the downstream supply of German 
regional pharmaceutical sales data. On these facts, the ECJ reformulated the 
test: it asked whether the refusal to licence reserved to IMS the market for the 
supply of pharmaceutical sales data in the Member States concerned, by 
eliminating all competition on that market. 
Regarding the so-called "two-market paradigm", the ECJ, referring to its 
judgment in Bronner, 317 held that, for the assessment of whether the refusal 
to grant access was an abuse, it was necessary to distinguish between an 
upstream market (in Bronner the market for home delivery of daily 
newspapers) and a (secondary) downstream market (in Bronner, the market 
for daily newspapers itself).318 However, the Court then followed points 56 to 
59 of the Opinion of AG Tizzano, stating that: "for the purposes of the 
application of the earlier case-law, it is sufficient that a potential market or 
even hypothetical market can be identified".319 This means a market in which 
the inputs in question are not actually independently marketed, but are only 
311 For a detailed analysis of AG Tizzano·s Opinion, see M.Domans!D.IIan, Competition and 
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used to monopolize the secondary, downstream market. AG Tizzano points 
out, for examplem that in Magilf2° the ECJ identified a market for television 
listings even where these were not marketed independently by the television 
broadcasters, but merely offered free of charge to certain newspapers. 
According to the AG such a market can always be identified where: 
"(a) the inputs in question are essential (since they cannot be substituted or 
duplicated) to operate on a given market; (b)there is an actual demand for 
them on the part of the undertakings seeking to operate on the market for 
which those inputs are essentia1."321 
Applied to the facts of IMS Health, the AG concluded that the upstream 
market was the market for access to the brick structure and the downstream 
market was the market for the sale of market studies.322 Even if the brick 
structure was not sold as a separate product, it would be sufficient if it was an 
indispensable factor in the downstream supply of German regional sales data 
for pharmaceuticals. 
The Court also adopted the same qualification of the 'new product' criterion 
as the AG. A refusal to licence can only be regarded as abusive: 
" ... where the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit 
itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the 
secondary market by the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new 
goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is 
potential consumer demand."323 
It was the for the Frankfurt District Court to determine the matter based on 
the facts of the case. In summary, both the AG and the ECJ seem to have 
confirmed the conditions in Magi/1,324 with a slight reformulation of the 
'prevention of a new product' condition. They also made clear that the 
conditions should be applied in a cumulative manner. Both stated that the 
application of the EFD requires the existence of two separate markets, but 
broadened the definition of the upstream market significantly. 
This broad definition of the upstream market as including a potential primary 
market has met with significant criticism. It means that a competitor can 
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322
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require access to the market which had so far been protected by the IP right. 
This could have a serious effect on the incentive to invest and innovate, since 
it deprives the IP owner of his expected reward. Another issue concerns the 
vague terms "different product" or "new goods or services", which raise a 
number of practical questions, and which may lead to a painful process of 
defining these terms. 325 
The judgment also provides yet another example of a divergence between 
the approaches in the EU and the US in cases involving unilateral 
infringements. First, the US Supreme Court in Verizon Communications Inc. 
v. Trinkd26 makes it clear that the courts should rarely impose upon a 
monopolist a duty to deal with its rivals. Secondly, no US court has found that 
a refusal to license IPRs violates antitrust laws: on the contrary, the US 
courts have generally held that such a refusal is lawful. Of course, given that 
the Supreme Court expressed concerns that forced sharing in Verizon 
Communications will apply with equal, if not greater, force to IPR, it appears 
even less likely that a US plaintiff could succeed in challenging a unilateral 
refusal to license IPR. 
The judgment also puts a new light on the appeal against the Commission's 
decision of 24 March 2004 in the Microsotf27 case, as it gives increased 
importance to the question of whether Microsoft's refusal to licence interface 
specifications has a negative impact on innovation, and whether Microsoft is 
right to insist that its competitors are merely seeking to "duplicate" or "clone" 
its products.328 
In view of the potentially far-reaching consequences of the judgment, it is 
possible that, when the European Courts next have the opportunity to 
consider the above issues, they may choose to provide some clarification. 
The judgment may therefore not represent the last word on the subject. 
325Aitman/Jones,p.142 
326supra n. 76 
327Commission decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 EC (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) 
328For further details on the implications of IMS on Microsoft, see D.W.Hull, Competition Law 
and IP: Compulsory licensing of IP rights: The ECJ ·s judgment in the IMS case, 10, 13 
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5. Conditions of an Essentia~ Faci~ities Doctrine in 
ECiaw 
88 
Although the ECJ has never expressly referred to the EFD in any of its 
judgments, it seems that it has acknowledged the EFD as part of Community 
law since Bronner. 329 Even when not actually calling it 'the EFD', it seems to 
be clear from the case law of the ECJ that a refusal to provide access to an 
indispensable facility can, under certain circumstances, constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. 
But what are the actual conditions for an application of the EFD or an 
obligation to grant access in EC law? These appear to be less clear. As 
discussed above, there are three main cases in which the ECJ and the CFI 
elaborated on the conditions under which the owner of an essential facility, or 
the holder of an IPR, will be obliged to grant access or to grant a licence: 
Magi/1,330 Ladbrokti31 and Bronner. 332 
In Magilf33 the ECJ held for the first time that, in 'exceptional circumstances', 
the holder of an IPR might be forced to grant a license. It stated three 
conditions: 1. the prevention of the appearance of a new product which the 
IPR holder did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer 
demand; 2. the refusal is not justified; 3. the IPR holder reserves to himself a 
secondary market, thereby excluding all competition on that market. 334 
In Ladbroke,335 the CFI added a new, alternative, condition: a refusal to 
licence is contrary to Article 82 EC if it concerns a product or service which is 
essential for the activity in question as there was no real or potential 
substitute. 336 
In Bronner,337 dealing with access to tangible property, the ECJ set out three 
conditions: 
329supra n.1 0 
330supra n.185 
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1. the refusal to grant access to the delivery scheme must be likely to 
eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the 
party requesting the service; 2. the refusal is not objectively justified; 3. the 
service must be indispensable to carrying on that party's business , inasmuch 
as there is no actual or potential substitute for the home delivery scheme.338 
As can be seen from this brief summary, the conditions applying to an EFD in 
EC law are less than clear. Did the Bronne?39 judgement overrule the earlier 
judgement in Magilf?340 This seems to have been the assumption of the 
Commission in /MS, 341 in applying the Bronne?42 criteria to a refusal to 
licence. However, from the fact that the ECJ dealt with the interpretation of 
Magi/1143 in its Bronner judgement, it should be relatively safe to deduce that 
Bronner did not overrule Magill. 
Other issues which arise are, firstly, whether different conditions apply to a 
refusal to grant a license and a refusal to grant access to tangible property, 
and secondly, whether the conditions are to be applied cumulatively or 
alternatively. 344 
It has been suggested that the differences between intellectual property and 
other forms of property justify a difference in treatment by competition law of 
refusals to grant a licence and refusal to grant access to tangible property.345 
Advocate General Tizzano seems to distinguish between tangible and 
intellectual property in his Opinion in /MS Health: 346 
" ... it is not sufficient that the intangible asset forming the subject-matter of the 
intellectual property right be essential for operating on the market and that 
therefore, by virtue of that refusal, the owner of the copyright may eliminate 
all competition on the secondary market."347 The ECJ followed this in para. 
49 of its judgment. 
This leads to another issue relevant to this thesis, arising in the context of 
access to an essential facility: the so-called two-market paradigm. In all 
338
"b"d 41 1 1 ., para. 
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cases in which the Court has acknowledged that the refusal to supply or grant 
access to certain facilities might constitute an abuse of a dominant position, it 
has distinguished between the market for such facilities (the upstream 
market) and a derivative market (the downstream market) in which they are 
used as inputs for the production of other goods or services. The abuse in 
these cases consisted of a leverage of market power from the upstream 
market to the downstream market in order to limit or restrict competition in 
that market. This was relied upon by IMS in its arguments against the 
Commission decision which obliged it to grant a licence to its competitors: 
"It is, however, the notion of what constitutes an essential facility that has 
been relied upon in the contested decision. According to the applicant, that 
notion only applies where two distinct markets are involved and the product 
or service supplied in one (usually an upstream) market is a necessary input 
for the production of goods or services in the second (usually downstream) 
market."348 The classic case in this sense was Commercial Solvents, 349 in 
which there was a primary market (for the raw material) which was clearly 
distinguishable from a secondary market (for the derivative drug). There was 
a clear abuse of a dominant position in that the dominant company used its 
dominant position in the raw material market to eliminate competition in the 
derivative market for the drug. However, it has been argued that the Court 
has failed to recognize that the "Commercial Solvents paradigm" does not fit 
all essential facilities cases.350 In particular cases, which concern essential 
facilities such as communications networks or energy infrastructure, there is 
no real upstream market, as there is usually no trade in the essential facility 
itself. Telecommunications operators do not "deal" in networks. In these 
cases, the facility is part of a firm, and often not very clearly identified as a 
separate item, for instance the home-delivery network in Bronner. 351 
Nevertheless, the Court has construed, somewhat artificially, the essential 
facility itself as the relevant upstream market: "[i]n such cases, there is no 
leveraging of a dominant position from one market into another- there is only 
3480rder of the Court.of First Instance of 26 October 2001 ,supra n. 306, para.80 
349supra n. 114 
JsoF. 7 me, p. 
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prevented access to an essential facility by the party dominating the relevant 
market in which the facility is used."352 
In its 1998 Access Notice, the Commission stated that "liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector will lead to the emergence of a second type of 
market, that of access to facilities which are currently necessary to provide 
these liberalized services."353 According to Larouche, this "amounts to saying 
that in the automotive industry, there is a market for the use of a given 
manufacturer's car making plant."354 However, he points out that network 
industries such as telecommunications, in contrast to other industries, have a 
geographic component, in that a competitor must be in control of a network in 
order to reach customers with its services. As a result, some kind of 
wholesale market might develop, in which operators agree to be allowed to 
use each others' networks, in order to reach customers outside the range of 
their own networks. This market may be considered a relevant market for the 
purposes of applying competition law. However, if there is no indication that 
third-party access has been given, it would be artificial to construe a market 
for access "to what is in the end a piece of property".355 
The Commission did not consider a "two -market" situation to be necessary 
for the application of the essential facilities doctrine in IMS Health, 356 nor did 
the Advocate General, who considered that a potential upstream market was 
sufficient as long as the inputs in question were essential and there was an 
actual demand for them. 357 AG Tizzano in IMS Health even seemed to 
indicate that two markets have never been required by EC law for the 
essential facilities doctrine to apply. He pointed out that in cases such as 
Magilf58 and Bronner 359 there had actually been no real separate market in 
the essential facility. 360 The ECJ held in IMS Health, referring to Bronner, 
that: 
"[t]he fact that the delivery service was not marketed separately was not 
regarded as precluding, from the outset, the possibility of identifying a 
352 ibid. 
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separate market."361 After stating that it was sufficient that a potential or even 
hypothetical market could be identified, the Court added that " ... it is 
determinative that two different stages of production may be identified and 
that they are interconnected, the upstream product is indispensable in as 
much as for supply of the downstream product."362 The problem inherent in 
the two-market approach was also recognized by Venit and Kallaugher: 
"The essential facilities doctrine may be of assistance, as a formal matter of 
antitrust analysis, with respect to cases in which the essential facility 
comprises something that cannot be characterized as a market. In such 
cases, invocation of the essential facilities doctrine can correct an analytical 
anomaly that has resulted from treatment of these cases as market 
leveraging cases."363 
It seems, therefore, that the two-market approach is not an indispensable 
condition for the application of the EFD in EC law. 
Even if it is considered to be established that the conditions set out in 
Bronne?64 constitute· the applicable test (at least in relation to essential 
facilities cases dealing with tangible property) the interpretation of those 
conditions themselves is far from clear. 
5.1 What is an "essential facility"? 
A useful starting-point is the definition adopted by the Commission in its 1998 
Access Notice, whereby an essential facility is "a facility which is essential for 
reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, 
and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means."365 
361 ibid, para. 43 
362ibid.,45 
363Venit/ Kallaugher, p.339 
364supra n. 182 
365See Ch.2, ftn.1 00, para. 68: in the footnote, the Commission refers to the definition of 
essential facilities included in the 'Additional commitment on regulatory principles by the 
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"Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network and 
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Since Bronner, 366 it must be shown that a product or service is 
"indispensable". It seems to be clear from the judgment that this is an 
objective test, which means it is not based on the specific circumstances and 
needs of the undertaking requiring access. The Court held, in para.44 of the 
judgment, that it could not find any obstacles which made it impossible "for 
any other publisher of dally newspapers to establish, alone or in cooperation 
with other publishers, its own nationwide home-delivery scheme (emphasis 
added)." It added that for the delivery system to be indispensable, it was not 
sufficient to show that its duplication was not economically viable for a small-
circulation newspaper like Bronner's. Instead, it had to be shown that it was 
not economically viable for a newspaper "with a circulation comparable to 
that of the daily newspapers distributed by the existing scheme"367 to 
duplicate the system. Advocate General Jacobs was more direct in his 
endorsement of an objective test: "However, the test in my view must be an 
objective one: in other words, in order for refusal of access to amount to an 
abuse, it must be extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking 
demanding access but for any other undertaking to compete (emphasis 
added)"368 
Temple Lang supports the use of such an objective test. It is in line with the 
assumption that the underlying function of Article 82 EC is to protect 
competition and not individual competitors. The dominant undertaking, which 
may have a legal duty to provide access, cannot be expected to know the 
needs of an individual undertaking. However, it can be assumed that it has 
sufficient knowledge of the general market situation, and therefore of the 
general needs of its competitors. There is no duty upon a dominant 
undertaking to subsidize a competitor. 369 In an earlier article, published 
before the Bronner judgement, Temple Lang puts it this way: "[t]he fact that 
one particular competitor needs access to a facility in order to enter the 
market is irrelevant if other more normally situated competitors do not. If 
suppliers; and b. cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to 
~rovide the service." 
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competition necessitates access for all except exceptional competitors, then 
access my be made compulsory."370 
Another question to be answered is what makes a facility "indispensable" and 
therefore "essential". In Bronner, the ECJ held that in order to demonstrate 
that a product or service is "indispensable" it must be shown that there is 
"no actual or potential substitute in existence".371 
As Ridyard pointed out, it is not sufficient that the refusal of access to the 
facility would result in a mere disadvantage to a competitor, for a facility to be 
regarded as "essential". If that were the case, any company which obtains an 
"envied advantage" could be required to provide access to its competitors. 372 
The same is true for a disadvantage to consumers as a criterion for access, 
as "the tension between static and dynamic incentives for efficiency within a 
market economy" will always leave scope for unrealised consumer gains.373 
The actual substitutes to the home-delivery system considered in Bronner 
were delivery by post and sales in shops and kiosks. The ECJ emphasised 
that such substitutes could not simply be discarded because they were "less 
advantageous".374 As far as the existence of a "potential" substitute is 
concerned, the test seems to be whether it is possible to duplicate the service 
or product in question. Commentators have pointed out that only in very 
exceptional circumstances is it absolutely impossible to duplicate a facility, 
although this would often entail very large expenses. Therefore, the 
duplicability of a facility depends rather on economic considerations than on 
actual physical conditions. 375 Both the Court and the AG accepted that cost 
considerations can be a factor. In para. 45, the ECJ held that in order to 
demonstrate that a facility cannot be duplicated, it must be shown that it is not 
"a realistic potential alternative" and that it is not "economically viable". AG 
Jacobs did not rule out that "the cost of duplicating the facility might alone 
constitute an insuperable barrier to entry."376 
370Temple Lang, (Fordh.lnt.Law.J, 1994).,p.489 
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This has led some commentators to believe that the essential facility is only 
applicable in the presence of a so-called "natural monopoly", i.e. a market in 
which two or more firms can never be economically viable on their own 
unless the essential facilities doctrine is applied. 377 However, according to 
Bergman and Doherty, earlier case law shows that this cannot be so. For 
example, in Commercial So/venti'78 and Sabena,379 products were regarded 
as essential, which can hardly be defined as a natural monopoly.380 
The applicable test seems thus to be that the duplication of the facility has to 
be economically unfeasible for competing firms. AG Jacobs in Bronner puts it 
the following way: " ... it would be necessary to establish that the level of 
investment required to set up a nation-wide home distribution system would 
be such as to deter an enterprising publisher who was convinced that there 
was a market for another large daily newspaper from entering the market."381 
5.2 Objective justification 
According to the case law, a dominant company can refuse to provide access 
if this refusal is objectively justified. However, the same case law sheds little 
light on the circumstances under which a refusal can be justified. It is 
therefore likely that dominant companies will try to rely on this defence 
because, to date, it has not been fully explored by the Court's case law. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be clear that the concept of objective justification is 
subject to the principle of proportionality.382 According to this principle, a 
public authority may not impose obligations on a citizen except where they 
are strictly necessary to the end that is to be achieved. There is no 
exhaustive lists of reasons which might constitute objective justification, 
although the following points out some examples. 
377See for example Werden, at 476 
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According to Stothers, analogies may be drawn from other areas of European 
law, such as mandatory requirements used to justify restrictions of the free 
movement of goods under Article 28 EC. One issue which might be put 
forward as an objective justification is that of efficiency considerations. If 
granting access to the applicant would cause the facility to be used 
uneconomically, or would reduce the value or efficiency of the facility, this 
may justify a refusal to give access.383 AG Jacobs lists some justifications 
from the US case law at para.4 7 of his opinion: "[a] company in a dominant 
position which controls an essential facility can justify the refusal to enter a 
contract for legitimate technical or commercial reasons. It may also be 
possible to justify a refusal to contract on grounds of efficiency".384 However, 
the ECJ has rejected several business justifications. For example, in United 
Brand~85 it considered actions taken by the dominant company, which were 
aimed at punishing a dealer who had promoted a different brand, to be 
disproportionate. In certain cases it may be a defence that the intended use 
by the applicant is not consistent with safety or technical standards of the 
facility, or that the applicant is not creditworthy. 386 
Temple Lang points out that genuine advantages of vertical integration could 
justify a refusal to grant access: "[a] dominant company never has the duty to 
offset a competitive advantage that it has lawfully obtained, although it cannot 
use exclusive access to an essential facility to obtain such an advantage."387 
However, this will only very rarely be the case as the advantage must 
outweigh by far the competitive disadvantages caused by the refusal. Temple 
Lang quotes Hugirr88 as an example in which the Court was reluctant to 
prevent a company from protecting its reputation by having its products 
serviced only by employees it had trained itself. 
As established by the ECJ in Vo!vd89 and Renault, 390 ownership of an IPR 
does not provide absolute protection against access demands. However, 
383 Temple Lang, (Journal for Network Industries, 2000) p.386 
384 The scope of legitimate business justifications may be narrower in EC than US law. In City 
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following Magi/1, 391 such access can only be required in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Dominant companies might argue that their large investments in tangible 
property should deserve a similar protection to that of IPRs?92 However, it 
should be pointed out that under Community law, property rights are not 
absolute.393 
The lack of spare capacity may possibly, but not necessarily, be a 
justification. If there is spare capacity, or the nature of the facility is such that 
there is unlimited capacity, a refusal to grant access is hard to justify, in 
particular when the owner of the facility is dominant in the downstream 
market.394 Incumbents should not be required to scale down or reorganise 
their existing activities unless an identifiable increase in competition can be 
expected as a result.395 It is necessary to assess whether the capacity, which 
the owner claims is fully utilised, is not in fact being inefficiently used, or 
whether the apparent use is not real, or whether the purpose of long term 
contracts is primarily to make the facility unavailable to new entrants.396 
It is questionable whether the owner of an essential facility is obliged to 
increase supply, or even to alter its facility in order to meet increased 
demand. According to Nikolinaikos, the fact that a new entrant will offer a new 
product which will significantly enhance competition could justify a reduction 
of supplies to existing customers. 397 Similarly, Temple Lang states that: 
"[i]ncumbents should not be required to scale down or reorganize their 
existing activities unless an identifiable increase in competition can be 
expected as a result."398 This is likely to be of significance in the 
communications sector, where the issue of transmission capacity is key to 
the assessment of possible justifications. To increase capacity can require 
391 supra n. 185 
392Doherty, p.429 
393 
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huge investments on the part of the dominant undertaking. Doherty rightly 
points out that one should be circumspect in requiring such investments, as 
in the long term they may have a significantly negative effect on the incentive 
for other companies to enter the market.399 
5.3 Elimination of competition on the downstream market 
One of the three conditions cited in Bronner,400 as necessary for a duty to 
supply to arise (or for the EFD to be applicable) was that the refusal was 
"likely to eliminate competition" from an undertaking. However, the term 
"elimination" is less than clear. There are several statements by the ECJ in its 
Bronner judgment referring to the effect of the refusal on competition on the 
downstream market. 
Referring to Commercial Solvents,401 the Court stated that the refusal to 
supply an indispensable raw material was an abuse "to the extent that the 
conduct in question was likely to eliminate all competition on the part of that 
undertaking".402 Referring to Magtl/, 403 it held that one of the exceptional 
circumstances which made the refusal to licence unlawful was the fact "that it 
was likely to exclude all competition in the secondary market of television 
guides".404 Finally, the ECJ declared that, in order to be abusive, the refusal 
had to "eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of 
the person requesting the service".405 
It therefore seems to be clear that the EFD does not apply if the downstream 
market is competitive. 406 The fact that the refusal to grant access would 
prevent one particular competitor from entering the market is not sufficient, if 
there are other competitors already operating on the market or able to 
399Doherty, p. 431 
400
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operate on the market. This appears to be in line with the AG Jacob's 
statement, that the primary function of Article 82 EC is to protect competition 
rather than a particular competitor. 
Consequently, for the EFD to apply, there must be insufficient competition on 
the downstream market, which means that the undertaking controlling or 
owning the essential facility must have a strong or even a dominant position 
on the downstream market. This is confirmed by a statement of AG Jacobs in 
Bronner 
"It may therefore ... be unsatisfactory ... to focus solely on the latter's ( the 
dominant undertaking's) market power on the upstream market and conclude 
that its conduct in reserving to itself the downstream market is automatically 
an abuse. Such conduct will not have an adverse impact on consumers 
unless the dominant undertaking's final product is sufficiently insulated from 
competition to give it market power."407 In para. 65, he states that the 
dominant undertaking must have "a genuine stranglehold on the related 
market". 
Venit and Kallaugher call this a "dual role" situation in which the owner of the 
essential facility has a "dual role as both administrator of an infrastructure 
and an operator on a market utilizing that infrastructure".408 They assume 
that, for the EFD to apply, the owner of the essential facility must also occupy 
a dominant position on the downstream market. According to Venit and 
Kallaugher, this distinguishes essential facility cases from monopoly 
leveraging cases: "in contrast to monopoly leveraging cases, the essential 
facilities rule comes into play only where denial of access has its effect in a 
market where the defendant has market power."409 Temple Lang similarly 
refers to this "dual role" situation as a "conflict of interests" situation,410 but in 
contrast to Venit and Kallaugher, does not require the owner of the facility to 
be dominant on the downstream market: Temple Lang considers it to be 
sufficient that "there is little significant competition in the downstream 
market".411 Nikolinaikos believes that, in connection with the Tetra Pak412 
407supra n.10, para.58 
408Venit/Kallaugher, p. 331 
409ibid 319 
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ruling, it is sufficient for the EFD to apply if the owner of the essential facility 
is dominant on the upstream market and there is no effective competition on 
the downstream market.413 He points out that the Commission, in its 1998 
Access Notice, seems to follow the same position. In para. 65 of the Access 
Notice the Commission states that it is common in the telecoms industry to 
find that "a particular operator has an extremely strong position on 
infrastructure markets and on markets downstream of that infrastructure." 
Then in para. 67 it points out, referring to Tetra Pak, that even if the 
undertaking only has a dominant position in one of those closely related 
markets, it could be found "in a situation comparable to that of holding a 
dominant position in the markets in question as a whole." 414 
To deduce a common denominator from the above discussion, there seems 
to be no room for the application of the EFD if there is effective competition 
on the downstream market. According to Temple Lang, this should even be 
the case if there is sufficient capacity available.415 However, according to 
some commentators, the situation is different if the new entrant wants to 
introduce a new product or service into the market. Then, there will be a duty 
to provide access, even if there is insufficient capacity and even if the 
downstream market is competitive.416 
Temple Lang suggests that another condition has to be fulfilled before the 
EFD can be applied: "[t]o justify a duty of contract, there must be a 
substantial scope for added-value competition in the market for which access 
is required. If this is correct, it is extremely important: it means that access to 
a product for mere distribution or resale ... can never be an essential 
facility."417 A similar position seems now to have been adopted by the ECJ in 
IMS Health,418 at least as far as a refusal to license IPRs is concerned. The 
ECJ held that refusal to licence can only be regarded as abusive "where the 
undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the 
downstream market: in other words, the company must be dominant in both markets (or 
would be able to become so as a result of the refusal)" (Temple Lang, Journal for Network 
Industries, 2000, 384) 
412supra n. 151 
413Nikolinaikos ( ECLR, 1999), p.407 
414See Ch.2, ftn.100 
415Temple Lang (Journal for Network lndustries,2000)p. 388 
416ibid.p. 392, Nikolinaikos,(ECLR, 1999)p. 408 
417Temple Lang (Journal for Network Industries, 2000), 380 
418supra n. 472 
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secondary market by the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new 
goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is 
a potential consumer demand."419 
No matter which position we follow, the above discussion indicates that the 
EFD only applies when the dominant undertaking is present on the 
downstream market, i.e. the two parties must be actual or potential 
competitors. White points out that where the owner of an essential facility is 
not competing in the downstream market, his interest in denying access will 
be limited, as increased utilisation of capacity could maximise the owner's 
profits. However, he specifies that this might not be the case in the 
telecommunications sector, which is characterized by a high rate of 
technological development and in which both incumbents and new entrants 
constantly compete for new markets and opportunities.420 The CFI's decision 
in Ladbroke421 seems to confirm this: the court did not find an abuse of a 
dominant position because the dominant undertaking, the French racetrack 
owners, were not present on the Belgian market. This appears to contradict 
United Brands,422 in which the two parties were not competitors, but Olesen 
was merely a dealer for United Brands bananas. In an article written before 
the decision in Bronner,423 Temple Lang had already pointed out that "the 
duty to supply a customer or distributor may be less strict than the duty to 
supply a competitor."424 Therefore, if Bronnef25 only protects competitors, it 
is not clear whether the United Brands426 principle still applies.427 
5.4 Determination of access terms 
Once it has been determined that the owner of an essential facility is obliged 
to provide access, the terms under which such access should be granted 
419
'b'd 49 1 1 ., para. 
4208. White, Is there a role for an "essential facilities" doctrine in Europe, (1995) 1(4) C.T.L.R. 
110' p.110 
421
supra n. 228 
422supra n. 118 
423
supra n. 10 
424Temple Lang (Fordham lnt'l L.J. 1994)., p. 447 
425supra n. 10 
426supra n. 118 
427Doherty, p.426 
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have to be stipulated. Venit and Kallaugher contrast two philosophies of 
access terms in EFDs: 
"Insofar as the principal role of the essential facilities doctrine as articulated in 
Sea/ink is to impose a stricter requirement of non-discrimination and certain 
procedural obligations ( the independent operator standard) on the company 
controlling the essential facility, the emerging EC doctrine may be at odds 
with the essential facilities doctrine as it has developed in the United States 
because there is no suggestion in the US cases that a firm controlling an 
essential facility is under an obligation other than to provide [the] facility, 
where feasible, on reasonable terms."428 Thus, under EC law a dominant 
company has a special obligation not to do anything that would cause further 
deterioration to the already fragile structure of competition, or to prevent the 
emergence or growth of new or existing competitors. 
However, this approach does not deprive a dominant company, owning the 
essential facilities, of the benefits of ownership, including making a profit. 
This raises the issue of setting a fair access price. As free negotiation 
between the parties will often be unsatisfactory (particularly if there is only 
one provider of the essential facility), courts or competition authorities may be 
required to engage in price calculations.429 The Commission has often been 
criticised because its decisions on essential facilities do not give any 
guidance on pricing issues: "[i]n Sealink and other cases, when it comes to 
the thorny question of access terms, the Commission has relied on the 
assertions that access prices should be 'fair and non-discriminatory'. This 
gives the impression that detailed regulation of access pricing, if it is a 
problem at all, belongs to someone else."430 The Commission has stated that 
it does not normally, in its decision-making practice, control or condemn the 
high level of prices which a dominant company may charge. However, in the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission has acted several times on 
complaints of excessive pricing.431 Moreover, there is now detailed regulation 
on pricing and access in the telecommunications sector. 
428Venit /Kallaugher, p. 333 
429Ridyard, p.450 
430National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Competition Brief No.4, January 1999, 
Oscar Bronner. Legitimate refusals to supply, p.3, cited in Doherty, p. 432 
431 1TT Promedia, IP/9/292 of 11.4.97: Deutsche Telekom business customer tariffs, IP96/975 
of 4.11.96, and the Commission's inquiry into fees for carrier pre-selection, IP98/430 of 
13.5.98 
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There has been intense discussion concerning how to determine fair access 
prices, but that would go beyond the scope of this thesis.432 To sum it up in 
Ridyard's words: "Access pricing to the essential facility should be set such 
as to provide a revenue stream that will remunerate the appropriate value of 
the asset, but not more".433 AG Jacobs in Bronner pointed out that the owner 
of an essential facility should be allowed to pass on "an appropriate 
proportion of its investment costs and to make an appropriate return on its 
investment having regard to the level of risk involved."434 It should be kept in 
mind that there is a danger in assuming that "essential facilities problems can 
be 'solved' simply by imposing an obligation to supply on the owner, but 
without specifying the details surrounding that obligation."435 
6. Conclusion 
It has been suggested that the cases treated under the essential facilities 
doctrine are nothing more than 'normal' refusal to supply cases. Therefore, 
there is no need for the doctrine to be introduced into Community law, as 
already-established legal principles under Article 82 EC are adequate to deal 
with these cases.436 
Compared to the Commission, the ECJ has been very reluctant to use the 
term "essential facilities". That, however, does not mean that it denies the 
existence of an essential facilities doctrine in EC law. AG Jacobs in 
Bronner437 conducted a comprehensive analysis of the development and 
reception of an EFD in EC law, and certain parts of the ECJ's Bronner 
judgment indicate that the Court has recognised this doctrine in EC law. 
Nevertheless, that does not mean that the EFD constitutes a new and 
independent concept of law which widens the scope of Article 82 EC. All EFD 
cases require all elements of Article 82 EC to be fulfilled, before the refusal to 
432For further details concerning access pricing in EC telecommunications, see? [editorial 
note - see what????] 
433Ridyard, p. 451 
434supra n. 10, para.57 
435Ridyard.,p. 441/442 
436Furse, pp.469 ff.: M. Mueller, Die "Essential Facilities"- Doktrin im Europaischen 
Kartellrecht, (1998) EuZW, 232, p.237 
437 supra n.1 0 
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grant access can be regarded as an abuse. If the refusal to supply has little 
or no effect on competition, it is not illegal, even if the competitive 
disadvantage suffered by the competitor is immense.438 It could be said that 
the EFD occupies a special position within the refusal to supply category.439 
Two major conditions for the application of the EFD in EC law can be 
deduced from the case law: 
(1) elimination of all competition from the downstream market; and 
(2) the principle of indispensability, i.e. the lack of actual or potential 
substitutes on the primary market ( the market of the essential facility) This 
includes, in particular, the issue of whether duplication of the facility is 
economically viable. This is highly relevant in the telecommunications sector, 
in which the initial investment costs, usually for the establishment of 
infrastructures necessary to provide services, often constitute a considerable 
barrier to entry into the relevant market. 
The ECJ made clear that the test of the duplicability of a facility is an 
objective one, i.e. it is independent of the situation and abilities of the 
competitor demanding access. This takes account of the function of Article 82 
EC which is to protect competition rather than a single competitor. This 
follows from the fact that Article 82 EC serves, according to Article 3(1 )(g) EC 
"a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted". 
This goal of Article 3(1 )(g), therefore, simultaneously defines and limits the 
application of the EFD in EU law.440 As long as there is undistorted 
competition in the derivative market, there is no obligation for the owner of an 
essential facility to provide access to a competitor, even if there is no 
objective justification for the refusal. This leads to a very restricted and 
careful application of the EFD in EC law: an obligation to grant access is only 
legitimate if it serves the preservation of undistorted competition. Such a 
restrictive application should be approved, as this is the only way to prevent 
the dangers connected with a too-broad policy of granting access to essential 
facilities. 
438Temple Lang !(Journal for Network Industries), p. 404 
439H.Fieischer/ H. Weyer, Neues zur ,essential facilities"- Doktrin im Europaischen 
Wettbewerbsrecht- Eine Besprechung der Bronner-Entscheidung des EuGH, (1999) WuW, 
350, p.354 
440Deselaers, p. 566 
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The EFD has been subject to much criticism, both in the EU and the US.441 
One of the main arguments advanced against the EFD, or at least against a 
too-liberal application of the EFD, is that it reduces the incentive to invest, 
both on the part of the owner of the essential facility as well as on the part of 
potential competitors. AG Jacobs picks up on this point in his Opinion in 
Bronner. 
"In the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of the 
consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has 
developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a 
production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there 
would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. ... 
Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient 
facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to 
share the benefits."442 
Bergman suggests that when applying the EFD one should try to distinguish 
between situations in which the incentive to invest may be discouraged and 
others where this risk is comparatively low.443 In particular, in formerly 
nationalized industries, where the exclusive control over the essential facility 
is the result of a legal monopoly, the incentive to make the original 
investment may have been less important.444 The negative dynamic effect of 
mandating access is diminished, as a negative return on investment may be 
recoupable elsewhere. Venit and Kallaugher recommend a different EFD for 
different types of property: 
"Ultimately, the area where an essential facility analysis may prove of greater 
value concerns cases under Art.90 (now Article 86 EC). As a practical matter, 
many facilities in Europe that are at least arguably "essential" are either 
controlled by the state or state-owned undertakings or are operated subject to 
regulation by the state. As a result, many of the general points made above 
regarding the application of the essential facility doctrine may have direct 
application in Article 90 (now Article 86 EC) cases, particularly in respect of 
telecommunications or transport infrastructure. Moreover, in the case of 
441 See for example: Areeda; Gerber; Hancher; Ridyard; A. Overd /B.Bishop Essential 
facilities:cThe risingtide, (1998) 19(4) E.C.L.R., l83 
442supra n. 10, para. 57 
443Bergman, p.62 
444
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state-owned monopolies, application of the essential facilities doctrine to 
deregulate and open up markets may prove less controversial than 
application of that doctrine to private company conduct."445 
However, as such former legal monopolies lose their exclusive rights and 
become privatised, incentives to invest become increasingly important.446 
The other main argument against a too-ready application of the EFD is that 
the administrative costs of enforcing this aspect of competition law, in 
particular the costs of price regulation, are too high. AG Jacobs states in 
para.69 of the Bronner Opinion: 
"To accept Bronner's contention would be to lead the Community and 
national authorities and courts into detailed regulation of Community markets, 
entailing the fixing of prices and conditions for supply in large sectors of the 
economy. Intervention on that scale would not only be unworkable but would 
also be anti-competitive in the long term and indeed would scarcely be 
compatible with a free market economy."447 
445Venit I Kallaugher, p. 343 
446Korah, p.23 
447supra n. 10, para.69 
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C[hap~er 4: The app~ica~ion of ~he Essen~iai 
Facii~ties Doc~rine in the te~ecommunica~ions 
sec~or: The Comm~ssion's Access No~ice 1 
1. ~ntroduction 
On 22 August 1998, the Commission published its Notice on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector (the Notice).2 The Notice remains in effect, in parallel with the New 
Regulatory Framework. 3 
The Notice builds on the Commission's previous guidelines published in 
September 1991 (Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in 
the telecommunications sector),4 since those guidelines did not deal 
specifically with access agreements.5 The Notice has no formal legal effect, 
and should be regarded as a "statement of policy"6 on the part of the 
Commission, concerning EU telecommunications competition policy. 
The purpose of the Notice is threefold: 
(1 ). " ... to set out access principles stemming from Community competition law 
as shown in a large number of Commission decisions in order to create 
1 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, (1998) OJ C265/2; see also Ch.2, ftn.1 0 
2ibid. 
3See the reference which is taken to the Access Notice in the SMP Guidelines (Commission 
Guidelines of July 11, 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
- and services ,O.J. 2002 C165/06), para.24 
4See Ch.2, ftn.99 
5supra n.1, para. 3 
6Naftel,p. 1 
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greater market certainty and more stable conditions for investment and 
commercial initiative in the telecoms and multimedia sectors"; 7 
(2). " ... to define and clarify the relationship between competition law and 
sector specific legislation under the Article 1 OOa framework"; 8 and 
(3). " ... to explain how competition rules will be applied in a consistent way 
across the sectors involved in the provision of new services, and in particular 
to access issues and gateways in this context". 9 
As noted above, one core issue for the telecommunications markets is that of 
whether, under Article 82 EC, new competitors should be granted access to 
existing facilities, such as networks, which cannot feasibly be replicated and 
which may originally have been developed with public money. Even where 
replication is possible, it may be against the public interest on other grounds, 
such as environmental considerations. The Notice is the Commission's 
attempt to deal with this issue. 
The concept of access in the Notice covers not only access to physical 
networks, such as interconnection to the public switched telecoms network or 
the ability to obtain leased lines, but also access to customer information and 
other data, or to facilities necessary for a potential competitor to enter a 
telecommunications market. 10 If a potential service provider is refused 
access, a remedy may be sought from either the established National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA), or national courts under national or EC 
competition law, or the Commission to which a complaint may be made. 11 
In the Notice, the Commission explicitly applies the EFD to access scenarios, 
i.e. scenarios in which a network operator refuses access to independent 
service providers. The EFD features when the Commission details instances 
in which a refusal to grant access to telecommunications facilities might 
trigger the application of Article 82 EC. 12 The following part of the thesis will 
elaborate on this use of the EFD in the Notice, and on the extent to which the 
Commission's use of the doctrine is compatible with the principles discussed 
above and developed in the later Bronner 3 judgment. 
7supra n. 1, preface 
8 ibid. 
9ibid. 
10ibid., para. 71 
11 ibid., part I 
12 ibid. paras 87-98 
13See Ch.3, ftn. 10 
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2. The EFD in the Access Notice 
The Commission envisages three scenarios with regard to essential facilities 
in telecommunications: 
"(a.) a refusal to grant access, for the purposes of a service where another 
operator has been given access by the access provider, to operate on that 
services market; 
(b.) a refusal to grant access, for the purposes of service where no other 
operator has been given access by the access provider, to operate on that 
services market; and 
(c.) a withdrawal of supply of access from an existing customer."14 
The Commission refers to scenarios (a) and (c) as, respectively, 
"discrimination"15 and "withdrawal of supply". 16 They constitute the classical 
refusal-to-supply scenarios under EC competition law. Only the second 
scenario, in which no third party access has been granted at all, relates to the 
concept of essential facilities. 
In scenario (a), different treatment of certain customers may constitute an 
abuse under Article 82 EC, except where such discrimination would be 
objectively justified, e.g. on the basis of cost or technical considerations or 
the fact that the users are operating on different levels. 17 Discrimination may 
relate to elements such as pricing, or restrictions, or delays in making 
network connections, routing, numbering or restrictions on the use of 
customer network data. 18 Issues of discrimination may also arise in respect 
of: the technical configuration of access, e.g. in relation to the degree of 
technical sophistication of the access, the number and/ or location of access 
points; and equal access, i.e. the possibility for customers of the party 
requesting access to obtain the services provided by the access provider, 
14supra n.1, para. 84 
15ibid., paras.85-86 
16ibid., paras. 99-100 
17ibid., para. 120 
18ibid., para. 125 
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using the same number of dialled digits as are used by the customer of the 
latter. 19 
It should be pointed out that the notion of "another operator" in scenario (a) 
does not include the dominant operator's own downstream operations, i.e. 
the situation in which the dominant operator grants access to its own 
downstream operations, but to no other third party, must be assessed under 
the essential facilities scenario (b). This can be inferred from the notion of 
"restriction of competition on the downstream market" in para. 85, which 
restriction would not be possible if the incumbent operator was not also 
dominant, or at least had a strong market position on the downstream market: 
i.e. it must be present on that downstream market.20 
In contrast to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Commission, as already shown 
in its Sealink1 decision, considers it sufficient for there to be an abuse that 
the competition on the downstream market has been "restricted",22 and not 
"eliminated". Unfortunately, it does not elaborate any further on this 
criterion.23 
To a certain degree, discrimination by dominant undertakings in the 
telecommunications sector has already been dealt with by ex ante regulation. 
Under the new Access Directive, an operator which is considered to have 
Significant Market Power (SMP) is subject to non-discrimination obligations 
regarding access and prices.24 Therefore, future cases may predominantly 
concern discriminatory practices by operators outside the actual core of ex 
ante regulation, such as cable operators discriminating between 
broadcasters, or producers of set-top boxes discriminating between content 
and service providers.25 
According to scenario (c), withdrawal of access from an existing customer will 
be abusive if it leads to a restriction of competition on the market for 
downstream services. Again, the refusal may be objectively justified, but any 
such justification must be proportionate to the effects of the withdrawal on 
19ibid., para. 127 
20Bartosch, Chapter 2, in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p. 150 
21 See Ch.3, ftn.164 
22supra n. 1, para. 85 
23Nikolinaikos,(ECLR, 1999),p. 401 
. 
24Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities (Access Directive), Art. 10 
25Garzaniti, (Oxford 2003), p. 308 
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competition. 26 In citing Commercial So/venti-7 as the authority in this area, 
the Commission states its intention to apply the same principles to both 
withdrawal of a product and withdrawal of access.28 
Referring to scenario (b), which, as mentioned above, deals with the concept 
of essential facilities, the Notice sets out a number of elements that the 
Commission will take into account, on a cumulative basis, when determining 
whether access to an essential facility should be granted: 
(a). access to the facility in question is generally essential in order for 
companies to compete on that related market. The refusal must lead to the 
proposed activities being made either impossible or seriously and 
unavoidably uneconomic. It will not be sufficient that the position of the 
potential or alternative competitor would be more advantageous if access 
were granted.29 
(b). the existence of sufficient capacity; 30 
(c). the failure to satisfy consumer demand on an existing service or product 
market, the blocking of the emergence of a potential new service or product 
or the impediment of competition on an existing service or product market; 31 
(d). the payment, by the undertaking seeking access, of a reasonable and 
non-discriminatory access price and acceptance of non-discriminatory access 
terms and conditions; 32 and 
(e). the lack of objective justification.33 
These elements more or less correspond to the conditions developed by the 
US Court of Appeals in MC/,34 concerning the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine to the telecommunications sector:35 
-control of an essential facility by a monopolist; 
-competitor's inability, practically or reasonably, to duplicate the essential 
facility; 
-denial of use of the facility to a competitor; and 
26supra n. 1, para. 100 
27 see Ch.3, ftn.114 
28supra n.1, paras., 99-100 
29 ibid., para. 91 a 
30ibid., para. 91 b. 
31 ibid., para. 91 c. 
32ibid., para. 91 e 
33ibid., para. 91 d 
34see Ch.3, ftn.61 
35Holzhaeuser,p. 218 
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-the feasibility of providing the facility. 
However, in one aspect the Commission seems to go further. Under the US 
EFD, a monopolist is only obliged to grant access to his facilities at retail 
prices. In contrast, under the Commission's EFD, a successful claimant has 
the right to access the facility at the dominant undertaking's own price, which 
is not necessarily the commercial price it would charge on the open market: 
" ... the dominant company's duty is to provide access in such a way that the 
goods and services offered to downstream companies are available on terms 
no less favourable than those given to other parties, including its own 
corresponding downstream operations." (emphasis added)?6 
Therefore, the gist of the EFD, as set out in the Notice, is that if the above 
conditions are fulfilled, the dominant undertaking has a duty to contract, even 
if the facility in question was not previously offered to any third party. The 
potential competitor gains a right of access to the facility in question. 
The Notice refers to a number of practices which may have the same effect 
as a straightforward refusal to deal, such as unjustified delays in responding 
to a request for access, technical configuration or excessive pricing. 37 Some 
of the elements constituting the EFD under the Notice will be analysed in 
more detail below. 
2.1 What is an" essential facility"? 
In telecommunications, there is a wide variety of facilities to which the EFD 
might potentially apply (e.g. the local loop, billing systems etc.). With the 
convergence of the telecommunications and media sectors, this number will 
expand dramatically.38 
However, having regard to the rapid technological change in the 
telecommunications markets, it is impossible to set up a comprehensive list 
of "essential facilities" for the sector.39 What can be regarded as an essential 
facility today, may well be substitutable with an alternative facility tomorrow. 
36supra n. 1, para. 86, see also Naftel,p. 7 
37supra n. 1, paras. 95-98 
38Larouche,(Oxford, 2000),p. 167 
39K. Coates, EU competition rules and access problems in the telecoms sector, (1997) 
International Business Lawyer, 310, p.315 
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The question of what is an essential facility therefore deserves a careful 
economic case-by-case analysis. 
In its Bronnel0 judgment, the ECJ set out a two-fold, objective test for the 
"essentiality" or "indispensability" of a facility: a facility was regarded as 
"essential" if there were no actual and no potential substitutes, i.e. the facility 
could not be duplicated. The ECJ summarizes its position, as developed in 
Bronner, in its IMS Hea!td 1 judgment as follows: 
" ... in order to determine whether a product or service is indispensable for 
enabling an undertaking to carry on business in a particular market, it must 
be determined whether there are products or services which constitute 
alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous, and whether there 
are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or 
at least, unreasonably difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the 
market to create, possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alternative 
products or services."42 
This test is reflected by the wording of the Notice, which provides that for a 
facility to be essential, its duplication by the requesting party must be "either 
impossible or seriously and unavoidably uneconomic".43 Although the 
Commission rightly remarks that it is not sufficient that access would simply 
be "advantageous" for the potential competitor, for the EFD to be applied, its 
Notice unfortunately lacks the detail that the Bronnel4 test provides.45 In 
this context, the Commission seems to consider that, although alternative 
infrastructures such as cable networks are available, it will be a long time 
before these constitute a satisfactory alternative to the facilities of incumbent 
operators. In particular, they do not offer the same density of geographic 
coverage.46 For example, at present, there seems to be no satisfactory actual 
or potential alternative for the local loop. However, considering the rapid 
technological development in the telecommunications sector, a dynamic 
application of the EFD will be necessary. This will constantly have to review 
whether the traditional fixed telephone network still constitutes a 'bottleneck', 
40See Ch.3, ftn.1 0 
41 See Ch.3, ftn.210 
42 ibid., para.28 
43supra n. 1, para. 91 a 
44See Ch.3, ftn.1 0 
45Bartosch, Chapter 4, in Koenig/ Bartosch/Braun, p.144; Holzhaeuser ,p.216 
46supra n. 1, para. 91 a 
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access to which is essential for competitors, or whether the market could be 
regarded as competitive because of the use of alternative connection 
methods, such as cable television networks or the wireless local loop,47 For 
example, mobile networks, due to the increasing presence of alternative 
network providers, can no longer be regarded as bottlenecks or essential 
facilities. 48 
Another rather confusing aspect of the EFD as applied in the Notice, is that 
the Commission uses the notion of "essential facility" both in the context of its 
explanation of dominance, and when describing an abuse. When dealing 
with a finding of dominance, the Access Notice reads: 
"In the telecommunications sector, the concept of 'essential facilities' will in 
many cases be of relevance in determining the duties of dominant TOs. The 
expression 'essential facility' is used to describe a facility or infrastructure 
which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to 
carry on their business, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable 
means. A company controlling the access to an essential facility enjoys a 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 (now 82)."49 
Regarding its interpretation of abuse, the Notice reads: 
"The key issue here is, therefore, what is essential. It will not be sufficient that 
the position of the company requesting access would be more advantageous 
if access were granted - but refusal of access must lead to the proposed 
activities being made either impossible or seriously and unavoidably 
uneconomic."50 
This may lead to the dangerous assumption that the determination of a 
behaviour as abusive may automatically lead to the company in question 
being regarded as dominant. However, the test of dominance should come 
before the test of abuse. 51 The ECJ seemed to have similar problems in 
distinguishing the tests for dominance and abuse in its Bronner2 judgment, 
as it used the notion of "actual substitutes" both in the determination of 
dominance and of abuse (see above). Regardless of these deficiencies, the 
ECJ clearly regards the notion of "duplicability" of the facility, i.e. the question 
47Holzhaeuser,p. 216 
48G.Knieps, Wettbewerb auf dem Mobilfunkmarkt, (2000) 2 MMR, 1, ,pp. 4ff. 
49supra n. 1, para.-68-69 ·· · · 
50 ibid., para, 91 a 
51 Doherty,p. 426 
52See Ch.3, ftn.1 0 
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of whether the party requesting access is able to build such facility of its own, 
as part of the abuse test. In contrast, in its Access Notice the Commission 
seems to have applied this test already in the determination of dominance. 
To this confusion is added a rather broad definition of abuse under the EFD 
in the Notice: "(a) refusal to grant access for the purpose of a service where 
no other operator has been given access by the access provider on this 
services market."53 It should be noted that the Commission does not 
positively define behaviour which is to be considered abusive. Instead, it 
merely describes the basic conditions under which a refusal to grant access 
could be considered an abuse. This is in contrast to the case law, referred to 
in the Notice, and often quoted in the literature on refusal to supply and 
monopoly leveraging, such as Commercial Solvents, 54 United Brands, 55 
Telemarketinq6 and Tetrapak. 57 Commercial Solvents and United Brands 
concerned a withdrawal of supply to an existing customer, Telemarketing 
dealt with tying and Tetrapak concerned two related horizontal markets. 
Loetz and Koenig believe that the reason for the lack of differentiation 
concerning the notion of abuse in the Access Notice is the Commission's 
indiscriminate adoption of the US essential facilities test in MCf in contrast to 
Article 82 EC, s.2 Sherman Act concentrates more on how the dominant 
position or the monopoly has been acquired rather than on what the holder 
of such a position does once it has achieved dominance (see above). It 
seems that the Notice already sanctions the control of the infrastructure itself, 
and not the abuse of that control, which will again lead to a lack of 
differentiation between dominance and abuse. 58 
2.2 Effect on competition in the downstream market 
In the Bronner judgement, the ECJ required that the refusal to provide access 
must be likely to "eliminate all competition" on the part of the person 
53supra n. 1, para. 84 b 
54See Ch.3, ftn.114 
55See Ch.3, ftn.118 
56See Ch.3, ftn.113 
57See Ch.3, ftn.151 
58Koenig,/Loetz, p.381 
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requesting access. 59 In one respect, the Access Notice therefore seems to 
adopt a broader view, as it suggests that the refusal must have an effect on 
competition in general, not only on the party requesting access. This is in line 
with the view expressed by AG Jacobs in Bronner and various commentators, 
that the role of competition law is to protect competition, not individual 
competitors. 60 On the other hand, however, the Access Notice does not 
speak of "elimination" of competition but uses a rather softer and narrower 
formulation: "the facility owner fails to satisfy demand on an existing service 
or product market, blocks the emergence of a potential new service or 
product, or impedes competition on an existing or potential service or product 
market".61 The element of the prevention of the emergence of a new product 
seems to be in line with the ECJ's judgment in Magi/1. 62 However, the Access 
Notice fails to consider the further requirement of the ECJ's judgement in 
Magill, that was essential for a finding of abuse in that case: the refusing 
parties "reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television 
guides by excluding all competition on that market."63 The Notice completely 
ignores the competitive situation on the downstream market. This is not in 
line with the jurisdiction of the Court which requires that, for the EFD to be 
applicable, the owner of the essential facility must at least enjoy a strong 
position on the downstream market. If the downstream market is competitive, 
there is no room for the EFD to apply (see above). The Commission's 
approach in the Access Notice has therefore been criticized as "over-
interventionist".64 
2.3 Objective justification 
According to para. 91 e of the Access Notice, the EFD does not apply if the 
refusal to grant access is objectively justified. The Notice seems to lay down 
59See Ch.3, ftn.10, para. 41 
60 ibid., para. 58 
61 supra n. 1, para. 91c 
62See Ch.3, ftn. 185 
63 ibid., para. 56 
64Bartosch, Chapter 4, in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p.147 
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a number of non-exhaustive examples (para. 91 e uses the phrase "could 
include") of what may constitute an objective justification for a refusal to 
provide access in the telecommunications sector. These include, for 
example, the overriding difficulty of providing access, or the need for a facility 
owner, which has undertaken investment aimed at the introduction of a new 
product or service, to have sufficient time and opportunity to use the facility in 
order to place that new product or service on the market 55 The possibility of a 
return on investment therefore appears to be a legitimate justification for a 
refusal to grant access.66 The Commission thus seems to recognize that, 
alongside its aim of promoting service competition by enabling new entrants 
to access the incuments' networks, it is also important, for the 
telecommunications industry and consumers, not to undermine incentives for 
firms to invest and innovate. Although it should be borne in mind that the 
incumbent operators obtained their dominant positions in a regime of 
exclusive rights, as the telecoms markets have become increasingly 
competitive, room for undertakings to invest and innovate has increasingly 
gained importance. It must also be pointed out that the rapid technological 
development in telecommunications progressively undermines advantages 
gained by the incumbent operators in the times of monopolisation.67 
Two further objective justifications mentioned in the Access Notice are 
'hidden' in the conditions which must be fulfilled before the EFD can apply: a 
dominant undertaking is not obliged to provide access if there is insufficient 
capacity to provide access, 58 or if the party seeking access is not prepared to 
pay a reasonable and non-discriminatory access price and/or accept non-
discriminatory access terms and conditions.69 
This enumeration of possible justifications for a refusal to grant access 
seems to conflict with para. 87 of the Access Notice, which states that where 
capacity constraints are not an issue "it is not clear what other objective 
65supra n. 1, para. 91 e 
66This seems to be in contrast to the Commission's decision in British Midland/Aer Lingus 
(see Ch.3, ftn.167), where the Commission refused to recognize a loss in revenue as a 
legitimate justification 
67Bavasso, (YEL 2002),p.99 
68supra n. 1, para. 91 b 
69 ibid., para. 91 d 
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justifications there could be." The Notice therefore seems to contain 
contradictory statements. 70 
3. Conclusion 
Generally speaking, on the one hand the Access Notice aim of creating more 
clarity (as to the application of the competition rules in the 
telecommunications sector) should be seen in a positive light, in particular 
with regard to the immense room for manoeuvre that the Commission has in 
this area.71 
On the other hand, the Notice has been criticized as an "over-zealous and 
over-interventionist approach".72 A number of the Notice's requirements do 
not seem to be in line with the Court's case law. Regarding the effect that the 
refusal of access should have on competition, the Notice sets out a number 
of criteria which are considerably weaker and less detailed than those 
developed in the Court's jurisprudence (see above). The same can be said 
about the criterion of the "duplicability" of the facility in question, upon which 
the Access Notice does not elaborate any further. It completely fails to 
comment on how competitive or uncompetitive the downstream market 
should be in order for the EFD to apply. By using the notion of "essentiality" in 
both the determination of dominance and of abuse, there is a danger of 
automatically inferring an abuse from a certain dominant position, and vice 
versa. 
In addition, there are a number of general reasons why the duty of network 
operators to provide access should be treated carefully. Following a policy of 
too-easy access to established networks will have a negative effect on 
infrastructure competition in the sector. It will significantly lower the incentive 
to invest in new and/or alternative infrastructure, for both established and 
new competitors in the market. This one-dimensional approach, of 
supporting service competition over infrastructure competition, might lead to 
a perpetuation or even strengthening of the dominant position of incumbent 
70Bartosch, Chapter 4, in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p. 148 
71 Koenig/ Loetz, p.384 
72Nikolinaikos ,(ECLR, 1 999), p. 410 
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operators. The increasing demand for access to established infrastructures 
may lead to an extension of the essential facilities and thus to an increase in 
barriers to entry. This undermines the liberalization measures which try to 
weaken the position of incumbent operators.73 This is closely connected with 
the concept that Article 82 EC protects competition and not competitors. The 
Commission seemed to have acknowledged that concept when it stated, in 
its draft Access Notice (in a footnote to paragraph 91 ), that "Community law 
protects competition and not competitors, and therefore, it would be 
insufficient to demonstrate that one competitor needed access to a facility in 
order to compete in the downstream market. It would be necessary to 
demonstrate that access is necessary for all except exceptional competitors 
in order for access to be made compulsory."74 Unfortunately, the first part 
has been left out in the final draft, which reads as follows: "It would be 
insufficient to demonstrate that one competitor needed access to a facility in 
order to compete in the downstream market. It would be necessary to 
demonstrate that access is necessary for all except exceptional competitors 
in order for access to be made compulsory."75 Naftel criticises the 
Commission's concept of competition which becomes apparent in the 
footnote. The Commission does not define competition as a maximization of 
consumer welfare, which should be the primary aim of any competition policy. 
It considers that the term 'competition' implies a number of competitors, in 
contrast to one single competitor.76 The Commission seems to ignore the 
fact that, under certain circumstances, it may be more efficient, and therefore 
more advantageous for the consumer, to have only one undertaking 
operating in a certain market. Instead, it seems to require efficient, if 
dominant, operators to subsidize less efficient competitors by providing 
access to facilities at artificially low costs. 
Another problem, which was encountered in Magi/1,77 is that of finding the 
right balance between the national property rights enjoyed by network 
operators in relation to their infrastructure, and EC competition law. This 
73Koenig/ Loetz,p. 383 
74Draft Access Notice on the application of competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecoms sector, framework, relevant markets and principles, COM (96) 649 final., para 79, 
ftn 58) 
75supra n. 1, para. 91 a, ftn. 67 
76Naftel ,p.17 
77See Ch.3, ftn.185 
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particular issue will arise if the Commission, as announced in para. 6 of the 
Access Notice, applies the EFD to digital communications. 78 
Granting access under Article 82 EC would also mean that the Commission 
would have to deal with access issues, such as the determination of access 
prices. However, it is questionable whether the Commission, as an antitrust 
authority, is suited for such ex ante regulatory control or whether that should 
rather be left to specialist regulatory authorities.79 Articles 12 and 13 of the 
new Access Directive80 deal with such access issues. 
In addition, it is questionable whether, in an environment of convergence and 
platform independence, a certain network constitutes an essential facility in 
all circumstances. Grewlich therefore suggests that the application of the 
EFD in the telecommunications sector should be confined to natural 
monopolies, i.e. facilities that nobody has an economic incentive to 
duplicate.81 
78Koenig/ Loetz, p.384 
79Bartosch , Chapter 4, in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p. 137 
80supra n.24 
81 Grewlich, (GYIL, 1998),p. 34 
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Chapter 5: The Regulatory Framework for 
Access and Interconnection 
As we have seen above, obligations for dominant undertakings to provide 
access in certain circumstances have been developed in antitrust law under 
the label of the "essential facilities doctrine" (EFD). Although these rules 
have been established as part of the ex-post application of competition rules, 
the principles of the EFD have also had significant influence on ex-ante 
regulation, notably the regulatory framework for access and interconnection. 
1. The old regulatory framework for access and 
interconnection (the ONP Framework) 
Originally developed to secure access for value-added services to the 
monopolists' networks, the ONP (Open Network Provision) framework 1 was 
adjusted to a more competitive environment with the adoption of the 
Interconnection Directive,2 to create a general framework providing basic 
principles for the regulation of access to public telecommunications networks 
in the EU. 
The old framework did not constitute a dedicated framework for network 
access, but rules for access and interconnection were scattered over various 
directives: the Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC)3; certain provisions of the 
Voice Telephony and Universal Service Directive (98/1 O/EC)4 ; certain 
elements of the Leased Line Directive5; and the Advanced Television 
Standards Directive (95/47/EC).6 
1The ONP framework consists of a series of directives, see Chapter 2 
2See Ch.2, ftn.56 
3ibid. 
4See Ch.2, ftn.55 
5See Ch.2, ftn.52 
6 Directive 95/47, European Parliament and Council Directive on the use of standards for the 
transmission of television signals(Advanced Television Standards Directive), [1995] O.J. 
L281/51 
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This regime is replaced by the new Access and Interconnection Directive,7 
Article 7 of which carries over the obligations under the current ONP 
Directives and the Local Loop Regulation, 8 but requires NRAs (National 
Regulatory Authorities) to review all obligations regularly, in particular in the 
light of the new framework and the new threshold for SMP (Significant Market 
Power). In particular, it maintains most of the provisions of the TV Standards 
Directive,9 including the obligation to provide additional access to 
broadcasters on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 
2. The new Access and Interconnection Directive 10 
2.1 Scope and aim 
The Access Directive, as the new regulatory framework in general, marks a 
move away from the focus on fixed voice networks to the regulation of 
communications networks generally. It establishes arrangements for 
regulating access to electronic communications networks and services, and 
interconnection between networks. The Directive deals with the wholesale 
relationship between the providers of networks and services and associated 
facilities. It sets the regulatory framework for the relationships between 
suppliers and services that should result in sustainable competition, 
interoperability and user benefits. 11 
There are two major aspects to the Directive: 
(1) Details of the rights and obligations for operators seeking access and /or 
interconnection. These general rights and obligations apply to all operators 
that come within the scope of the Directive. 
7 Directive 2002/19/EC of March 7, 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and services, (2002) OJ L 1 08/7 
8 Regulation 2887/2000, Commission Regulation on unbundled access to the local loop (LLU 
Regulation) ,[2000] O.J. L336/4 
9 supra n. 6 
10 supra n.7 
11 ibid. Art. 1(1) 
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(2) Arrangements for the imposition of specific obligations on operators 
designated as having Significant Market Power (SMP), following market 
analysis in the relevant market. 
Recital 1 of the Access Directive specifically limits the provision of the new 
access framework to those networks used for the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services. The definition of "Public 
Communications Network", as set out in the Framework Directive, states that 
such a network is "used wholly or mainly for the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services."12 
The Directive does not cover services providing content13 (Recital 2 Access 
Directive and Recital 10 Framework Directive). It also excludes Information 
Society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC14 , which do not 
consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks. The main difference between such services is 
considered to be that content and Information Society services are triggered 
by an individual request (e.g. booking a flight online) and therefore relate to 
information rather than signalling. 15 
The Access Directive includes provisions that require ex-ante rules to be 
withdrawn in the event that a relevant regulated market segment becomes 
competitive (Recital 13). It was drafted with the aim of providing clear 
boundaries within which ex-ante regulation is necessary and proportionate. It 
balances the need for regulatory certainty and consistency against the need 
for a sufficiently flexible framework, which is able to address new access 
issues as they emerge. The new flexible approach stipulates that National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are to impose specific ex-ante access 
obligations, if such obligations are necessary to ensure adequate access and 
interconnection in a concrete market situation. 
12Framework Directive (see Ch.2, ftn.4), Art. 2(d) 
13Defined as "services providing or exercising editorial control over content (Art. 2(c) 
Framework Directive, see Ch.2, ftn.4) 
141nformation Society Services are defined in Directive 98/34/EC as "any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request or 
a recipient of the service"; Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
22.6.1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, [1998] OJ L 204/37, 
as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of 5.8.1998, [1998]0J L217/18 
15C. Koenig/ S. Loetz, Framework for Network Access and Interconnection, Chapter 8, in 
Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p.427 
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2.2 Definitions 
Under the new regulatory framework, the same rules will apply to both access 
and interconnection with an operator's network. 
For the purposes of the Directive, "access" means making available facilities 
or services to another undertaking for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications services. 16 This includes physical infrastructure, such as 
buildings, ducts and masts. "Access" in the sense of the Access Directive 
does not refer to access by end users (i.e. users not providing publicly 
available electronic communications networks or services 17). 
"Interconnection", for the purposes of the directive, is a specific type of 
access implemented between public network operators, 18 in order to allow 
users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or another 
undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking. 19 
2.3.General provisions 
Article 3 carries forward the provisions of the old Interconnection Directive20 
in requesting that Member States take all necessary measures to remove 
restrictions which prevent the negotiation of access/interconnection 
agreements between undertakings. It also contains a type of 'one-stop-shop' 
principle, in that an operator requesting interconnection does not need to be 
authorised/licensed in the Member State where the request is made, if it is 
not providing services in that Member State. 
Article 4 sets out the so-called 'primary interconnection rule', 21 which gives all 
service providers, authorised to operate a network providing publicly-
16supra n. 7, Art. 2a 
17 Art. 2(n} Framework Directive (see Ch.2, ftn4) 
18
"0perator", for the purposes of the Directive, is "an undertaking providing or authorised to 
~rovide a public communications network or an associated facility." (supra n. 7, Art. 2(c)) 
9ibid. Art. 2b 
20See Ch.2, ftn.56 
21 Bavasso, (CMLRev,2004), p. 100 
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available services, a right and an obligation to negotiate interconnection with 
each other. This obligation applies to all operators, not only SMP operators. 
Commercial negotiation therefore remains the first step for any service 
provider seeking to gain access to networks or service. 22 However, because 
of the strong market position of the incumbent operators of fixed public 
telephone networks (see above), and the risk of them engaging in anti-
competitive behaviour, it was considered that interconnection could not be 
left entirely subject to commercial negotiation, and that a regulatory 
framework was needed to ensure regulation of operators with market power. 
Furthermore, operators shall offer "interconnection to other undertakings on 
terms and conditions consistent with obligations imposed by the NRAs 
pursuant to Articles 5,6, 7 and 8." These obligations set out: powers and 
responsibilities of the NRAs with regard to access and interconnection; 
arrangements for conditional access systems and other facilities; review of 
former obligations for access and interconnection; and arrangements for the 
imposition, amendment or withdrawal of obligations. Article 4 also imposes 
obligations of confidentiality on undertakings negotiating interconnection. 
According to Article 5(1 ), NRAs may, in certain circumstances, impose 
obligations on operators that do not have SMP. In doing so, the NRAs must 
comply with their obligations under Article 6 Framework Directive23 
(consultation and transparency mechanism) and Article 7 Framework 
Directive (consolidating the internal market for electronic communications). 
They must ensure that all conditions imposed are objective, transparent, 
proportionate and non-discriminatory (Article 5(3)). Some of these 
obligations may be imposed on undertakings that control access to end-
users, whenever that is necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity.24 This 
is particularly the case in markets where there continue to be large 
differences in negotiating power between undertakings, and where some 
undertakings rely on infrastructure provided by others for delivery of their 
services.25 
22As in ONP Interconnection Directive (see Ch.2, ftn.56): Article 4(1) gives priority to 
commercial negotiation of interconnection 
23 Framework Directive, see Ch.2, ftn.4 
24 supra n.7, Art. 5(1)(a) 
25 ibid., Recital 6 
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2.4. Obligations of operators with SMP26 
The Access Directive incorporates two sets of rules that deal with bottleneck 
issues at infrastructure level. Article 6 deals specifically with broadcasters' 
access to an established conditional access system, while Articles 9-13 deal 
more generally with access to electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, 27 i.e. they comprise all facilities that can be involved in 
the process of transmitting signals. 
In Article 6, the Access Directive provides that access to Conditional Access 
(CA) Systems (CASs), 28 and associated facilities, will continue to be 
regulated (as they are under the TV Standards Directive29), and that the 
scope of such regulation will be extended if this is found to be necessary after 
a market review. It exclusively refers to CA services for digital television and 
radio broadcasting services. The mere fact of having control over a CA facility 
triggers an unconditional and absolute access obligation. 
Articles 8 to 13 impose additional obligations on operators designated as 
having SMP. According to Art. 16(4) Framework Directive,30 once the NRA 
has decided that an operator has SMP, it must at least impose one ex-ante 
obligation on that operator. According to the Access Directive, the NRAs can 
impose the following types of obligation on such operators at the wholesale 
level31 : 
- a requirement to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, 
specific network elements and associated facilities (Article 12); 
26For the concept of SMP in the New Regulatory Framework, see Chapter 1, 1 
27For the definition of "electronic communications networks", see Chapter 1; "associated 
facilities" are defined in Art. 2 (e) Framework (see Ch.2, ftn.4) as "facilities associated with 
an electronic communications network and/or an electronic communications service which 
enable and/or support the provision of services via that network and/or service." 
28Art. 2(f) of the Framework Directive (supra n.14) defines "conditional access" as "any 
technical measure and/or arrangement whereby access to a protected radio or television 
broadcasting service in intelligible form is made conditional upon subscription or other forms 
of prior individual authorisation." This includes a combination of hardware (set-top box, 
smartcard) and software devices (encryption system, subscriber management functions). CA 
has traditionally been associated with pay-TV services. 
29supra n. 6 
3° Framework Dir., see Ch.2, ftn.4 
31 The Universal Service Directive (Directive 2002/22 on universal services and users'rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services, [2002] O.J. L 108/51) sets the 
obligations which may be imposed at the retail level, such as tariff regulation (Article 16), 
provision of the minimum set of leased lines (Article 18), carrier selection and/or pre-
selection services (Art.19). 
::::::; 
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- requirements in relation to transparency including accounting information, 
technical specification, network characteristics, terms and conditions for 
supply and use, prices (Article 9); 
- obligations in relation to non-discrimination (Article 1 0); 
- requirements in relation to accounting separation to ensure that cross-
subsidies are not being made (Article 11 ); and 
- price control and cost accounting obligations (Article 13). 
Therefore, a service provider deemed to have SMP may be required to 
provide access and interconnection services to a wide range of potential 
competitors. According to Article 12 Access Directive, access obligations may 
be imposed on operators to ensure that they "meet reasonable requests for 
access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities." 
Article 12 specifically mentions the competitive development of retail markets 
to justify the imposition of access obligations upon operators with SMP. The 
meaning of "access" is extended by the list of examples set out in Article 
12(1 ), including, inter alia, access to services on a wholesale basis, as well 
as general obligations such as the duty to negotiate in good faith. 
As to the actual access obligation, Article 12 of the Access Directive leaves it 
to the NRAs to determine what initiatives are actually needed to ensure the 
openness of a certain facility. Unlike the ONP Interconnection Directive,32 the 
Access Directive does not contain a focus on access to facilities relevant to 
voice telephony, which enables an NRA to mandate access to a much 
greater range of network elements and services. This means that Articles 8-
13 do not automatically label certain facilities as bottleneck facilities, as was 
done under the ONP concept, but NRAs are entitled to determine the 
circumstances under which particular facilities are to be regarded as potential 
bottlenecks to market entry and competition (with the exception of Article 6). 
The Access Directive continues the proportionality approach ("essential 
requirements") of the ONP framework. According to Article 12(2), when 
imposing access obligations, NRAs must balance all interests involved and 
take into consideration not only such technical aspects as systems integrity 
and security, interoperability and capacities, but also competition policy 
aspects, such as: the need to recoup initial investments; the long-term effects 
32 See Ch.2, ftn.56 
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on competition of access denial; the economic risks involved in setting up 
certain facilities; and any property interests of the provider of the facility. In 
exceptional circumstances, and with prior agreement of the Commission, a 
Member State may impose ex-ante obligations, which are in excess of those 
described above, on operators with SMP. (Article 8(4)). 
3. Regulation 2887/2000/EC on Unbund~ed Access 
to the Local Loop33 
Regulation 2887/2000/EC (the ULL Regulation), although published at the 
same time as the Directives of the new regulatory framework, became law in 
all Member States at the beginning of 2001. The reason for this special 
treatment is that access to the last mile remains the least competitive 
segment of the liberalized telecommunications market as incumbents still 
dominate the local access market.34 
New entrants do not have widespread alternative network infrastructures and 
are unable, with traditional technologies, to match the economies of scale 
and the coverage of operators designated as having SMP. This results from 
the fact that these operators rolled out their metallic local access 
infrastructures over significant periods of time, protected by exclusive rights, 
and were able to cross-subsidise investment costs through monopoly rents?5 
Furthermore, it is usually not economically viable for new entrants to 
duplicate an incumbent's metallic local loop access infrastructure in its 
entirety and within reasonable time, and alternative infrastructure (such as 
upgraded cable TV networks, satellite, wireless local loop, fibre optic 
networks) do not generally offer the same functionality or universality.36 One 
33supra n.8 
34Commission: 5th Report on the implementation of the telecommunications regulatory 
~ackage, [1999] COM 537 
5supra n. 8, Recital 3 
36Commission Communication of 26 April 2000, Unbundled Access to the local loop: 
Enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services 
including broadband multimedia and high-speed internet, COM (2000)final, p.6 
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of the main deficiencies of cable television networks is, for example, their 
limited coverage.37 
The incumbent's copper pair is the key infrastructure for providing: 
(a). access to voice telephony services, which includes call termination; 
(b). local call (originating ) services (except where carrier pre-selection allows 
the delivery of local call services); and 
(c). high bandwidth services to end users.38 
There is a danger that the incumbents will lever their dominant position in the 
former two markets into the latter market of broadband internet access. 
Incumbents are already rolling out their own broadband high speed bit stream 
services for Internet access in their copper loops, but may delay the 
introduction of some types of DSL (digital subscriber technologies) and 
services in the local loop, where these compete with the incumbents' own 
current offerings.39 It is therefore considered crucial to grant new entrants 
access to the local loop, both to meet users' needs (in particular those for 
high speed Internet access) and, more generally, "to create an inexpensive, 
world-class communications infrastructure and a wide range of services", as 
envisaged by the European Council of Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 2000.40 
High connection speeds between content-providers and users are essential 
for new Information Society services, such as: video and music on demand; 
voice over Internet; video conferencing, etc. 41 Using the traditional copper 
local loop for these services makes them available to the normal consumer. 
37
"b"d 6 I I ., p. 
38ibid. p. 8; until recently, the copper pair of the local loop has not permitted high speed 
network connections - digital subscriber line (DSL) technologies make it now possible to use 
the wire local loop for high speed internet connections. For this, a DSL access multiplexer 
(DSLAM) must be connected directly to the copper pairs (see Annex of Commission 
Communication, 15). 
39Commission Recommendation of 25 May 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop: 
enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communications services 
including broadband multimedia and high-speed internet, [2000) OJ L 156/44 
40
supra n. 8, Recital 1 
41 T.C. Vinje and H. Kalimo: Does competition law require unbundling of the local loop?, 
Journal of World Competition (2000) 23(3), 49 
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3.1.Scope and definitions 
"Local loop" is defined in Recital 3 and Article 2(c) of the Regulation as "the 
physical twisted metallic pair circuit in the fixed public telephone network 
connecting the network termination point at the subscriber's premises to the 
main distribution frame or equivalent facility." Local loops that are not based 
on metallic circuits, e.g. fibre systems, are therefore excluded from the 
Regulation's scope of application.42 "Unbundled access to the local loop" 
means, according to Article 2(e) of the Regulation, "full unbundled access to 
the local loop and shared access to the local loop;43 it does not entail a 
change in ownership of the local loop." 
3.2. Relation to Access Directive44 
Recital 15 of the ULL Regulation provides that the new regulatory framework 
for electronic communications should include appropriate provisions to 
replace the Local Loop Regulation. It is presently unclear whether the ULL 
Regulation will be repealed, once the new regulatory framework and the 
specific provisions regarding the local loop contained in the Access Directive 
have been fully implemented at national level. Under the new regulatory 
framework, the regulation is incorporated in the Access Directive,45 providing 
an annexed list of items to be included in the offer for sufficiently unbundled 
access under conditions that are transparent, fair and non-discriminatory, and 
based upon cost orientation, identical to the list in the ULL Regulation.46 
Article 2(a) of the Access Directive makes clear that any definition of access 
should also encompass local loop unbundling and facilities and services 
42
supra n. 8, Recital 5 
43
"Full unbundled access to the local loop" means "the provision to a beneficiary of access to 
the local loop or local sub loop of the notified operator authorising the use of the full 
frequency spectrum of the twisted metallic pair" (Art. 2(f)). "Shared access to the local loop" 
means "the provision to a beneficiary of access to the local loop of the notified operator, 
authorising the use of the non-voice band frequency spectrum of the twisted metallic pair; the 
local loop continues to be used by the notified operator to provide the telephone service to 
the public" (Art. 2(g)). Full unbundled access was not covered by the ONP framework, 
although shared access to the high frequency spectrum was covered by Art. 16 of the ONP 
Voice Telephony Directive and Art. 4 of the ONP Interconnection Directive. 
44supra n. 7 
45 ibid. Art. 12(1)(a) 
46 ibid., Annex II 
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necessary to provide services over the local loop. Under Article 12(1)(a) of 
the Access Directive, operators designated as having SMP in the market for 
wholesale local access may be required to provide unbundled access to their 
local access network. 
3. 3 Unbundled Access 
Article 3(2) of the Regulation requires incumbent operators, designated by 
their NRAs as having SMP47 ("notified operators"), to meet all reasonable 
requests for unbundled access to their local copper loops - on the basis of 
both exclusive and shared use - on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. This includes the right for competitors to have access on the same 
terms as those offered to the operators themselves or their associated 
companies. It also includes the right for the new entrant to co-locate its own 
network equipment with that of the incumbent. The price for unbundled 
access to the local loop must be cost-oriented, so long as competition is not 
sufficient to prevent excessive pricing (Articles 3(3) and 4(4)). Operators must 
publish a reference offer for unbundled access to the local loop, including 
prices, terms and conditions (Article 3(1 )). Requests for access to the notified 
operator's local loop may only be refused on the basis of objective criteria, 
relating to technical feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity 
(Article 3(2)). As in the Access Directive48 above, the regulation focuses on 
the commercial negotiation of network access, whilst simultaneously setting 
conditions for agreements. 
47For the purpose of the ULL Regulation, the old concept of SMP applies, i.e. that an 
operator is rebuttably presumed to have SMP when it has market shares of 25% or more in 
the market for the provision of fixed public telephone networks and services. 
48supra n. 7 
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4. Access/Interconnection and Unbundling of the 
Loca~ Loop: interrelation between competition 
law and regulation 
132 
EC competition rules in general, and the EFD in particular, have had a 
significant impact on regulation of access and interconnection in EC 
telecommunications. Two of a number of examples of the influence of 
antitrust law and principles in this area are: access to network facilities, and 
the unbundling of the localloop.49 
4.1 Access to network facilities 
Article 12(1) of the Access Directive50 reads: 
"A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for 
access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, 
inter alia in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that 
denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having similar effect 
would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail 
level, or would not be in the end-user's interest(emphasis added)." 
The Article provides that when the national authority deals with access 
requests, it must take into account the competitive situation of the market, in 
that it has to ensure that the refusal to provide access would not "hinder the 
emergence of a sustainable competitive market." This seems to be in line 
with the ECJ's case law on refusal to deal, which requires, for there to be an 
abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC and therefore a duty to 
deal, that the behaviour in question must have a negative impact on 
competition in the downstream market. 51 
49Another area of regulation where the influence of competition law is very obvious is that of 
digital broadcasting 
50supra n.7 
51 See case law of the ECJ, above Chapter 2 
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It should also be noted that the Commission takes account of the interests of 
the consumer, emphasising the impact of the denial of access "at the retail 
level" and considering the "end-user's interest". This seems to be supported 
by AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Bronner, where he stated that "the primary 
purpose of Article 86 is to prevent distortion of competition - and in particular 
to safeguard the interests of consumers - rather than to protect the position of 
particular competitors."52 In particular, the earlier case law of the ECJ has 
often been criticised as being too competitor-orientated.53 
In the second paragraph of Article 12, the Commission seems to rely heavily 
on principles developed in relation to essential facilities case law as well as 
the Access Notice.54 Article 12(2) provides that NRAs, when considering 
whether to impose an obligation to provide access, shall take account of the 
following factors: 
"(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing 
facilities ... ; 
(b) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity 
available; 
(c) the initial investment by the facility owner, bearing in mind the risks 
involved in making the investment; 
(d) the need to safeguard competition in the long term; 
(e) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights; 
(f) the provision of pan-European services." 
4.2. Unbundling of the Local Loop 
Regarding the unbundling of the local loop, the Commission's 
Communication on unbundled access on the local loop,55 setting out 
guidelines on the application of the existing Community law in this respect, 
seems in particular to rely heavily on the concept of essential facilities. The 
52See Ch.3, ftn.1 0, para. 58 
53See above Chapter 2 
54See Ch.2, ftn.1 00 
55supra n.36 
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Communication expressly refers to the Bronne?6 precedent when justifying a 
general obligation to unbundle the local loop, and states that: 
"Given the size of the investments required, the absolute cost of nation-wide 
duplication of the incumbents' network with a similar population coverage is 
likely to be a barrier to entry for any competitor. This infrastructure appears to 
be with present technologies economically unfeasible, or unreasonably 
difficult to duplicate at a nation-wide level in a reasonable time period, even 
for the most important competitors of existing incumbents, in particular 
incumbent operators from other Member States which develop their activities 
in neighbouring European countries, alone or in cooperation with others."57 
However, the Commission seems to ignore the fact that the ECJ in Bronner 
did not regard it as sufficient for there to be a duty to provide access where 
duplication of the facility had to be unfeasible for any kind of competitor. 
Duplication had to be unfeasible for a competitor with a similar customer 
base as that possessed by the dominant operator:58 
"For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would 
be necessary at the very least to establish ... that it is not economically viable 
to create a second home-delivery scheme for the distribution of daily 
newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers 
distributed by the existing scheme."59 
Competitors requiring access would therefore have to establish that 
alternative networks would be unfeasible on a nation-wide scale, serving a 
similar number of customers as the current incumbent. 
The Commission starts the essential facilities test in its Communication by 
justifying an obligation to unbundle with the fact that the incumbent operators 
have gained an unfair advantage through their former monopoly position. 
This seem to mirror a statement of AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Bronner, 
where he declared that "the cost of duplicating a facility might alone 
constitute an insuperable barrier to entry. That might be so particularly in 
cases in which the creation of the facility took place under non-competitive 
conditions, for example, partly through state funding."60 
56
see Ch.3, ftn.1 0 
57 
supra n. 36, p. 8 
58Naftel M./Spiwak,L.J, The telecoms trade war, (Oxford, 2000) p. 315 
59 
see Ch.3, ftn.1 0, para. 46 
60 ibid, para. 66 
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According to Naftel and Spiwak, the fact that public funds were used to 
construct networks cannot by itself justify an obligation to provide access to 
the local loop by the incumbent operators in subsequently liberalized and 
privatized economic environment , as investors have reimbursed the state for 
its network construction.61 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, it can be said that EC regulatory measures on access and 
interconnection have been influenced by competition law in general, and by 
the Community courts' interpretation of competition law. The competition 
rules have been transformed into bases for ex-ante regulation. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that this codification of competition law 
under a regulatory measure will, in turn, provide guidelines for the application 
of competition law and the EFD in areas of the communications sector which 
are outside the scope of a regulated environment. 52 
However, the relatively slow progress in the unbundling of the local loop in 
the Member States, even after the introduction of the ULL Regulation, shows 
that the interrelation between competition and regulation, which has been 
successful in some areas, might not work in others. This highlights the 
importance of complementing regulatory action with ex post application of 
Article 82 EC. The Commission has launched infringement proceedings 
against Member States that have not fully implemented the ULL Regulation. 
It has also expanded its sector enquiry to the local loop,63 and investigated 
anti-competitive behaviour through several competition cases. The two main 
examples are Wanadoo64 and Deutsche Telekom. 65 
61 Naftel/ Spiwak,p.315 
62Bavasso, ( The Hague, 2003) p. 79, quoting Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, [1998] 
ECR 803 
63See Press Release IP/02/849, June 12,2002. Further information on the Local Loop sector 
inquiry can be found at: 
www.europ.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrustlothers/sector_inquiries/local_loop/ 
64See Press Release IP/01/1899, December 12 2001 and Press Release IP/03/1025, July 16 
2003 
65Commission Decision [2003] O.J. 1263/9, October 14, 2003; Press Release IP/03/717, May 
21 2003 
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Therefore, the question remains whether, in a liberalized market 
environment, it would be better to phase out sector-specific regulation and let 
competition law rule on its own. 
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Chap~er 6 " Conc~usion 
In line with Article 3(1 )(g) EC, the ultimate aim of the liberalization process is 
to achieve a state of undistorted and sustainable competition in the EC 
telecommunications market. There are basically two ways to achieve that 
goal: via sector-specific regulation on the one hand and via general 
competition rules (in particular Articles 81 and 82 EC) on the other. From the 
beginning, the liberalization of the telecommunications sector has been 
based on a dual regime of sector-specific regulation and EC competition 
rules. Both sets of rules are based on a common origin: the quest for the 
internal market. 1 However, the competition rules have become increasingly 
independent from this common market origin and have had a significant 
influence on sector-specific rules.2 One of the most recent examples of this 
trend is the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, 
which contains a previously unattained level of mutual interaction between 
regulation and competition law, giving a position of prominence to 
competition principles within the regulatory regime. To the extent that 
communications activities are subject to both specific regulation and 
competition rules, the issue of the relationship and interaction between these 
different set of rules arises.3 
1. Competition law versus sector-specific regulation 
Both set of rules pursue the policy goal of effective competition., but have 
different characteristics and partly apply to different market situations. The 
1A. Bavasso, Electronic communications: A new paradigm for European regulation, (2004) 
41 C.M.L.Rev.87, p. 111 
2ibid. 
3The issue of the relationship between sector-specific regulation and competition law has 
attracted extensive commentary. See, in particular, OECD: Relationship between 
Regulators and Competition Authorities, DAFFE/CLP(99)8; and Grewlich, Cyberspace: 
sector-specific regulation and competition rules in European Telecommunications, (1999) 36 
CMLR 937 
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general competition rules are broadly formulated and apply across a 
comprehensive range of industries. This makes them automatically less 
predictable for market actors, but on the other hand more flexible than sector-
specific rules.4 They are essentially reactive in nature, i.e. they apply ex post 
to market conduct. 5 However, it has been argued that if the application of 
competition rules is backed by sanctions, they can fulfil a certain ex-ante 
function in that they could work as a deterrent for anticompetitive behaviour.6 
This seems to be a reasonable approach in economic sectors where the 
competitiveness of the market is sustained by actual or potential competition 
between undertakings, i.e. in most industries.7 Competition rules therefore 
start with the presumption that markets are competitive to begin with, and 
their role is to protect competition by eliminating anti-competitive behaviour. 
However, the main drawbacks of relying on competition law are the limited 
scope for intervention and the time and costs involved in resolving disputes.8 
Sector-specific rules, in contrast, pursue a wider range of objectives, 
including effective competition, and can take account of specific technical or 
economic characteristics. Thus, they are capable of achieving specifically 
defined social and political objectives.9 They apply ex ante, defining a narrow 
range of acceptable conduct, and therefore provide considerable legal 
certainty for long-term investors. In contrast to competition rules, sector-
specific rules apply in market situations where competition is absent, or at 
least not optimal, by imposing controls which substitute for competition. 10 
Sector-specific rules are therefore particularly applied in sectors which have 
been regarded as too politically or economically sensitive to be opened to 
free competition. Until the beginning of the liberalization process in 1987, 
telecoms services in the EU were mostly monopolized and under state 
control. Even after the telecoms markets were liberalized, due to the specific 
economic features of the telecoms sector (dominant incumbent operators, 
high costs of entry, technical externalities) the Commission decided that 
competition rules alone were not sufficient to deal with the various problems 
4J.-D. Braun/ R. Capito, The Emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a New Self-
Standing Field within Community Law, Chapter.2,in Koenig/Bartosch/Braun, p.65 
5 With the exception of merger control, see for example OECD report p. 26 
6Murroni,/lrvine, p.53 
7
van Dijk,p. 96 
8
van Dijk, p.1 09 
9Garzaniti, (Oxford, 2003), 538 
10
van Dijk,p. 96 
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in the telecoms sector. 11 Ex ante rules were therefore considered to be 
necessary, at least in the short- to medium-term, to ensure efficient and 
timely access to networks and other facilities that would otherwise constitute 
bottlenecks for market entry, and to control tariffs for services that were not 
subject to effective competition. Thus, a comprehensive framework of sector-
specific regulation developed in the telecoms sector. One of the main 
questions in telecoms policy today is whether these sector-specific 
circumstances still justify the continued use of sector-specific regulation. 
In principle, EC competition law and sector-specific regulation apply in 
parallel. Competition rules are thus fully applicable even when sector-specific 
rules have been adopted. 12 NRAs must therefore ensure that actions taken 
by them within the regulatory framework are consistent with EU competition 
law.13 They may not approve arrangements which are contrary to EU 
competition rules. 14 According to the Access Notice,15 sector-specific 
regulation will generally take precedence with regard to action under 
competition law, if such sector-specific action is pro-competitive and 
efficient. 16 
The competition rules thus have the function of a "safety net"17 in the event 
that certain abusive behaviour by an operator is not covered by the specific 
regulations, or in cases where Member States have failed to implement 
Community legislation. 18 It is the role of competition rules to ascertain that 
the goals which have been achieved through sector-specific regulation are 
not undermined by the anticompetitive behaviour of undertakings: in 
particular, the incumbent undertakings which still occupy dominant positions 
in the market. Competition rules have also had a significant influence on 
sector-specific regulation. For example, from the beginning, competition 
11 See Ch.2, ftn.100, para. 14 
12Grewlich,(GYIL, 1998), p. 40 
13See cases 66186, Ahmed Saeed, [1989] ECR 838; Case 153193, Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Delta Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, [1994] ECR-2517; Case 267186, Van Eycke, 
~1986] ECR 4 769 
4Case 13/77, GB-Inno, [1977] ECR 2155, at para. 33: " ... while it is true that Article 86 is 
directed at undertakings, nonetheless it is also true that the Treaty imposes a duty on 
Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure that could deprive the 
wovision of its effectiveness." 
5See Ch.2, ftn.100 
16The Access Notice refers to the old ONP framework when referring to sector-specific 
regulation. However, the Notice remains in effect in parallel with the New Regulatory 
Framework: see reference made to the Access Notice in SMP Guidelines, ibid., para. 24 
17 Grewlich,(GYIL, 1998), p. 40 
18 ibid. 
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rules have been used as a legal basis for sector-specific regulation. 
Competition rules, and in particular Article 86 (ex 90), have played a decisive 
role. 
2. Ptractica~ examp~e of interaction between 
competition ~aw and sector-specific regu~ation: 
Access to "essential facilities" 
One area in the telecommunications sector in which the interrelation between 
regulation and competition law is particularly apparent is that of access to, 
and interconnection of, networks: this has always played an important role in 
the opening-up of the telecoms sector. As the liberalization process did not 
coincide with the end of dominant positions, access policies are necessary to 
enable new competitors to enter the market. On the one hand, providing 
access and interconnection for new competitors seems to be the inevitable 
way to achieve competition regarding the network externalities which 
characterize the telecommunications sector. On the other hand, requiring 
operators to provide access for their competitors could undermine 
competition, as it is a deep intervention in the market mechanism. 19 One of 
the main issues in telecoms policy is whether such access issues should be 
resolved by sector-specific regulation, or whether it is sufficient to apply EC 
competition rules (particularly Articles 81 and 82 EC), building on the concept 
of essential facilities. 
Access to networks is one of the areas in which sector-specific regulation and 
competition law converge and, to a certain extent, overlap. If a competitor 
requires access to an incumbent's network, this could be dealt with under 
competition law, in particular under the essential facilities doctrine, or under 
the Access and Interconnection regulatory regime. The EFD, and competition 
19Grewlich calls this the "interconnection paradox" (CMLRev, 1999,p.962), quoting from 
Arlandis, "Concurrence et dominance: Le probleme de Ia boucle locale", 23 
Communications&Strategies ( 1996), 79, p. 93 
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law in general, is one way of dealing with bottlenecks affecting 
telecommunications. Until now the telecommunications industry has been 
shaped instead by industry specific regulation. 
The Commission considered that ex post application of competition rules to 
access and interconnection was insufficient: in rapidly-expanding markets, 
delay in granting access or interconnection may impair competition. In its 
1998 Access Notice,20 the Commission deals extensively with the 
relationship of competition law and sector-specific regulation in the area of 
network access. According to the Access Notice, sector-specific regulation 
will generally take precedence with regard to action under competition law, so 
long as the sector-specific regulation is pro-competitive and efficient. Thus, 
since the beginning of the liberalization process with the 1987 Green Paper, 
a comprehensive sector-specific framework dealing with access and 
interconnection has been established, both at EU level and at the level of EU 
Member States. 
Within the framework of sector-specific regulation of access, the NRAs can 
act in a substantial ex-ante manner and mandate, in substantial detail, 
interconnection provisions concerning pricing, accounting and the technical 
details of access. However, the competition law concept of essential facilities 
has had a significant influence on this sector-specific access regime. In the 
Access Notice, the EFD has found its most explicit formulation. However, the 
EFD has always been viewed with a certain degree of scepticism. Although it 
owes its origins to US antitrust law, the Supreme Court has never officially 
recognised the doctrine. In a very recent case in the telecoms sector, Verizon 
Telecommunications, 21 the Supreme Court again refused to endorse the EFD 
and expressed strong reservations, in particular concerning the difficulty of 
finding a balance between the fundamental antitrust concept of 
independence of competitors and the concept of enforced sharing of assets. 
To date, only the lower US courts have expressly referred to the term 'EFD'. 
Similarly, the ECJ has never recognized the doctrine as such, but has dealt 
with access cases under its 'refusal-to-deal' jurisdiction. C:3spite the quite 
broad application of the doctrine by the Commission since the ECJ's 
20See Ch.2, ftn.1 00 
21 See Ch.2, ftn.76 
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judgment in Bronner, 22 the application of the EFD in EC competition law has 
been severely restricted. Many of the provisions in the Access Notice should 
be revised, as they are not in line with this case law. The test laid down in 
Bronner is probably more exacting than that which the Commission had in 
mind when it included the EFD in the 1998 Access Notice. 
This restricted application of the EFD has been welcomed by most 
commentators. It underlines the importance of sector-specific access 
regulation, which provides more specific and far-reaching rights than 
competition law. Too broad an application of the doctrine could have a severe 
effect on the incentive to invest in the telecoms sector, on the side of the 
incumbents as well as on the side of new entrants. Although it should be 
borne in mind that the incumbent operators in the telecommunications sector 
will have obtained their dominant position in a regime of exclusive rights, with 
the telecoms market becoming progressively competitive, room for 
undertakings to invest is becoming increasingly important. Rapid 
technological development in telecoms undermines the advantages gained 
by the incumbent operators during the time of monopolization. In addition, a 
broad access policy could even strengthen the position of the incumbents, 
and therefore undermine the goals achieved by the liberalization process. 
This inherent conflict between a broad access policy and innovation has often 
been phrased as a debate between, on one side, those advocating 
infrastructure competition and, on the other side, thos~ advocating a model of 
competition based on access, i.e. services competition. However, the 
question is not necessarily whether one should prevail over the other. It is 
important to take into account the time dimension. In order for competition to 
develop in the short term, new competitors have to be given access to 
incumbents' networks. However, in the long term, telecoms regulation should 
reward operators which base their competitive advantage on building their 
own infrastructure.23 
It should also be noted that granting access under Article 82 EC would mean 
that the Commission would have to deal with access issues, such as the 
determination of access prices. However, it is questionable whether the 
Commission, as an antitrust·authority, is suited for such ex ante regulatory 
22See Ch.3, ftn.10 
23M.Monti, Competition Law and Regulation in the Telecoms Industry: The way forward, 
ECT A Conference Brussels, December 2003, p. 3 
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control, or whether that should be left to specialist regulatory authorities (the 
NRAs, in EC telecommunications). Articles 12 and 13 of the new Access 
Directive24 deal with such access issues.25 
This leads to a very restricted application of the EFD in EC law: in line with 
the goal of Article 3(1 )(g)EC an obligation to grant access is only legitimate if 
it serves the preservation of undistorted competition. As mentioned above, 
competition law and sector-specific regulation apply in parallel under EC 
telecommunications law. However, with the New Access and Interconnection 
Regime covering a wide range of access issues, it is questionable to what 
extent general competition law, and in particular the EFD, continue to play a 
practical role in the regulation of access. A number of issues formerly 
addressed by the EFD are now covered by the New Access and 
Interconnection Regime. 26 Thus far, the EFD has at least influenced the 
regulation of access, in that actions taken by NRAs under the access 
regulatory regime are required to be consistent with competition law, i.e. the 
principles established under Article 82 EC by the Commission or the ECJ 
with regard to access to essential facilities. Furthermore, as Article 82 EC is 
directly effective in the Member States, third parties may continue to use 
Article 82 EC and the EFD to gain access in private litigation. This will be of 
particular importance whenever Member States have not, or have not fully, 
implemented sector-specific rules. 27 The EFD could also be used as an 
instrument to gain access in cases which are not covered by the New 
Regulatory Framework. For example, as the New Regulatory Framework 
does not cover content services, cases concerning access to radio and TV 
broadcasting content, or web-based content, may still be dealt with under the 
EFD.28 
24See Ch.5, ftn.7 
25See also the US Supreme Court in Verizon Communications (see Ch.3, ftn.76) where it 
held that "essential facility claims should ... be denied where a state or federal agency has 
effective power to compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms". 
26Garzaniti quotes as an example the right of mobile operators to install microwave links on 
their competitors' base station, which has traditionally been viewed as an essential facilities 
problem, but which may today fall under the regulatory regime (see Garzaniti, Oxford 2003,p. 
313) 
27Garzaniti, (Oxford, 2003),p. 544 
28ibid, p. 314 
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3. Assessment of the "dual regime" 
For the liberalization of the telecoms sector in the 1990s, the dual regime of 
sector-specific regulation and competition law applied by the Commission 
had proved very successful, giving a general precedence to sector-specific 
regulation. In most cases, the sector-specific regulation seems to have been 
sufficient to deal with the issues that have arisen. In major cases where 
proceedings had been opened under competition rules, the Commission has 
tended to stay those proceedings whenever sector-specific proceedings at 
EU or national level were likely to resolve the issue.29 The 1990s have been 
characterized by an exceptional boom in the telecommunications sector. 30 
Most of the goals set in the policy papers underlying the 1998 liberalization 
package have been reached, namely: successful liberalization and market 
restructuring; increased efficiency; and innovation. The sector has witnessed 
an unprecedented expansion in the markets for mobile services and within 
the Internet market, which has attracted substantial support from capital 
markets for the restructuring of telecoms markets.31 Since 1 January 1998, 
prices for international and long-distance calls have fallen by an average of 
35%. Consumer choice and quality of service have increased dramatically.32 
However, in 2000 and 2001, the sector seemed to be undergoing a major 
crisis, or, as the Commission put it, "a severe adjustment process".33 Many of 
the new market entrants simply disappeared, and established market 
operators were saddled with huge debts. When economic growth slowed, 
expected revenues did not materialize. This led to a decline in stock market 
valuations and to the postponement of investment, at a critical time both for 
the sector and the wider economy_34 These difficulties were also felt in 
29See Mob1le Interconnect proceedings: Press Release IP/98/707, 27. 7.1998, which 
concerned an inquiry by the Commission into interconnection charges between fixed and 
mobile operators. See also Accounting Rate proceedings: Press Release IP/98/763, 
13/08/1998 which concerned accounting rates charged to terminate international calls 
30Larouche ,P., What went wrong: The European Perspective, (TILC Discussion Paper 2003), 
~-4 1H. Ungerer, Introduction of competition in the communications market- The European 
Experience, (Rio de Janeiro, 2001), p.4 
32
"b"d 4 I I ., p. 
33Commission Communication: The Road to the Knowledge Economy (see Ch.1, ftn.2) 
34
"b"d 1 I I ., p. 
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neighbouring sectors, such as that for communications equipment and media 
content, and in the financial sector, which had heavily invested in the 
communications industry. The high licence fees paid by operators for 
frequencies reserved for third-mobile services (UMTS) worsened the 
operators' financial situation.35 Another cause of the dire state of the 
communications sector seems to have been the unexpected resilience of the 
incumbent communications operators. With respect to fixed local 
communications in particular, incumbents usually hold more than 90% of the 
market, whereas in other areas their share is usually around 50%.36 Delays 
in the unbundling of the local loop have given incumbents a comfortable head 
start in the provision of broadband Internet access.37 The development of 
broadband services constitutes an important source of revenue growth, both 
for fixed line communication companies and for cable operators, who are 
facing stagnating demand for their other services.38 However, according to 
the Commission's latest Report on the Implementation of the EU electronic 
Communications Regulatory Package, the sector is now on its way to 
recovery. 39 Improved financial conditions, combined with continued growth in 
the revenue from services, have created the conditions for the sector to 
recover.40 In 2003, the sector experienced a modest rate of expansion with 
revenues having increased by 2.6%, most of which can be attributed to the 
services sector: in particular, mobile services as well as broadband41 and 
Internet services.42 
The deadline for implementing the new regulatory framework expired on 25 
July 2003. Both the implementation process in the Member States, and the 
economic crisis suffered by the sector at the beginning of the new 
millennium, have once again triggered a controversial debate about the "best 
possible way" to reach the commonly-shared objective of sustainable 
competition. Predictably, most operators call for an end to sector-specific 
35ibid. 
36
"Eighth Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package" COM (2000) 695 ( 3 December 2002), 15-17 
37ibid. 29-32 
38 1 See Ch. , ftn.2, p.4 
39Ninth Report on the Implementation of the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Package, supra n.1, p., 4 
4
°Commission Communication: Connecting Europe at High Speed, see Ch.1, ftn.6 
41 By October 2003 there were nearly 20 million broadband connections in Europe: however, 
broadband growth in the best-performing Member States shows signs of levelling off (see 
Ch.1, ftn.6, p. 4-5) 
42
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regulation, while regulators maintain that regulation is preferable to 
competition law. It has been argued that the specific characteristics that 
made sector-specific regulation necessary in the telecoms sector are no 
longer present, or at least exercise less influence. For example, due to 
digitalization, as non-voice services can be provided at lower cost over a 
variety of access mediums (such as cable TV, Internet or Satellite), the entry 
barrier of high sunk costs is no longer universally applicable. 
The convergence of telecommunications and media (both highly regulated 
sectors) with the IT sector (which has developed in the absence of specific 
regulation), has called into question the need for continued sector-specific 
regulation in the communications sector altogether. As a result of this 
convergence, there could be an increasing number of cases which are not 
covered by the ex-ante regulatory regime. In particular, the convergence of 
once separate sectors may make market definition increasingly difficult.43 
Therefore, competition law, which applies across sectors, may have to deal 
with an increasing number of issues. In this sense, although the EFD has 
clear deficiencies, as explained above, it may again play an increasing role in 
the regulation of the sector.44 
The New Regulatory Framework tries to take account of these concerns, and 
provides for a gradual phasing-out of sector-specific regulation in relevant 
market segments which become fully competitive.45 It was drafted with the 
aim of providing clear boundaries within which ex-ante regulation is 
necessary and proportionate. The framework is based on the principle of 
technological neutrality, taking into account the increasing convergence of 
telecoms, broadcasting and information technology. It covers any 
communications network or service permitting transmission of signals, 
regardless of the type of information conveyed. The new Framework, in an 
unprecedented manner, incorporates competition law principles into the 
sector-specific regulation. The new framework uses the concepts of 
dominance and market definition, developed under competition law, as a 
basis for the future regulation of the sector. In this sense, the traditional 
distinction between sector-specific regulation as being ex-ante and general 
competition law as being ex post has become blurred. The Framework gives 
43Grewlich, (CMLRev 1999),p. 950 
44 ibid,p. 966 
45See, in particular, Recital27 Framework Directive (see Ch.2, ftn.4) 
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the competition law concepts of dominance and market definition a quasi-
regulatory character, by applying them ex ante as a basis for regulatory 
obligations on the part of specific undertakings. "This is an obvious hybrid, 
employing dominance without 'abuse', and market analysis which is not a-
priori case-by-case (as in competition law)."46 One of the risks of this reform 
is that, instead of introducing a more flexible competition law approach into 
telecoms regulation, the regulators will adopt a more formalistic approach to 
competition law enforcement in the sector.47 Predetermined narrow market 
definitions may not be able to deal with the difficulties connected with 
competition law analysis, which should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis.48 "The application of antitrust principles in the context of regulation 
runs a serious risk of falling victim to its own success."49 
Be that as it may, it seems to be clear that competition law has taken over the 
primary role within the regulation of the telecoms sector. There has been a 
clear move, from a mainly administrative approach to regulation, to an 
approach entirely based upon (and therefore clearly compatible with) 
competition law and practice. 5° 
Of late, the Commission has applied Article 82 EC to areas which are 
covered by sector-specific regulation. Article 82 EC can apply to such 
regulated areas if an undertaking has been left with a certain degree of 
entrepreneurial freedom, which it has abused in an anticompetitive way. 51 In 
March and May 2002, the Commission instigated investigations relating to an 
alleged abuse of a dominant position against the German and Dutch 
incumbent telecom operators Deutsche Te/ekom Ad2 and Koninlijke NV53 
Both cases concern pricing issues. Deutsche Telekom is supposed to have 
abused its dominant position by charging unfair prices for access to its local 
loop. The Koninkijke case deals with prices charged for the termination of 
telephone calls. 
46 J. Pelkmans, Making EU network markets competitive, (2001) 17 (3) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 432, p.447 
47Bavasso,(The Hague, 2004), p.116 
48ibid.,p.118 
49 ibid. 
50M. Monti ( ECTA Conference Brussels 2003) 
51 Kiotz,p. 307 
52For further details see Commission Press Release IP/02/686 of 8 May 2002 
53For further details see Commission Press Release IP/02/482 of 27 May 2002 
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This shows clearly that despite the existence of a sophisticated regime of 
sector-specific regulation, general competition law is able to deal with market 
failures in the telecommunications market. However, there are counter-
examples. 
One such example is that of the liberalization of the telecommunications 
market in New Zealand, which shows that negative consequences can arise 
if general competition law is mainly used in order to regulate a newly 
liberalized market. Endless antitrust litigation concerning the terms of 
interconnection, between the incumbent operator and new entrants, forced 
the New Zealand government to introduce a certain degree of sector-specific 
regulation covering network access and interconnection. 54 
Another example is the unbundling of the local loop in the EC. Although 
Article 82 EC, and the EFD in particular, can be applied to gain access to the 
local loop,55 competition law proved to be insufficient to deal with the 
incumbent dominance in the local access markets. The competitiveness of 
the local access market only increased when additional legislation requiring 
unbundling (the ULL Regulation) was introduced. According to Larouche, 
competition law cannot give a conclusive answer to the question of whether 
to favour service-or infrastructure-based competition, i.e. whether or not to 
support the full unbundling of the local loop: " ... competition law cannot alone 
determine the appropriate mix of incentives that might achieve the desired 
balance between innovation and competitiveness."56 
It should also be noted that the use of competition law principles, such as the 
EFD in the area of access to networks, might prove to be as restrictive as, or 
even more restrictive than, sector-specific regulation. In addition, the question 
of what is an essential facility in the telecoms sector requires a careful 
economic case-by-case analysis. Due to rapid technological change, what 
can be regarded as an "essential facility" today, may well be substitutable 
with an alternative facility tomorrow. It is therefore questionable whether, in 
an environment of convergence and platform independence, a certain 
network constitutes an essential facility in all circumstances. At present, for 
54 For more details see Webb and Taylor, Light-handed regulation of telecommunications in 
New Zealand: Is generic competition law sufficient?, (1998/99) 2 International Journal of 
Communications Law and Policy 
55for the application of the EFD to access to the local loop, see Vinje /Kalimo 
56Larouche,(Oxford 2000),p. 329 
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example, no satisfactory actual or potential alternative has been established 
for the local loop. However, it will be necessary to review, constantly, whether 
the traditional fixed telephone network still constitutes a 'bottleneck', access 
to which is essential for competitors, or whether the local access market 
should be regarded as competitive, because of the use of alternative 
connection methods with a similar coverage to the local loop. 
As market structures become more competitive, with the market power of the 
incumbents subsiding, sector-specific regulation should be gradually phased 
out in favour of increased reliance on competition rules. 57 
The establishment of a sector-specific regulatory regime in EC 
telecommunications was due to a number of economic factors. These factors 
require regular assessment in order to judge whether sector-specific 
regulation is still necessary. Convergence may open opportunities for 
network competition. In such a changing economic environment, the role of 
sector-specific regulation needs to be reviewed constantly. 
However, it is important that any transition from sector-specific regulation to 
general competition law should occur gradually, and only in areas where 
sustainable competition has been achieved. Phasing out regulation too early 
by relying on competition law alone would create considerable risks for both 
new entrants and the regulated operators. Instead, it is important that 
competition law is applied alongside regulation and that both are being 
enforced in a consistent manner. As Commissioner Monti said: 
"I believe that what really matters is not that regulation as an instrument is 
abandoned completely and too soon, but that the approach to regulation is 
consistent with the approach of antitrust analysis and enforcement."58 He 
adds later that: "the only type of regulation which can foster the development 
of self-sustaining competitive market conditions is the regulation which is 
solidly grounded on the same set of principles of which competition policy 
makes use."59 
However, there is a distinction between economic regulation, which includes 
access regulation, and regulation to safeguard public interests (not only such 
interests as privacy, security and public safety, but also affordable pricing of, 
57 other Larouche, who does not believe that the telecoms market can be governed solely by 
competition law, (Larouche,Oxford 2000, p.322-440) 
58M. Monti,( ECTA Conference, Brussels, 2003] 
59
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and universal access, to communications services). Because of the non-
economic nature of these issues, their protection cannot be fully achieved by 
the application of competition rules. Thus, even if economic regulation is 
gradually phased-out, social regulation must remain in place to protect 
public interests.60 
60Bavasso, ( CMLRev 2004),p. 87 
Garzaniti, (Oxford, 2003),p. 548 
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